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ABSTRACT 
 
Comparative Direct Democracy: A Study of  
Institutions and Individuals 
 
By 
 
Donald D. Mirjanian 
 
Dr. John Tuman, Examination Committee Chair 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
 Do institutions matter? This dissertation examines the role of institutions in the 
context of comparative direct democracy.  Through an institutionalist framework, this 
study considers how the context in which the mechanism of direct democracy is first 
introduced has an impact on later usage, and how individuals operate when constrained 
by those very institutions. In particular, I examine the cases of Italy, France, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela and find that the inclusion of direct democracy mechanisms (most 
commonly, the referendum device) is more likely to occur when previously excluded 
“out-groups” participate in constitutional formation. In addition, I find that institutional 
design is an important (but not a universal) factor in understanding referendum outcomes 
(in particular, in explaining frequency). Finally, I argue that the rational choice 
perspective does not fully explain individual level motivations of political elites, and that 
an interweaving of prospect theory and the cybernetic theory of decision-making better 
explains how elites operate when constrained by institutions. Along the way, I develop a 
theoretical approach that may be utilized to better evaluate direct democracy outcomes 
across political systems.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Can citizens (including political elites) be trusted with the responsibility of 
directly enacting public policy? While this question forms the underlying basis of this 
dissertation, the question clearly presupposes several aspects of the political arena: that 
the context of citizens enacting public policy allows for information symmetry among 
participants; that the political institutions of a given state allow for policy transformation 
and aggregation without placing an undue burden on the participants; more generally, 
that a sense of legitimacy surrounds the process.  While the focus of direct democracy is 
often on the role of individuals – whether it be the individuals seeking an “end-around” 
entrenched legislative or executive powers, or elites seeking the legitimation of powers – 
the role of institutions in the process has become less important.    
 To that end, this dissertation examines the behavior of individuals acting within 
institutions. In particular, this dissertation examines three key questions: first, under what 
circumstances is the mechanism of direct democracy introduced within a state in the first 
place? Secondly, to what degree does the institutional design affect later usage? Finally, 
how much influence do individuals working within institutions have on direct democracy 
outcomes? 
 To properly analyze these questions, I offer the following hypotheses: first, the 
historical context in which direct democracy is introduced in a given state is crucial to its 
later usage, and that historical institutionalism holds explanatory power in terms of how it 
constrains the choices of individuals and actors who must work within them at some 
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point in the future (generally as a function of the critical juncture in which it was 
created). Secondly, and in consideration of those individuals, the choices such individuals 
make are guided not by ranked preferences, but rather by the loss/gain analysis offered by 
prospect theory, and within the bounds of institutional arrangements.  
Theoretical Framework 
Do institutions matter? The broad question justifies an affirmative answer; the 
process of understanding the nuanced impact that institutions have on procedural 
democracy is the general purpose of this dissertation. The dissertation will focus on 
several issues. However, the key research question is threefold: in what way does the 
formation of an institution direct, predict, or influence its later usage; secondly, do 
variations in the institutional structure affect the likelihood that direct democracy will be 
used? Finally, to what degree to individuals have an impact on outcomes?  Current 
research related to direct democracy does not consider the context in which the 
mechanism for direct democracy was introduced as a predictor of outcomes; moreover, 
the unintended consequences as a function of the introductory context are also 
underdeveloped. Finally, while empirical research has focused on variance in institutional 
structure as a determinant of usage, such research is either limited to individual country 
studies, and does not consider such effects across countries within a region, nor across 
time. Considerable attention has been given to the role of individuals working to speed or 
slow change via the referendum; this study continues that focus, but also argues that the 
role of institutions has been increasingly neglected.  
The role of institutions in the political process can be considered along that of 
individuals in the political process. In this context, the question initially becomes that of 
3 
 
which “matters” more: institutions or individuals? Do individuals create institutions 
according to their preferred outcomes and act accordingly? Perhaps more pointedly, are 
individuals able to work within the confines of the institutions to achieve their objective, 
or are they able to alter the structure of the (what should be, be definition) inherently 
stable institutions to achieve their objectives?  On the other side of this equation is the 
focus on institutions: do institutions limit the ability of actors to operate within the 
political process? Finally, is it possible that individuals and institutions work in concert to 
achieve political objectives? 
The overarching purpose of this dissertation is to examine the institution of direct 
democracy at a comparative level; a secondary purpose, however, is to consider the 
theoretical foundations of institutionalism and test its strength in explaining the relevance 
of institutions in the political process. Toward that end, I offer here a brief overview of 
the theoretical literature relevant to institutions and individual-level behavior.  
Throughout the middle part of the 20th century, the search for methodological and 
theoretical rigor provided the impetus to move towards alternative explanations grounded 
in rational choice and behavioralism. No longer was the focus on the importance of 
institutions, but rather, on the micro-level approach of individuals and their actions. Both 
behavioralism and rational choice perspectives assumed that the individual could and did 
act autonomously, and that choices could be made without constraints imposed from 
above by formal or informal institutions. Such a view considered that all political 
phenomena reflect the decisions of individual actors and those individual decisions are 
made exogenously to the political process. In particular, Downs (1957) argued that a 
rational individual can certainly make a decision when confronted with alternatives by 
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following utility maximization tenets, while Mayhew (1974) argues that individual 
members engage in activities that help achieve reelection. Fenno (1978) argues along 
similar lines. For Mayhew and Fenno especially, and Downs to considerable degree, the 
focus is on individuals rather than formal institutions (such as Congress as a whole) or 
informal institutions (such as parties).  Buchanan and Tullock (1962) also consider the 
rational choice perspective and the importance of the individual, and in particular, the 
“representative or average” individual; Ordeshook (1993) would later argue that the 
perspective has led to a reintegration of politics and economics under a a common 
paradigm” (76). Perhaps even more notably, Riker (1990: 177-178) argues that the 
rational choice perspective accounts for “the only genuine advances ever to occur in 
political science.”  
This dissertation does not seek to determine the efficacy of the rational choice 
paradigm, other than to argue that it is insufficient alone to account for political 
outcomes1. However, this project does seek to examine the relationship between the 
individuals and the institutions that structure their behavior. Towards this end, this 
dissertation utilizes a hybrid approach, known generally as “new institutionalism” (March 
and Olsen 1984), and within this domain, historical institutionalism.   
 March and Olsen (1984) argue that the focus on individual level behavior suffers 
from several faults. First, they argue that the state has lost its “position of centrality,” and 
instead, the literature focuses on contextual determinants, such as class structure, 
economic conditions and development, cultural aspects, and religion, which affect 
politics but “are not significantly affected by politics” (735). Secondly, they argue that 
                                                          
1 For example, Green and Shapiro  (1994) argue that the rational choice theory has been over-applied in the 
discipline of political science, and that the findings associated with rational choice theory have limited 
empirical support.  
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“reductionism” has forced individual level analysis of what should be collective 
phenomena, such as markets. Third, the authors argue that the analytical power of 
utilitarianism depends largely on unrealistic assumptions related to preferences, and that 
values other than personal values are important when considering outcomes. Fourth, the 
authors argue that the dependence on “functionalism,” (the notion that historical 
processes are efficient and move towards solutions) as a determinant is largely 
unrealistic. Finally, the authors argue that “instrumentalism” in the modern literature puts 
excess emphasis on symbols, rituals, and ceremonies that actually lack substantive value 
in terms of determining political outcomes.   
 March and Olsen (1984) cast these caveats with circumspection, and they do not 
argue to dismiss them without cause. Indeed, the authors instead argue that such analytic 
devices should be incorporated into “old institutionalism”, resulting in a “blending of 
elements of an old institutionalism into the non-institutionalist styles of recent theories of 
politics” (738).  In short, the authors argue that while society may shape politics, politics 
(and political institutions) may also help shape society – primarily by imposing various 
elements of order.  
 New institutionalism, as the name suggests, is similar in many ways in that the 
focus remains on how institutions themselves shape politics, but focuses less on the 
administrative, legal, and political structures that were once studied in a highly normative 
(and descriptive) way. Instead, new institutionalism focuses more on the “relational 
character” of institutions, or “how a given institutional configuration shapes political 
interactions” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 6).  
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Peters (1999) finds the theoretical literature on institutions can be conceptualized 
in different ways. In particular, Peters argues that a “normative institutionalism” 
espoused by March and Olsen (1984) focuses on solving the structure-agency issue 
through individual-level acceptance of the importance (and values) associated with 
institutions, and that while choices are important, they are conditioned by membership in 
political institutions. The normative aspect here derives from understanding institutions 
as creating and reinforcing long-standing values, rather formal than “rules.” Secondly, 
Peters finds that “rational choice institutionalists” also put a premium on institutions, but 
instead of focusing on norms and values as guiding factors, behaviors are rather a 
function of rules and incentives through which individuals attempt to maximize their own 
utilities. Third, Peters argues that “historical institutionalists” consider the policy choices 
that are made very early in the history of the policy itself as determinants of later policy 
decisions, which then informs its logic. Fourth, Peters finds that “empirical 
institutionalists” focus on the structure of government (e.g., presidential vs. parliamentary 
systems, or perhaps, “decision points”) to understand political processes and outcomes. In 
addition, he argues that “international institutionalism” focuses on the behavior of states 
or other international actors as a function of other international institutions or actors. 
Finally, Peters locates “societal institutionalism” as a framework focusing on the 
structuring of relationships between state and society, primarily through intermediaries 
such as groups.  
The case for “bringing the state back in” is clear: institutions are primary 
determinants of political outcomes. This dissertation focuses primarily on historical 
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institutionalism, and a brief review of its features, and the basis for its utilization over 
other methods considered here follows.2 
In general, institutionalists are “interested in the whole range of state and societal 
institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their 
relations of power to other groups” and more specifically, historical institutionalists argue 
that institutions “constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole cause of the 
outcome ”(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2). In large part, historical institutionalists 
disagreed with the structuralist-functionalist approach that the “social, psychological, or 
cultural traits of individuals” were responsible for political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 937). To further flesh out historical institutionalism, Hall and Taylor (1996)  argue 
that the relationship between institutions and individual behavior is conceptualized in 
broad terms; that the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and 
development of institutions are emphasized; that institutional development emphasizes 
path dependence and unintended consequences; and finally that historical institutionalists 
are especially concerned with the “contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas 
can make to political outcomes” (938).  
Arguing for an institutionalist perspective within international relations theory, 
Krasner (1988) notes that “the basic characteristic of an institutional argument is that 
prior institutional choices limit available future options” (72). The benefit of this 
approach lies in its usefulness over utilitarian or functionalist approaches insofar as these 
                                                          
2 A theoretical question does arise here: to what degree is historical institutionalism compatible with new 
institutionalism? New institutionalism “emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions, 
possibilities for inefficiency in history, and the importance of symbolic action to an understanding of 
politics (March and Olsen 1984), while at the same time, historical institutionalism  aids our ability to 
understand the “impact of institutions on the construction of interests….without imposing arbitrary, 
‘objective’ definitions of interests (Immergut 1998:25). Thus, the two are not mutually exclusive, insofar as 
new institutionalism does not disregard the emphasis on the autonomy of institutions, and historical 
institutionalism does not arbitrarily delineate the concept of “interests.” 
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may yield “unambiguously dysfunctional behaviors” (69), whereas the institutionalist 
approach would explain such behavior not as dysfunctional, but rather, as a product of 
prior choices. Krasner further develops the theoretical perspective by arguing the 
“tendency of patterns of behavior, norms, or formal structures to persist through time 
depends on two dimensions: vertical depth and horizontal linkage” (74). The former, he 
argues, views reality as a “social construct”, which in everyday English refers to the 
degree to which citizens share the acceptance of the institution in question. The latter 
refers to the “density of links between a particular activity and other activities” and an 
increased linkage (the inability of changing one activity without affecting another) leads 
to higher levels of institutionalization. (75)3. Perhaps most importantly, Krasner notes 
that institutions are persistent, and that while institutions may alter their own environment 
(e.g., by altering distribution of power among groups in civil society), institutions rarely 
alter established routines because of the associated costs and unpredictable outcomes; 
that path dependency is likely to determine future trajectory of developments; and 
because the horizontal links with other organizations constrain the range of institutional 
possibilities (85).  
Thus, a significant dilemma regarding historical institutionalism is that the focus 
is often on continuity, and not change. This is due mainly to the structural paradox that 
exists: while the notion of punctuated equilibrium as a method to explain change enjoys 
widespread acceptance, Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 6) note that institutions are the 
independent variable in explaining political outcomes in times of stability, but then 
become the dependent variable predicted by the very political maneuverings they once 
                                                          
3 The author points to the amendment process of the U.S. Constitution as an example of a highly 
institutionalized process; the simple promulgation of a law, however, is not.  
9 
 
predicted themselves. The authors argue that by focusing on the sources “institutional 
dynamism,” (an integral part of “new institutionalism”) researchers will be able to “look 
at how institutions mediate and filter politics [and also] turn the question around to 
demonstrate how the impact of institutions is itself mediated by the broader political 
context (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:16).  
More specifically, the authors focus on four sources of institutional dynamism: 
first, broad changes in the socioeconomic  or political context can produce a situation in 
which previously latent institutions suddenly become salient, with implications for 
political outcomes; secondly, changes in socioeconomic or political balance of power can 
produce a situation in which old institutions are put in service of different ends, as new 
actors come into play who pursue their new goals through existing institutions; third, 
exogenous changes can produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within 
existing institutions: changes in outcomes as old actors adopt new goals within the old 
institutions; and finally, political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in 
the institutions themselves.  
Another way of conceptualizing change within the institutionalist framework is 
through the exploration of “veto points.” In particular, this helps to illustrate the 
relational character of institutions in that the veto points provide “strategic openings” 
(facilitated by institutions) that actors use to achieve their goals. As defined by Thelen 
and Steinmo, “veto points” are areas of institutional vulnerability. Perhaps most 
importantly, Thelen and Steinmo argue that while veto points may be “sticky,” they are 
not permanent, and shifts in the overall balance of power can cause veto points to 
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emerge, disappear, or shift their locations, which in turn provides the aforementioned 
“strategic openings” that actors may use to achieve their goals.  
Along similar lines, Hug and Tsebelis (2002) argue that “veto players” (an 
individual or collective player whose agreement is required for a change of the status 
quo) are crucial to understanding change (or, no change) via referendums. Insofar as the 
institution of direct democracy introduces one additional veto player (essentially, the 
median voter) which in turn shifts the outcomes of legislative politics closer to the 
population median (2002:493). The referendum essentially acts as a guard against 
outcomes that would replace the status quo; the popular initiative strengthens this guard.  
 However, the focus on change necessitates consideration of individuals. 
Institutions are key components in determining outcomes; however, they cannot change 
on their own (unless purposefully designed to do so). The question remains, however: can 
individual-level decision-making theories be intertwined with historical institutionalism? 
      Weyland (2008)  argues that the theoretical underpinnings of historical 
institutionalism have, in recent years, acceded to “insistent demands of rational choice 
theorists and based their own arguments on choice-theoretic reasoning”, while at the 
same time, rational choice theorists have  “moved closer to historical institutionalism”  
(312)  through a more prevalent accordance to institutions that shape outcomes. Weyland 
argues that a synthesis approach offers a “solid and realistic, empirically grounded 
alternative” that considers the “bounded rationality” of the human psyche (333). In 
particular, Weyland argues that prospect theory can explain why individual actors bring 
about significant change to institutions. Prospect theory suggests that people who face the 
prospect of loss tend to take very bold and often risky countermeasures in an effort to 
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reduce or avoid further losses altogether. The theory further holds that individuals in such 
a dire situation will refuse to accept a limited loss, and will be more likely to gamble on a 
proposition that has a lower expected value, but ultimately, the chance of reaping greater 
rewards. This lack of a reliance on the expected utility diverges from the strict rational 
choice perspective, which holds that individuals are able to order the preferences and 
maximize their outcomes accordingly. Weyland further argues that “risk seeking in the 
domain of losses can explain drastic rescue efforts mounted by political actors seeking to 
stem political decay and restore basic institutional functioning” (287). The opposite side 
of prospect theory holds that when individuals are facing positive prospects, they tend to 
proceed with caution. Now risk averse, individuals prefer the “sure gain of limited 
magnitude over a lottery that offers greater expected value” (287), and this of course is 
not what strict rational choice theorists would posit for their actors in a given situation.  
Weyland (2008) argues that interweaving prospect theory into historical 
institutionalism and rational choice strengthens both theoretical approaches, insofar as it 
better explains the “punctuated equilibrium” driver of change within historical 
institutionalism, but also better explains the often unexpected choices of ostensibly 
rational actors as a function of risk aversion. This formulation is particularly attractive to 
Weyland in certain Latin American policy determinations, but also holds promise in the 
current analysis of direct democracy in Latin America, and Western Europe.  
However, what happens when neither “loss” nor “gains” properly frame the 
context under which individuals make decisions? Another possible theoretical 
perspective may help here. Taking rational choice theory as his point of departure, 
Steinbruner (1974) argues that a new “paradigm” is in order, as the “internal logic in 
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rational choice theory is under strain” and that “such internal strain has generally 
preceded a successful challenge to the paradigm” (12). Correctly noting that rational 
choice theory assumes excessive capacity to process extraordinary amounts of 
information, while at the same time, correctly identifying preferences and utility, 
Steinbruner argues that cybernetics “provides and analysis of extremely simple decision-
making mechanisms which are nonetheless highly successful in the proper environments” 
(13). The cybernetic theory, then, suggests that the processes of decisions are better made 
along the lines of a servomechanism: in general terms, the basic idea is that a specified 
response is pre-engineered in anticipation of particular stimuli. Using the “Watt 
governor” as an apparent proxy for high-level bureaucratic decision-makers, Steinbruner 
argues that such a process “avoids the preference ordering, the explicit calculations of 
alternatives and outcomes, and the optimizing process which form the core of the analytic 
paradigm” (53). Thus, the idea is to simplify the process for the decision-maker, insofar 
as a decision-maker is like a servomechanism and has the ability to determine their 
systems-level output in accordance with set standards and input variation among those 
standards: “the cybernetic thesis then is that the decision mechanisms screen out 
information which the established set of responses are not programmed to accept” (57).   
An important component of the cybernetic theory is that of values. Briefly, 
Steinbruner suggests that instead of trying to integrate values, the cybernetic theory 
separates values and thus “the mind actively but subjectively resolves uncertainty 
because of its universal tendency to generalize” and from here (this notion is known as 
cognitive theory) the servomechanism operates by confining the problem structure as 
defined to the decision-maker (cf. 130-136). The value separation, the author argues, 
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exists in a systematic (though not necessarily scientific manner) insofar as rationality and 
logic assume a prominent role.  The notion that this concept approaches analytic theory is 
not missed by the author, as he suggests that cognitive theory, when used in supplement 
to cybernetic theory “expects a constrained learning process which develops partial but 
general models of the environment as required by the analytic paradigm, but which does 
not evolve in the manner predicted by that paradigm’ (139).  
 On its face, such a theoretical approach may not seem useful to the study of direct 
democracy. However, insofar as the referendum component of direct democracy 
generally includes political elites working within the confines of the institution of direct 
democracy as whole, the approach may yield insights towards understanding the 
decision-making process of that individual. In several instances of referendum politics, 
referendums are mandatory, in which case such an approach is obviously not a wise 
choice. However, the majority of cases discussed in this work involve referendums as a 
matter of choice: support by individual political elites, parties, or parliaments; in other 
cases, initiatives from the people directly. Thus, in an effort to better evaluate the 
decision-making process of those involved in both referendums and initiatives, I 
incorporate this approach.  
Theory Building for the Current Study 
To put this all together, I offer the following summary: First, I hold that the 
historical institutionalist perspective is useful in helping to understand why institutions 
are created in the first place. That is, the historical context is crucial to the outcome. 
Historical institutionalism also holds explanatory power in explaining why institutions 
are “sticky”; that is, why they often constrain the choices of individuals and actors who 
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must work within them at some point in the future. After all, a defining feature of an 
institution is that it is not peculiar to any individuals who operate within it at a given time 
(e.g, institutions persist; lest they would not be considered institutions). The path 
dependent nature of institutions within the institutionalist framework is, thus – in my 
opinion – neither a defining feature nor a causal variable. Rather, path dependency is 
simply a descriptor of historical institutionalism, and scholars who place more emphasis 
on path dependency as an inherent problem with historical institutionalism are simply 
placing too much weight on the concept as an instrumental variable, rather than viewing 
it as what it is: an indicator of the presence of institutions. In addition, “critical 
junctures”4 should also be considered descriptive rather than causal: the formation of 
institutions, regardless of the intention of the actors creating the institutions, constitutes a 
critical juncture in and of itself; it is not axiomatic that simply because intention came 
before creation, creation creates outcomes. The institution itself predicts outcomes. This 
notion leads to the final point: the debate among historical institutionalists as to the 
independent, causal variable is the unintended consequence of the institution itself. The 
consequences of the creation of the institution create the basis for eventual change (the 
“x” factor); that individuals are unable to predict the future suggests that consequences 
are unintended. In other words, it is the institution, and the context in which it was 
created that dictates future outcomes – and not the rational (or irrational, for that matter) 
choice of political elites, parties, or parliaments.  Secondary to this notion is the fact that 
actors are (1) constrained by the institutions created, and (2) that the changes they make 
are based on the consequences of the context in which they act (though, such 
                                                          
4 It should also be noted that this exercise in theory-building holds that critical junctures are antecedent to 
the creation of institutions – later changes, alterations, modifications, etc. are not considered critical 
junctures.  
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consequences are – of course – limited by the context of the creation of the institution 
itself) In short, excessive “causality” has been given to individuals over institutions, and 
this dissertation seeks to reestablish the proper role of institutions as superior to the role 
of individuals.  
Secondly, to the degree that individuals do have an impact on outcomes I contend 
that the decision-making paradigm is a combination of the cybernetic model of decision-
making offered by Steinbruner (1974) and the synthesis of rational choice/prospect 
theory offered by Weyland (1996). That is, Steinbruner’s approach avoids the preference-
ordering called for by rational choice theorists; in addition, Steinbruner argues that 
individuals (for our purposes, elites with decision-making capabilities) have set 
standards, and that their decisions are reactions along a servo-mechanism 
conceptualization in relation to those standards. As the input changes, the reaction of the 
decision-maker changes based on (1) the standards of the individual and (2) the structure 
of the institution in which the decision-maker operates. Thus, the key factor in the 
equation becomes the capabilities of the decision-maker in a given situation: he is 
constrained by competing institutions (e.g., a legislature, direct democracy mechanisms, a 
bureaucracy, or perhaps a military) as well as the standards by which that decision-maker 
operates (e.g., are his goals self-oriented, or does he seek collective action that benefits 
the community?). When faced with a loss/gain scenario, certainly these factors play a role 
as well; however, in this instance, prospect theory will also play a developmental role. 
Scholarly research finds prospect theory a credible explanatory approach when working 
in the domains of loss; however there are two problems here: first, what constitutes a 
perceived “loss”, or the “fear of loss” is debatable. Secondly, not all situations (even in 
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politics) are situated along a gain/loss scenario, and as such, prospect theory is 
incomplete as a conceptual framework.  
Thus, institutions are created as a result of critical junctures, the context of which 
is important to understanding later outcomes (though not necessarily as a causal 
explanation). The causal explanation (assuming the dependent variable is conceptualized 
as “alteration” or “change” in a given system) is the choices made by rational actors who, 
unable to logically order their preferences or choose accordingly, instead operate within a 
sort of servo-mechanism, in which their choices are guided  (forced?) by individual 
standards5 and bounded by the institutions that constrain them. In extreme cases, 
punctuated equilibrium does result, but is better explained by the dynamics of prospect 
theory.  
The remaining question, of course is this: how does this fit into the realm of direct 
democracy? The current study seeks to identify recurring examples: that the introduction 
of direct democracy in a political system, and cast definitively in a constitution is a 
function of the participation of out-groups (Condition 1, or C1); that the later usage of 
referendums is dependent upon (1) historical institutional design (HI1) and (2) the role of 
political elites in the process (P1), where (P1) are conditioned by (HI1) as well as by the 
tenets of the prospect theory/cybernetic theory of decision making discussed above 
(PC1).   
                                                          
5 The concept of “standards” is admittedly quite fuzzy. A plausible distinction here would be the range of 
outcomes a decision-maker is willing to accept. A capitalist would not be willing to accept orthodox 
Marxist policies; a leader committed to the rule of law would not fall victim to corruption (and vice-versa). 
The wide parameters here also indicate that a partisan decision-maker would and could seek policies 
adverse to his own partisan agenda such that his standards are not compromised (e.g., he holds power 
without compromising standards).  
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Thus, the theoretical approach developed here will be applied to case studies in an 
effort to determine the (1) existence/nonexistence of “out-groups”6 during the formation 
of governing constitutions, with the hypothesis that such out-groups are a common 
feature associated with inclusion of the referendum device; (2) that later usage is a 
function of institution design but are also a function of the role of political elites in the 
process. In this sense I argue that institutional design (primarily operationalized as the 
availability of the device as well as difficulty in achieving the ballot) will certainly 
influence the amount of referendums appearing on a ballot; however, institutional design 
is insufficient alone as a predictor of outcomes: the role of political elites (for the 
purposes of this study, elites are considered to be those individuals primarily responsible 
for access to the ballot for referendums, or those interested in slowing access to the ballot 
for referendums). Finally, the role of political elites (and thus outcomes facilitated by 
elites) are conditioned by institutional design, but also by the tenets of prospect theory 
(which suggests that when facing a “loss” scenario, elites will increase risk while seeking 
larger returns, and while risk averse as a function of not facing a “loss” scenario, seek to 
marginally improve returns, or at the minimum, hold their current gains); when neither 
loss nor gain properly frames the scenario, I contend that the pragmatism of the 
cybernetic theory of decision-making offers a better explanation than that of rational 
choice when understanding outcomes as a function of individual-level behavior.  
 
 
                                                          
6 Operationalizing the term “out-group” is inherently problematic; however, I follow Barczak (2001), who 
argues that “out-groups” can be conceptualized as “previously excluded interests ….able to capture a share 
of the reform-rewriting process” , and similarly a “political outsider who had successfully harnessed 
popular aggravation over a history of political exclusion” (39).  
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Research Design | Chapter Overview 
In an effort to advance the literature on direct democracy, I focus this theoretical 
application on cases from both Europe and Latin America. Such an approach invites a 
qualitative method, as the context must be fully considered. An important consideration 
for historical institutionalists is that of “unintended consequences” as a result of 
contextual formation, and once again, a qualitative approach will utilize historical 
institutionalism in an effort to determine this model’s strength in predicting such 
consequences.  
I begin by utilizing the historical institutionalist approach to consider how the 
political context (in particular, constitutional formation) helps to predict the availability 
of direct democracy to a state. This dissertation examines constitutional origins with the 
notion that inclusion of direct democracy (and in particular, the referendum) is more 
likely to occur when once-marginalized interests are included in the formation of a new 
constitution or regime. This follows Barczak (2001) who considers this notion to a 
limited Latin American set of cases; my work seeks to extend this to the European and 
other Latin American cases. 
Chapter two comprises a literature review with a dual purpose. First, the chapter 
seeks to review the literature on referendum politics in and at the same time, organize the 
review into three parts: literature related referendum politics within the context of 
constitutional formation; referendum politics as a function of institutional design, and 
also a review of literature related to the campaigns of referendums themselves. Secondly, 
the literature review also serves as a broad-based view (rather than an in-depth qualitative 
analysis) of the hypothesis discussed above: in other words, I will examine (briefly) 
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several cases of constitutional development in Europe and Latin America in an effort to 
examine the variables discussed in the theoretical foundations section above. Though a 
traditional literature review would be focused solely on a review of the literature and not 
an application of the theoretical foundations to the case studies, I argue this approach is 
beneficial for two reasons: first, the literature does discuss (in superficial terms) this 
process, and thus its inclusion is warranted; secondly, in an effort to alleviate an inherent 
problem in qualitative research (selecting on the dependent variable), the cases reviewed 
in the literature review will serve to supplement the four cases studies that are the main 
focus of this work. Thus, the dissertation considers four cases (Italy, France, Uruguay and 
Venezuela) in detail and several other cases from Europe and Latin America more 
superficially.  
Chapter three focuses on referendum usage in Italy and France. The discussion 
here begins with the historical context in which the referendum was initially introduced 
into both the Italian and French political systems in an effort to show how such a context 
predicts later referendum usage. At the same time, the chapter considers other relevant 
variables, such as institutional design of the referendum device in Italy, the role of parties 
in the Italian political system, the role of the Constitutional Court, and of course, the role 
of political elites. The inherent nature of French politics requires a greater focus on the 
role of the presidency, and insofar as the large majority of referendums occurred during 
the Charles De Gaulle era, the chapter focuses on his role in referendum usage and 
outcomes. The chapter concludes with an application of the theoretical foundations 
discussed above to the Italian and French cases, and finds that the context in which the 
institution of direct democracy was introduced in large part explains its later use; at the 
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same time, the role of political elites who are thus constrained by institutional 
development play a minor role: certainly, the have some agency, but that agency is 
limited by the boundaries set by institutional design. The fact that such agency is limited 
suggests that institutions are the primary causal agent of change, rather than individuals.  
The purpose of chapter four is to once again apply the theoretical foundations 
discussed here to additional cases: Uruguay and Venezuela. I begin with a discussion of 
the formation of the institution of direct democracy within the Uruguayan system and in 
particular, a focus on the work of Uruguayan President José Batlle y Ordóñez in 
introducing referendum politics to Uruguay. Certainly, Batlle’s legacy is far-reaching in 
Uruguayan politics, and thus, the focus of the chapter is on his work. Finally, the case of 
Venezuela is examined for similar patterns. I begin by examining the context in which 
the governing constitution was created (this occurrence is much more recent than the 
other cases, occurring in 1999), and also examine the role of institutional design as well 
as that of political elites (primarily Hugo Chávez).  The research will be informed 
primarily by secondary historical sources that focus on the political context of the times, 
and primary sources where applicable and available; prior works (e.g., Skocpol 1979 and 
1992; Thelen 2004) utilizing historical institutionalism will serve as a “guide” in terms of 
the qualitative path. Such cases will also be examined for aspects of unintended 
consequences.   
Chapter five will serve two purposes: first, to weave together the multiple ideas 
discussed in the first four chapters; secondly, to offer a review of the limitations of the 
current study and possible suggestions for future research.  
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Thus, chapters two, three and four will examine case studies in effort to locate the 
primary condition of out-group inclusion in original constitutional development (C1, 
discussed above), and its presence is dichotomous – it is either there, or not there. At the 
same time, the chapters will examine later usage (in general usage/non-usage terms) in an 
effort to determine whether the primary variable was historical institutional design (HI1) 
or the role of political elites in the process (P1), and the degree to which their role was 
conditioned by HI1 and/or  prospect theory/cybernetic theories of decision-making 
(PC1). If the hypotheses suggested prove true, then usage is a function of C1, HI1 and P1, 
with P1 conditioned by PC1. If the hypotheses suggested do not prove correct, then 
creation in a given system would occur without C1, usage would occur without regard to 
HI1, and without the impact of P1, irrespective of PC1. Thus, if the study evaluates cases 
more commonly associated with the former, a systematic evaluation of referendum 
politics can be assumed; if the latter process occurs more commonly, the remaining 
conclusions is that institutions are largely irrelevant, and that the politics of direct 
democracy occur independently of established norms.  
Case Selection 
 The theoretical foundation suggested above is capable of being applied to any 
case study in which referendum politics exist (or for that matter, do not exist, as a 
function of C1). Thus, a sampling frame could, theoretically, be drawn from a population 
made up of all political systems. Such an examination would be better suited to a 
quantitative analysis, and such a study should be undertaken at a future time. However, 
the present study is qualitative in nature, and designed to examine the nuances of the 
cases selected. However, regardless of the intent, the selected cases were not drawn 
22 
 
randomly; and while random selection is generally the condition for valid inferences, 
“such inferences can be made by a sample selected by some rule not correlated with the 
dependent variable” (Geddes 1990:135). Such that the dependent variable in this case is 
(1) existence of the institution of direct democracy and (2) its later usage, I have 
attempted to adhere to Geddes’ condition (1990) by selecting matched pairs of study: 
Italy and France, and Uruguay and Venezuela. In the first pair, France has a long history 
of referendum politics with limited use, while Italy has a shorter history of referendum 
politics with considerably greater usage. In addition, this pair serves the “most similar” 
approach in terms of degree of democratic values, and also “most different” approach in 
the sense of a stronger parliamentary system (Italy) and a stronger presidential system 
(France). Within the Latin American context, systems that consistently utilize direct 
democracy are rare, with Uruguay being the exception to the general rule. Uruguay has 
also experienced a greater degree of democratic practices than other systems, and at the 
same time, has experienced numerous constitutions – some with, and some without the 
institution of direct democracy. The Venezuelan system has rarely utilized the institution 
of direct democracy, and at the same time, has undergone a significant transition over the 
last ten years – a transition focused (as Chávez argues) on the bringing the people into the 
process. 
It is worth repeating that the theoretical framework could be applied to any 
political system, and in that sense, the problem of selecting cases on the dependent 
variable is mitigated here. Each of the cases presented here have the institution of direct 
democracy as part of their existing constitution: such a study would be futile otherwise, 
and to this degree, some selection on the dependent variable is necessary. As King, 
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Keohane and Verba (1994) argue, random selection is not always the ultimate goal in 
qualitative research, though selection should “allow for the possibility of at least some 
variation on the dependent variable” (1994:129). In the cases presented here, extensive 
variation occurs in each of these dependent variables in terms of institutional constructs, 
both in terms of the systems of governance as well as the availability of the referendum 
device. The literature review intends also to help alleviate this concern by applying the 
theoretical approach outlined here in multiple cases, though in a more superficial manner 
than the case studies that follows.  
At the same time, the independent variables here include the presence of “out-
groups” at the time of the drafting of the constitution, which can be identified as groups 
who had been traditionally excluded prior to the drafting  of the constitution in question 
(Barczak 2001); institutional design (the “rules of the game” – signature requirements, 
quorum thresholds, and the degree to which referendums can be initiated by both the 
government and the people, or by only one of the two); and finally, the role of political 
elites in the process. Certainly, this variable presents operationalization difficulties 
insofar at the variable does not remain constant – it changes as a function of the 
individual responds to the political environment. Nonetheless, the variable is centered on 
the boundaries of the earlier-discussed prospect theory/cybernetic theory of decision-
making, which allows for inferences to be drawn: either the decisions of the political elite 
can be explained by such a theoretical approach, or it cannot. That is to say, the 
independent variable is limited in its approach in an effort to explain outcomes; 
falsifiability is, in other words, still an option. Insofar as variation exists in the dependent 
variable, inference problems are mitigated; bias as a function of causal variable 
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correlation with the dependent variable is not a concern because such bias is accounted 
for in the dependent variable selections (King, Keohane and Verba 1994:137). . In 
addition, each of the cases here vary on the value of the independent variable as well, as 
variance occurs in institutional design, the role of the political elites, as well as the 
presence of “out-groups”  at the time that constitutions affecting direct democracy 
originated. The research forming the analysis of these independent variables is developed 
from the secondary literature on the topic in each given case.  
 
Table 1: Overview of Variables for Matched-Pair Study 
 ITALY FRANCE URUGUAY VENEZUELA 
Governance 
Parliamentary 
(strong multi-
party) 
Semi-presidential 
system (weak 
multi-party) 
Presidential system 
(strong multi-party, 
though long 
dominated by two 
parties) 
Presidential 
system (weak 
multi-party) 
Mechanisms 
of Direct 
Democracy 
Government 
and Citizen-
Initiated 
Government-
Initiated 
Government and 
Citizen-Initiated 
Government 
and Citizen-
Initiated 
Qualification 
Difficulty Low High Low Low 
Direct 
Democracy 
Usage 
Frequent Infrequent Frequent Infrequent 
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Individual referendum data are taken primarily from the Centre for Research on 
Direct Democracy (cited throughout this study as C2D). The Centre for Research on 
Direct Democracy offers a worldwide database of national-level referendums including 
frequency of use (dating back to the 1800s), type of referendum (citizen-initiated or 
government-initiated; binding or facultative, etc), subject information, background 
materials, turnout levels, and total vote percentages. The Centre is a digital archive 
managed by the University of Zurich7.  
Benefits of Study 
The dissertation is expected to advance the literature in several ways. First, it 
separates much of the fuzzy definitions and logic used by historical institutionalists, 
rational institutionalists, and rational choice theorists. Throughout much of the literature, 
there seems to be a trend towards using “critical junctures”, “unintended consequences” 
and “institutional stickiness” in an arbitrary fashion (mainly, when it suits the needs of 
the scholar). There also seems to be considerable disagreement as to when the institution 
can be considered an independent variable or a dependent variable, vis-a-vis the actors 
involved. Secondly, the approach clarifies the role of actors in the process. Certainly, the 
relationship between institutions and actors must be considered in tandem; institutions do 
not operate on their own any more than actors operate without the constraint of 
institutions. Along these same lines, the approaches clarifies the process of change within 
institutions, holding that change is the result of actors responding to stimuli within the 
confines of their own institutions, and when faced with risk, operate according to the 
                                                          
7 http://www.c2d.ch/index.php. As stated by C2D: “The c2d is an academic research center dedicated to the 
study of direct democratic institutions (referendum and initiative) around the world, their history, legal 
nature, functioning and political implications. It aims at running an international database, promoting 
interdisciplinary scientific research, organising conferences and providing services.” 
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guidelines of prospect theory. 8 Third, past and current literatures do not focus on how 
the context surrounding the introduction of referendum mechanisms informs its effects on 
later political outcomes. While Barczak (2001) and Altman (2011) both argue that 
formation is an important aspect (and these authors disagree over its importance), neither 
consider the path dependence aspect inherent in the historical institutionalist perspective. 
This study focuses on such aspects. Finally, the approach offers explanatory value in 
understanding outcomes as a function of the arena as a whole, rather than on either the 
institutions or the actors involved; moreover, the cultural aspect is not ignored insofar as 
institutional creation encompasses cultural components as does the “standards” of the 
decision-maker. Though a top-down approach, the approach is still useful insofar as most 
outcomes are the result of the top-down approach taken by elites (even in the case of 
direct democracy).  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 The question that naturally arises here is whether or not “standards” are part of the prospect theory 
approach. In other words, do decision-makers abandon their standards when operating within the prospect 
theory framework? Though this could certainly use a more detailed explanation, I would offer that prospect 
theory is not incompatible with the “standards” of decision-maker as I have tried to define “standards” here. 
That is, the notion that decision-makers may “gamble” on a much riskier endeavor in an effort to mitigate 
losses (while at the same time, foregoing certain, albeit smaller, losses) can fit within the boundaries of an 
acceptable “standard”.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 In comparison to most political topics, the policy space that is referendum politics 
is uncharacteristically diverse. That is, political scientists have a scholarly tendency to 
focus on inclusivity and exclusivity rather than the holistic. The discipline as a whole is 
subdivided into subfields (e.g., comparative politics, or security studies); theoretical 
foundations utilize logic in the manner best fitting the author’s needs. For the most part, 
the economical focus considered here serves the discipline well; the organization is 
befitting. Referendum politics, however, defies such an approach: referendum politics is 
practiced at subnational and national levels; it occurs in democratic and nondemocratic 
states; it is based on institutional development but also requires individual as well as 
group agency; the possible topics for referendum are limited only by the imagination of 
the producer9, and could such include such diverse topics as governance issues, political 
issues, national security issues, gender issues, and natural resource policy. To further 
unpack the field of referendum politics, multiple strategies may be employed in each of 
one of these instances – some to be repeated (regardless of success); others to be 
discarded.   
This study, however, is focused on three points: first, the degree to which the 
context in which direct democracy was first introduced in a political system affects later 
usage; secondly, the degree to which institutional design affects later usage; and finally, 
                                                          
9 In some systems, the topic is actually limited by constitutional language (e.g., one cannot consider budget 
issues via the referendum in Italy.) 
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the degree to which individuals operating within institutions can affect referendum 
outcomes. The following literature review is organized around these three general topics.  
First, I consider scholarship related to referendum politics within the context of 
constitutional formation by examining the method by which the institution of direct 
democracy came to be included in a given constitution in various cases, and secondly, 
how such a context informs later usage. As the prior chapter suggests, such an 
examination is crucial to understanding how and why initiatives and referendums are 
used in future instances.  
Secondly, I review scholarship related to the institutional design of referendum 
politics in various political system. Common sense suggests that usage in a given state 
could be a simple function of institutional design: easier access equals increased usage. 
Alongside this seemingly axiomatic calculation is the notion that a state may enjoy an 
“initiative culture” in which mechanisms of direct democracy are common, and thus, 
expected (e.g., Switzerland). Thus, an examination of institutional design is warranted 
here. 
 Third and finally, I review the literature related to referendum campaigns, the role 
of political parties in referendum campaigns, as well as the impact of political elites on 
the process. Certainly, the broadest of considerations in the field of referendum politics is 
that of how the institution of direct democracy reconciles with that of representative 
governance more generally. That is, in the case of established representatives (and the 
degree to which such representatives are democratically elected is a further question), to 
what degree, and indeed, to what end, should such representatives utilize the referendum 
process? If one assumes that legitimacy is a key concern for representative government, 
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perhaps the institution of direct democracy becomes instrumental towards this end. 
However, such an assumption precludes the possibility that referendum usage may be 
used towards illegitimate ends (purposefully or otherwise). Moreover, such an 
assumption also precludes the possibility that political authorities allow the voters to 
decide any issue on its merits alone, and do not intervene to shape, or even quash 
questions to protect their own interests. That is, the question of referendum outcomes 
may be interesting; the question of which referendum did not make the ballots may be 
just as interesting (and the subject of another study). Legitimacy in this sense is not 
limited to policy aggregation and transformation; leadership itself may be legitimated by 
referendum usage, and certainly not in the “democratic” sense of the word10. 
Additionally, a key concern within the field of referendum politics is that of change – and 
the degree to which referendums facilitate (or prohibit) change. Certainly, an instrument 
of direct democracy is designed to measure the status quo: whether (and how) voters 
accept or reject the question under consideration. Thus, evaluating referendum politics as 
a function of the campaigns and individuals involved seems a prudent topic for a 
literature review.  
The Current Scholarship of Direct Democracy 
 Usage of direct democracy mechanisms such as the initiative and referendum are 
on the rise worldwide, especially since the beginning of the 20th century. In the United 
States, 23 states incorporated the referendum or initiative (or both) into their state 
constitutions (Cronin 1989); in the 1920s, populist movements led Canada to adopt the 
                                                          
10 Adolf Hitler would use a series of four referendums between 1933 and 1938 to consolidate his power; in 
Italy, Mussolini would use two in 1929 and 1934 to achieve the same outcome; in Romania, General Ion 
Antonescu would follow this path with two referendums in 1941. Other political figures have used the 
referendum to affirm existing power. 
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practice (Laycock 1990). After 1989, democratic transformations in Eastern Europe led 
to 27 new constitutions, many of which contain language allowing for referendum usage 
and (perhaps more importantly) that were approved via the referendum itself. Altman 
(2011) evaluates the change in use of mechanisms of direct democracy by country and 
year, and finds that usage has doubled over the last fifty years and quadrupled since the 
turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, Scarrow (2001) finds that the primary cause of such 
increased usage is institutional change: in the 1990s, states that had already 
accommodated direct democracy as well as those who had previously given scant 
institutional recognition both began to utilize the device more frequently.  
 While direct democracy itself may be on the rise worldwide (Kaufmann and 
Waters 2004; Scarrow 2001), scholarship on the subject is lacking in several respects. A 
review of the literature shows a lack of uniformity with regards to even the most basic 
terminology: for example, the term “referendum” is often used almost interchangeably 
with the word “initiative” – and while the two may share some similar characteristics, 
they are most definitely two different animals. An initiative is an instrument available to 
the people (and indeed, should be constitutionally granted and/or protected) that allows 
the people to initiate the law-making process. A referendum, on the other hand, should 
refer to policy choices referred to the people by the legislative branch for their approval 
or denial. As mentioned, some characteristics are shared, most notably, that the people 
can petition the legislative branch for a referendum to be placed on a ballot. Nonetheless, 
the difference remains clear: in the former, the substance of the proposal, along with the 
process of the proposal being placed on the ballot, its subsequent adoption (assuming 
passage) and enforcement, are all independent of the legislature; the latter, of course, is 
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dependent upon the legislature in some way: they have either proposed the legislation, or 
perhaps they have been forced to consider it (such as a possible EU accession vote); they 
have either opted to place the proposal on the ballot, or they have been forced to via 
petition (or perhaps constitutional requirement). In either case, the referendum is far from 
direct democracy: even with the case of the petition, the very notion that the people are 
simply voting on a policy proposal generated by the legislature questions its inclusion 
within the boundaries of direct democracy (at least, in the truest sense of the term).  
 This distinction is far from trivial. The implications for policy outcomes – and for 
democratic theory – are dependent upon the process. That is, whether or not a nation state 
actually allows direct democracy (in terms of a true, California- style initiative process) 
or simply permits an occasional referendum vote will result in a very different political 
culture, and as a result, different policy outcomes. The reasoning behind this logic should 
be clear: the ability of the people to have a “gun behind the door” of the legislature, or to 
use another popular analogy, to be able to “end-around” the legislature and propose and 
enact legislation is a very powerful tool. Conversely, the ability of the people to give an 
up or down vote on a policy proposal may be superficially viewed as “power to the 
people” but in reality, little such power exists. This is especially so when all of the variant 
institutional constructs are considered (e.g., non-binding, facultative only, whether or not 
the government is required to place the proposal on the ballot, quorum requirements etc.). 
Such referendums often turnout to simply be a second-order (or “confidence”) vote of the 
party in power (Hobolt 2007) rather than an actual up/down vote on the policy proposal 
at hand. 
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 A second problem found within the literature is a lack of examination of the type 
of electoral processes within the state itself – prior to, and then in conjunction with – the 
examination of the institution of direct democracy. Although EU member states are in 
many ways very similar, there are also considerable differences that may have an effect 
on the outcomes. For example, majoritarian electoral processes exist along with more 
traditional proportional representation systems; indeed, an examination into possible 
consociational democracies and their effect would also be helpful. Indeed, some scholars 
have argued that the EU itself is a consociational democracy (Bogaards and Crepaz 2002; 
Gabel 1998). The benefit of an approach considering electoral processes would be to 
consider the nature of policy aggregation that is typical within a nation-state, and by 
extension, the degree to which compromise (in terms of coalition-building) are a common 
aspect of the democratic process. Such an avenue may help to explain both the frequency 
as well as the expected outcome of both initiative and referenda. 
 Another recurring feature in the current literature on direct democracy is a lack of 
empirical analysis regarding the economic aspect of the nation state and its impact on the 
outcome of initiative and referenda voting. Certainly, a consideration of some measure of 
economic well-being may be beneficial when attempting to understand why voters 
approve or disapprove of a certain measure, and may be perhaps more beneficial in 
understanding why some initiatives are considered and eventually pass or fail. The 
implication here is that a prosperous country would have a different outlook from both an 
individual-level perspective (that is, their own financial well-being) as well as group-
level perspectives (that is, group-level evaluation of the overall economy within their 
own nation) than those from an economically challenged nation. Moreover, economic 
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performance may have clear effects in both public policy areas of citizen lawmaking, as 
well as governance related areas of direct democracy.  
 On a more fundamental level, however, is the lack of scholarship dedicated to the 
role that institutions beyond the institution of direct democracy have on the process. That 
is, while the individual state-level institutional rules (e.g, restrictions on types of 
questions that may be asked, restrictions on signature requirements, differences between 
facultative and binding resolutions, etc.) obviously influence the usage of direct 
democracy within a given state, this does not fully account for when a state is more or 
less likely to utilize mechanism of direct democracy. For example, a study of the 
historical context of the timing in which the institution of direct democracy was first 
introduced may play a significant role in its later usage, primarily because the context of 
the times often dictates later usage in other political institutions. Certainly, the context of 
the times in which a constitution is created affects (and generally constrains) outcomes at 
a later date. Thus, while a state may recognize certain civil liberties or civil rights within 
a constitution, the constitution itself was created at a fixed point in time, and the drafters’ 
views of civil liberties or civil rights may enforce how those rights and liberties are 
enforced. Future generations may be able to “mold” outcomes related to civil liberties or 
civil rights recognition, but a complete reconceptualization is generally not possible – 
future generations are constrained by the original drafting.  
Finally, an empirical study of the institution of direct democracy may reveal the 
impact of excluded interests on the process of institutional change. For example, Barczak 
(2001) examines the reform and rewriting of several Latin American constitutions and 
notes that many of them emerged with direct democracy mechanisms in place. She finds 
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that such mechanisms are contained within constitutions when one of two conditions is 
met: when (1) the reform and rewriting process is controlled by traditionally excluded 
political interests; or (2) traditionally excluded interests mobilize to capture a significant 
(but not controlling) share of authority over the reform-rewriting process (39). By way of 
example, Barczak points to Peru (1990), Argentina (1996), Brazil (1996), Ecuador (1996 
and 1998) and Venezuela (1999) as cases in which the rewriting process becomes 
controlled by traditionally excluded interests. Fewer cases fall under the second 
condition: Colombia (1991) and Paraguay (1992). The remaining cases (Uruguay, Chile, 
and Bolivia) also saw new constitutions developed (1997, 1980, and 1993-1996, 
respectively) and either did not expand the direct democracy status quo (Uruguay and 
Chile) or did not introduce the mechanism (Bolivia).  
  The idea that direct democracy measures are included when traditionally excluded 
interests have a say in the matter is neither new nor unique to the Latin American system. 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century brought tremendous changes to the 
American system of government in the form of direct democracy. This “founding” of 
direct democracy in the U.S. can be considered a function of several components: the 
deleterious effects of the Industrial Revolution on many farmers and ranchers in America; 
the desire on the part of Progressives and Populists to install a mechanism that could 
“check” the powerful hold of special-interest groups over state legislatures; and the 
widely-held desire to improve government by making it “more responsive” to the people 
in general – which would in turn, the Progressives argued, lead to a more politically 
efficacious citizenry, which would again in turn, lead to a better overall government 
(Cain and Miller 2001; Polhill 2001) In the late 1800s, disenchanted groups (mainly 
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alliances of farmers, miners, and laborers) formed the People’s (or Populist) Party, 
favoring governmental ownership of railroads, elimination of monopolies, a graduated 
income tax, free coinage of silver, an expanded money supply, and similar efforts aimed 
at improving the livelihood of rural families (Cronin 1989: 43). With bankers, railroaders, 
and land speculators in their sights, the Populists attempted to enter politics and change 
the system, as they could envision gaining little relief from the two main political parties 
that they believed were controlled by the influence of railroads, trusts, and monopolies. In 
1892, the Populists codified their beliefs at their first national convention, where they 
introduced a platform that called for the direct election of senators, limiting the president 
and vice-president to a single term, and most importantly for our purposes, the 
introduction of the initiative and referendum (Cronin 1989).  In 1897, South Carolina 
became the first state to adopt direct democracy measures, and several states followed, 
each with support of traditionally excluded or marginal groups.  
Constitutional Formation and Referendum Politics 
 
The preceding chapter discussed a theoretical foundation suggesting that 
usage/non usage of referendums could be considered within the context of the initial 
presence of out-group inclusion in the original constitutional development (C1); and that 
later usage may be a function of  historical institutional design (HI1) or the role of 
political elites in the process (P1), and the degree to which their role was conditioned by 
HI1 and/or prospect theory/cybernetic theories of decision-making (PC1). The following 
section considers literature related to Europe and Latin America, but also applies the 
theoretical foundation (though it should be noted, this is done superficially here).  
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The (Former) Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
The democratic revolutions that occurred throughout Eastern Europe in the 1990s 
provided no fewer than 27 new constitutions, many of which were considered and 
approved by popular referendum. However, the region was no stranger to the referendum 
device: The Soviet Constitution of July 1923 allowed such a process (allowing each of 
the union republics to withdraw, though the particular method was unspecified), and 
Bolsheviks more generally were supportive of self-determination and referendums11. 
When the Congress of Soviets of the Soviet Union clearly defined the role of the 
Communist Party in 1936 and redesigned the government under Stalin, Article 48 
allowed for the Supreme Soviet Presidium to conduct a referendum on its own initiative, 
or at the demand of one of the union republics, though no actual referendums occurred.  
In the 1960s, debate and discussion occurred  regarding the move towards increased 
usage of the referendum, and a particularly scholarly debate erupted between Viktor 
Kotok and M.I Baitin over the normative aspects of the referendum: the degree to which 
the practice should be mandatory for constitutional questions (historian and commentator 
Roy Medvedev would argue for a compulsory referendum for each republic once every 
ten years), and the degree to which the practice would increase civic engagement12 
(White and Hill 1996). Discussion, however, did not translate to usage. This pattern 
would be repeated in 1977, when the “Brezhnev” Constitution would specifically allow 
for the referendum in Article 5 – but for all the debate that had occurred regarding the 
proper usage of the referendum, Article 5 did not set provisions for what would be 
                                                          
11 Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky demanded the use of referendums to decide the fate 
of occupied areas; the Soviet government also promised referendum usage with initial relations with the 
Ukraine and Georgia (Wambaugh 1933). 
12 The normative concern is especially prevalent in the initiative and referendum literature in the United 
States. See especially Brown (2004).  
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binding, what would be consultative, nor did it provide guidance in terms of which types 
of questions could be asked. Indeed, it would not be until 1990 that such concerns would 
be addressed: such referendums could adopt a new law, to amend or rescind a law, or to 
determine public opinion on important issues. The policies of perestroika (a plan to 
restructure the political and economic systems) and glasnost (the effort to increase 
openness and transparency in government institutions) would help deliver thirty-three 
referendum questions between 1987 and 1993, twenty-five of which occurred in the 
former Soviet Union,13 and can be considered within the context of a state facing a major 
transition. Mikhail Gorbachev turned to the public at large to transform his desired 
policies into realities, and Gorbachev would set his sights quite high 14: replacing (though 
reaffirming) the Union Treaty that had created the Soviet Union in 1922. For their first-
ever referendum, the Soviet population was asked on March 17, 1991 whether they  
 …consider necessary the preservation of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of 
equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms 
of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed? 
The ambiguity in the question became quite problematic for voters and member 
states alike. Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia and Armenia proposed their own 
independence referendums in response to the question; six of the republics worked to 
                                                          
13 For comparative purposes, between 1946 and 1986, no referendums occurred in the Soviet Union; seven 
referendum questions were posed in Eastern Europe; four of these were noncompetitive: approval for three 
Romanian questions, two of which approved the Antonescu government (99.9% each); one to approve the 
1968 German Democratic Republic Constitution (94.5%); and one to end the Bulgarian monarchy (95%). 
The remaining three were more competitive, and each occurred in Poland on 30 June 1946: to abolish the 
Senate, to make a more permanent economic system, and to approve Baltic and eastern frontiers (68, 77 
and 91%, respectively).  
14 In addition to the importance of the topic, the referendum would set records for votes cast (149 million), 
and the largest geographic expanse covered by a referendum question. 
38 
 
disable the voting mechanism; five other republics either changed or added questions of 
their own (Brady and Kaplan 1994). Though Gorbachev would win the vote (in some 
areas, by greater than a 90% margin), the fractured process led to inconclusive 
outcomes,15 and Gorbachev learned first-hand what many others had also come to learn: 
the unintended consequences of referendum can be difficult to accept. Though Gorbachev 
had intended the use of the referendum to legitimize his own agenda,16Yeltsin would 
utilize the same tactic on his own behalf: putting to the voters the question of a strong 
republican presidency, viewed by scholars as an offensive quest for power (White and 
Hill). While Gorbachev would win 76%, Yeltsin also claimed victory with 70%.  In this 
case, the purpose of the referendum was designed to settle the issue of the permanency of 
the union; instead, the spark for independence referendum ignited across Eastern Europe: 
in December 1991, 84% of the Ukrainian electors turned out to vote in an independence 
referendum, with 90% voting for independence. Gorbachev would resign on December 
25, 1991.  
The case of the Soviet Union suggests a number of relevant outcomes. First, that 
the context in which the institution of direct democracy was introduced in large part 
explains its usage. In the case of the Soviet Union, the referendum mechanism was 
introduced and reaffirmed multiple times; its use, however, did come about until both 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin found it necessary to utilize the device against political enemies 
individually, but also against subnational units. As the last chapter suggests, the lack of 
                                                          
15 The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1991)  argued that “the first referendum in 
Soviet history produced plebiscitary paralysis, and the standoff between the center and the republics 
continues” http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015024951678;view=1up;seq=2 
16 Gorbachev refers to his own agenda as “more socialism, and therefore, more democracy”, arguing that 
socialism itself was not internally flawed, as many argue, but rather, that principles of socialism had been 
insufficiently applied (Gorbachev, 1987: 46).  
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an “out-group” in the 1922, 1936, 1944 and 1977 constitutional revisions results in a 
fewer items being referred to the people (even with the presence of debate on the issue), 
and thus the Soviet Union in this instance did not meet (C1). Facing a possible loss 
scenario however, Gorbachev utilized the mechanism in an attempt to legitimize his own 
power, while at the same time certifying the legitimacy of others (individuals and 
republics alike) to utilize the same mechanism. Paradoxically, through an attempt to 
strengthen and legitimize his own (individual) power, Gorbachev set in motion the 
process of power destabilization through affirming the use of the very tool that would 
undermine centralized (institutional) power in the Soviet Union. Certainly, Gorbachev 
had other options: Walker (2003) argues he could have allowed each republic to decide 
its status, or brokered a compromise with the republics, or perhaps let the Politburo or 
Supreme Soviet decide; certainly, a crackdown on the separatists would be an option on 
the table as well.  
Historically, then, C1 (the primary condition of out-group inclusion) is lacking in 
this case, suggesting reduced usage in later years. Also, an important variable responsible 
for usage/non usage was historical institutional design (HI1), but perhaps more 
importantly was the role of the political elites operating within that institution (P1), 
operating within the confines of historical institutional design (HI1), and certainly 
conditioned by PC1. Gorbachev had a number of options, as discussed, and instead – as 
prospect theory suggests – opted for the larger gamble when facing a loss scenario, but of 
course, operated within the confines of the options available to him, without regard to 
values, as the cybernetic theory of decision-making suggests.   
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Germany and Austria 
 Historical developments in Germany offer additional insights into referendum 
politics in the context of transitional governance. Prior to the Weimar Republic, the 
German Constitution of 1871 supported a high degree of state sovereignty, but the 1919 
Constitution gave the power of the referendum to the people. Suksi (1993) argues that 
while the constitution did give the state the literal power of the referendum, the practice 
was severely limited: significant limitations existed for the subject matters (budget issues, 
tax statutes, and salary regulations did not have to be placed before the people, and thus 
parliament was insulated from these issues) as well as majority requirements in both 
approval and turnout (the latter causing those wishing to oppose to simply not go to the 
polls). The initiative was also available to citizens, though only two of sixty attempts 
were able to reach the voters, and both of these would fail the majority quorum 
requirements (C2D). Suksi (1993:96) finds that the initiative was used primarily by 
parties to further their own ends, but at the same time, the institution of the referendum 
provided a “constitutional channel” that would preclude “unconstitutional action.” Such 
an argument is supported by scholars writing at the time: Thoma (1928) argues that that 
“there is every reason to expect that this moderation in resorting to…(direct 
democracy)…will continue to be shown in future so long as the principle of proportional 
representation is applied in the Reich” (73).  
 After the rise of the National Socialist Party in 1933, the powers of legislation and 
constitutional amendment were given to a cabinet headed by Hitler, and while the 
parliament was now of little importance, a Law on Referendum was enacted by the 
cabinet (though no initiative was provided).  As Suski (1993) argues, the referendum in 
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this context was not designed to achieve mathematical majorities, but rather to secure the 
assent of the people, insofar as the whole society was based on the concept of the 
“organic personality of leadership” (99). The three referendums that took place in this era 
support this notion: the German populace approved the withdraw from the League of 
Nations in 1933, the merger of the offices of the President and the Chancellor into a 
single unit in 1934, and in 1938, approved the annexation of Austria while at the same 
time electing a Nazi list to the national parliament (C2D)17.  
 Certainly, legitimation was a key concern here: though policy confirmation was 
the ostensible goal, regime legitimation was the real motivation. As Suski observes, “the 
conclusion that can be drawn from the Nazi referendums seems to be that a device which 
is a part of the formal or mechanistic decision-making procedures …can be used to 
further the purposes of a substance-based political system” (102).  
Once again, however, out-group inclusion (C1) was not a factor here in either the 
Weimar Republic or the Nazi era, suggesting reduced usage in later years; the case also 
presents an interesting historical institutional design (one in which the focus was on 
organic power of leadership, rather than institutions during the Nazi era) but overall, the 
same result occurs: the context in which the institution was developed played a role in 
later usage, suggesting relevance for HI1, and of course, political elites played a role in 
both the Weimar Republic and the Nazi era with both (obviously for different reasons) 
not utilizing the device often. Finally, PC1 plays a role here, too: interestingly, the 
parliament-centered Weimar Republic opted to maintain their small victories rather than 
gamble (and, not facing a loss scenario, the option supports the theory).  
                                                          
17 German voters may have been “tipped off” in terms of elite support: the “approval” circle was quite 
large; the “disapproval”, placed next to the “approval” circle, was quite small (Suski 1993:102).  
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Though the Austrians included the provision of referendum (allowing any act of 
legislation to be submitted to the people through a simple majority vote in the 
Nationalrat, and mandatory referendums for amendment or alteration of the 
Constitution), in practice the procedure is rarely used. Introduced with the Constitution in 
1920 and in large part reflecting the general political mood in Europe after 1918 (Pelinka 
and Greiderer 1996), only three referendums have been placed before the voters.  
 The question of whether or not the Zwentendorf nuclear power plant should begin 
operating became a catalyst for expressing discontent with the status quo at the time of 
the 1978 referendum. The discontent focused especially on the established party 
structure, and by extension, the lack of opportunity for active participation, and the 
discontent showed in the outcome: parties that had experienced longstanding particular 
demographic support found those demographics bolting the party line (Pelinka and 
Greiderer 1996), and voters ultimately rejected the opening, though turnout was a scant 
64.1% (C2D).  
 In 1994, Austrians voted on the EU referendum, and instead of discontent, voters 
decided the fate of the question primarily on economic terms: concerns about 
unemployment motivated both affirmative and negative votes, while concerns over the 
loss of sovereignty and the deterioration in the quality of products drove the “no” vote. 
As Pelinka and Greiderer (2003) argue, the “differences in voting behavior were strongly 
related to party preference”.  
 Finally, in January 2013, Austrians were invited to give their opinion on 
mandatory conscription, which drafts some 22,000 men per year into the Austrian 
military for service of six months in the military or nine months in civilian service. Once 
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again, party divisiveness played a role: in a coalition parliament, the center-left Social 
Democrats argued for moving away from a conscripted military towards a professional 
military (and such an action would follow Germany and France, each of whom ended 
conscription policies), while conservative members argued that increased spending would 
hinder economic improvements and at the same time move the nation away from the 
neutrality stance it has observed since 1955.18Though the parties may be divided on the 
issue, the electorate does not see this issue as a possible referendum on power overall; 
60% voted to retain the compulsory conscription practice.  
 The Austrian case is thus focused on representative over direct democracy. 
Pelinka and Greiderer argue that “it almost seems as politics have feared the pressure that 
might result from direct democracy, as if they feared the potential damage that might be 
done to the established, highly concentrated political system by direct participation” 
(1996:29), suggesting that elite-level behavior is highly useful for predicting referendum 
usage and outcomes. Moreover, the context in which the constitution was created also 
suggests that a lack of usage was likely, insofar as “out-groups” were not an important 
factor. 
Latin America 
Though historical institutionalism often has trouble defining how institutions are 
established, rational institutionalism suggests that institutions are created when the 
benefits of that institution help to maximize the preference of the creators. Such instances 
result in “critical junctures.” In terms of governance, the rewriting or reworking of a 
                                                          
18 Austrians vote to keep compulsory military service” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21110431 
3/24/13 
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constitution would certainly qualify as a critical juncture (even in Latin America, where 
constitutional fortitude and longevity are not always apparent).  
  The role of political elite in shaping the introduction of measures of direct 
democracy into the system cannot be overemphasized. Thus, to what degree does a 
rational institutionalist theory take hold in helping to explain extant direct democracy in 
Latin America? Bruer (2008) argues that “the decision of Latin American governments to 
resort to referendum is mainly rooted in specific problems in executive-legislative 
interaction and may be additionally spurred by contextual factors such as the 
government’s need for rehabilitation, whether because of preceding corruption scandals 
or a lack of democratic legitimation” (13). The case of Bolivia illustrates how the 
motivations of political elites in maximizing favorable outcomes (but working within the 
constraints of the institutions) shaped direct democracy measures.  
  As Breuer (2008) notes, the Bolivian transition to democracy in 1982 was largely 
successful, and based on the hybrid presidential system as well as the introduction of a 
mixed-member proportional electoral system. However, the author argues that the actual 
outcome of this process, while designed to limit the problems inherent to Latin American 
instability (e.g., minority governments and legislative deadlock) actually resulted in 
legislative support “dominated by presidential patronage strategies rather than by 
programmatic compromises” (14) which resulted in corruption and an alienated 
electorate. This system was replaced in 1994 by a traditional List Proportional 
Representation system that was intended to reconnect voters with parties was successful 
only in encouraging party system fragmentation and polarization by “aggravating existent 
ethnic and regional cleavages” (14). After increased fragmentation and eventual civil 
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unrest over the plan to export natural gas to California, President Sanchez de Lozada’s 
government collapsed, and was replaced by vice-president Mesa, who sought the legal 
introduction of the referendum.  
  In the Bolivian case, Breuer argues that four factors were largely responsible for 
Mesa’s action. First, since the idea of referendum was initially brought up by Mesa’s 
predecessor, Mesa could not ignore it without preventing further escalation of the 
situation; secondly, the lack of a direct popular mandate required him to seek continued 
favorable approval ratings; third, that a lack of stable support basis made the ordinary 
route of legislative approval (especially with energy policies) quite difficult; and finally, 
Mesa’s own preferences shaped his desire to find a balance between an unhappy 
electorate on the one hand and international lending organizations on the other by 
increasing taxes on foreign companies operating in Bolivia (16). The final version of the 
referendum process was accepted as part of a constitutional reform package passed in 
June 2004. The Bolivian case thus shows how the historical context shapes the 
introduction of measures of direct democracy, but also that  institutionalism plays a large 
part in the choices that political elites make (indeed, those who have control over the 
institutions) such that their preferences are maximized as a result of the institutions they 
create. Breuer also finds that the Bolivian case “parallels the Peruvian case in which 
Fujimori resorted to a referendum in order to make up for the lack of a democratic 
legitimation of his government” (20).  For Mesa, the first usage of the referendum came 
in 2004, and initially the results seemed to be regarded as a “solid vote of confidence for 
Mesa” (Breuer 2008:17); however, strategic decisions resulting from the outcome of the 
referendums ultimately led to further civil unrest, and culminated in Mesa’s resignation 
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in 2005. For Mesa in particular, and for scholars more generally, the notion of unintended 
consequences19 could not be clearer.  
 Other cases show how the historical context, critical junctures, the cybernetic theory 
of decision-making, and the prospect theory blend together to form an explanatory 
framework. Breuer (2009) finds in a cross-nation quantitative study that several factors 
are responsible for the introduction and continued use of measures of direct democracy. 
First, she argues that presidential systems in Latin America are a key determinant, insofar 
as “presidents facing situations of civil unrest may attempt to use referendums to several 
strategic ends: a means to divert public attention from unpopular policies or personal 
misdemeanor; as a political offering to mobilized groups of citizens; and as a way to 
delegate responsibility for unpopular decisions by “passing the buck to the voter” (29). 
Secondly, she finds that multi-party systems are more likely to result in difficulty within 
interparty negotiation and increase the problems inherent in presidential systems, and in 
such a case, the executive or oppositional legislators “could use a referendum to outplay 
their political rivals in the opposite branch of government” (29). Along this same line of 
reasoning, the author finds that a common result of multiparty systems is divided 
government, and depending on institutional constraints (e.g., whether the direct 
democracy measure is available to the legislature, the executive, either or both), a 
referendum may offer a way to break a stalemate. Yet another cause of direct democracy 
usage for Breuer is instances in which the executive does not have direct democratic 
legitimation, such as in the case of an automatic successor. Finally, Breuer argues that 
                                                          
19 Though I have referenced unintended consequences in terms of Mesa individually, the concept would of 
course refer to the institution of direct democracy in Bolivia (e.g., would direct democracy, instituted as a 
measure to increase democratic stability, actually be able to resolve conflict between state functions and 
enhance participation and legitimacy). The irony was just too blatant to pass over.  
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constitutional rigidity is a predictor of referendum usage insofar as constitutional 
amendment processes often take a supermajority, and thus referendum becomes a more 
viable alternative. Extending these suppositions to Western Europe finds support; as the 
dissertation will show, the semi-presidential system in France has facilitated such 
outcomes; in Italy, multi-party organization has also has significant effects on outcomes.  
  A correlated finding in Breuer’s (2008a; 2009) study is that it also disproves the 
notion that the introduction (and later usage) is primarily based on “personalistic, neo-
populist leadership”, suggesting that institutions (and institutionalist theory) matter more 
than individuals (and a strict rational choice theory). Such an examination is worthwhile. 
O’Donnell (1994) offers that many Latin American countries that can be considered 
“democracies” in the definitional sense of the term (e.g., the Dahl polyarchy test), are 
actually “delegative democracies” that lack the institutional framework necessary to 
control the flow of political power. Instead, the delegative democracy described here 
implies that the “the president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the main 
custodian and definer of its interests” (60). In particular, O’Donnell points to Argentina, 
Brazil, and Peru as examples (at least at the time of his writing) of delegative 
democracies. However, as Breuer (2008a) points out, the institutional constraints and 
decision-making aspects of the leader are not fully considered. She argues that “the 
capacity to obtain policies consistent with the executive preferences….vary according to 
the interaction [several] institutional variables” (64). In particular, presidential system 
executives are likely to use the government-instituted referendum when the position of 
the median voter reflects their preferences (and the interaction of negative preference 
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distribution in the legislature) as well as constitutional rules regulating the competences 
of elected officials20 and minimum turnout requirements21.  
In 1983, Argentines chose a new president in Raul Alfonsin and the Union Civica 
Radical  (UCR),  and returned to constitutional rule. However, a reworking of a 
constitution did not take place until Carlos Menem took power with the Partido 
Justicialista. Scholars note that Menem ruled by decree on many occasions, offering 336 
“need and urgency decrees” in a five year span, all in an effort to avoid legislature 
approval (Barczak 2001). The Menem administration sought economic stability through 
neoliberal economic and social policies, including privatization of state enterprises, 
deregulation of economic activities, and efforts at a balanced budget (Vacs 2006). 
However, the important point for the purposes of this study is that the new constitution – 
in collaboration with former president Alfonsin and the Radical Party – included 
authorization for “consultas” and initiatives (Barczak 2001). In this case, Barczak argues 
that the instrumental variable for the inclusion of direct democracy components was the 
rise of Menem and the decline of the UCR, but that the process included collaboration of 
the traditionally excluded elements in the form of Alfonsin.  
 The case of Brazil also follows the idea that the critical juncture resulting in 
constitutional inclusion of direct democracy was the fact that “new parties ended up 
dominating the constituent assembly of 1987-1988, which opened the door for the 
introduction of direct democracy” (Barczak 2001). Chafee (2006) notes that the 1988 
Constitution had a “strong liberal content”, primarily a reaction against the centralization 
                                                          
20 This refers to the executive’s ability to conduct a referendum.  
21 Minimum turnout requirements are an important institutional constraint: in countries with “low levels of 
democratization, governments confront politically apathetic citizens” (Breuer 2008a: 67). In most Latin 
American countries, a threshold must be met before the referendum is valid (this varies between 25-51%).  
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and excesses of the military regime. The Constitution increased the voting population 
from 1891 stipulation of literate white males to both illiterates and those over 16, brought 
rural workers into the social security system, and also expanded labor rights.  
Barczak also finds that the case of Ecuador’s inclusion of direct democracy was 
the result of a critical juncture that included outsider interests. In this case, however, three 
constitutions were written between 1979 and 1996, and while the 1979 Constitution 
introduced direct democracy, it was expanded by “newly organized forces” (47). The 
original Constitution was itself a product of a referendum between different constitutional 
plans drawn up by civilian politicians and scholars, and the result was dramatic changes, 
including the enfranchisement of illiterates and the abolishment of the Senate, in addition 
to the allowance of limited direct democracy measures, such as indirect initiatives and 
allowing the president to call a consulta (48). Future administrations, such as Leon 
Febres Cordero sought to expand the ability to call a referendum, and the rise of the 
Ecuadorian Roldosista Party and the PSC (both relatively new players, at least in terms of 
electoral success), resulted in the expansion of the president’s ability to call a consulta 
(51). Each of these cases, Barczak argues, are predicted by the fact that traditionally 
excluded interests held power over the reform or rewriting process, which would 
certainly be considered a critical junction.  
In a related but ultimately different context, Barczak finds that Colombia and 
Paraguayan inclusions of direct democracy were the result of traditionally excluded 
interests capturing a significant, though not controlling, share of the reform process. In 
the former, the author notes the emergence of direct democracy was the result of 
traditionally excluded groups, in this case, the ADM-19 and representatives from social 
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groups also won seats in the legislature charged with approving the 1991 Constitution. 
The author notes that participatory democracy was important to the agenda of the 
minority groups (52). In the Paraguayan case, the 1992 constitutional rewrite process in 
the legislature was dominated by the traditional Colorado Party, but the 76 of 198 seats 
not held by the Colorado Party went to a main opposition party and a newly formed 
independent movement (53), and the end result included provisions for consultas and 
indirect initiatives.  
Thus, the scholarship reviewed here shows that the inclusion of direct democracy 
is not always a function of “out-group” participation; certainly, the introduction of the 
mechanism occurs without it. However, there does seem to be an evident pattern: 
inclusion of out-groups in the constitutional formation process does lead to increased 
usage of the referendum process in later instances, while the lack of such a group is 
associated with a lower usage in later instances. Such a finding will be useful in the case-
study application in future chapters. 
Institutional Design, Turnout, and Outcomes   
 
That direct democracy is on the rise both in the United States (Cronin 1989, 
Waters 1999) but also around the world (Butler and Ranney 1994; Uleri 1996) is hardly a 
revelation.  Scarrow (2001) finds that widespread institutional reforms have incorporated 
access to the referendum process, particularly at the local level. 22 In Europe, two main 
causes can be attributed to this rise: the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe during 
the 1990s produced almost thirty new constitutions (many of which were actually passed 
                                                          
22 Though not discussed by the Scarrow, this could be an indirect attempt at overcoming the problems that 
had been solved by federalism. A study examining the relationship between federalism (though rare in 
Europe) and local referendums could be of interest here.  
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by referendum), and the integration process within the European Union that has reignited 
both national and transnational direct democracy mechanisms (Kaufmann and Waters 
2004). Other scholars have argued that increases in referendum usage reflects the 
“unfreezing of political alignments and institutions” that had characterized the early part 
of the twentieth century (Bogdanor 1994). In this sense, the increases in referendum are a 
function of the challenge to the longstanding representative institutions in the form of 
participatory forms of democracy. However, further research suggests that such usage has 
increased where provisions for referendum usage currently exist; in states that had 
offered minimal referendum usage, or in states where citizens lack the abilty to trigger a 
referendum, institutional constructs have not given way to increased usage (Setala 1999).  
 Leaving aside the purely institutional aspect for a moment, other scholars suggest 
that aspects such as cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1996), or the increases in popular 
demand for access to the policy-making process as a function of the increases in 
resources and skills available to the general (non-political) elite. Significant research 
focuses on the role of direct democracy as a method of countering the growing cynicism 
and disaffection with extant government structures, and insofar as the referendum offers a 
direct voice, their use is a function of an increased desire for responsiveness (Gerber 
2001). Craig, et al (2001) argue that evidence from the United States suggest that while 
each of these hypotheses has some plausibility, a stronger causal element is that of 
“policy entrepreneurs” who seek their own ends while at the same time capturing public 
support for the institution of direct democracy itself. Insofar as the process of direct 
democracy was intended as a process through which individual could counter the power 
of political elites (whether they be elected officials or interest groups), the capture of the 
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process by elites suggest negative outcomes in terms of the original purposes of the 
institution. At the same time, the individual-led approach (rather than institutional-led) 
approach offered by Morel (2001) is that increases in the use of the referendum are in 
part a “path dependent” issue: as a state utilizes the process (regardless of the purpose), 
its use not only legitimizes the issue at hand, but also legitimizes the process itself. This, 
of course, makes it difficult for the state to eschew the process in the future. Moreover, 
Morel argues that the increases in referendum usage in Europe is a consequence of the 
increases in obligatory referendums as well as increases in uses of direct democracy in 
the Italian system. In each of the European cases, Morel finds that the process is not fully 
consultative; that is, the process is not used by a representative government seeking the 
honest, objective opinion of the people. Rather, political elites are interested in resolving 
tensions within their own parties, furthering their legislative agenda, and increasing their 
own power (2001:62).  
Significant variations occur across the countries with respect to the availability of 
various types of initiative and referendums. Unlike the United States, where the only 
variation is in terms of a popular initiative versus a legislative referendum and the 
requirements of each for ballot access (in terms of signature gathering, available 
provisions, and general availability) European countries have a host of options among 
them. For example, referendums can either be binding or non-binding. In the latter, such 
referendums are consultative or advisory in nature and the government may or may not 
choose to implement the results. Moreover, the referendums may be mandatory (i.e., 
required when constitutional issues or EU accession are considered) or facultative (i.e., 
instituted at the will of a public authority or by a petition of the people). In yet another 
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twist, some countries may adopt a simple majority rule for adoption; others, however, 
may require a supermajority for passage, and in still other, a “quorum”23 of sorts must be 
met in terms of voter turnout before adoption will be considered.  
  A consideration of the mechanics now complete, the question becomes one of 
empirical and normative value: who uses direct democracy? What are the benefits and 
drawbacks of such a mechanism? What are the consequences for democracy as a whole? 
Donovan and Karp (2006) consider the first of these questions by examining the demand 
side of the equation: are I & R initiatives preferred by those who embrace the notion of 
greater demand in citizen involvement in the governmental process, or do those who may 
find themselves on the periphery (or may be largely disenchanted with the status quo) 
prefer the availability of direct democracy? Their study considered the direct democracy 
mechanism in countries across Europe, as well as the Americas and New Zealand. Survey 
data results indicate overall support for the process itself but also that, between groups, 
the politically interested and engaged are more likely to assume the increased costs 
associated with referendum voting, as are the young. Additionally, increased support was 
found among those on the left of the political spectrum and the authors argue that, by 
extension, the implication that direct democracy was a threat to the political status quo 
due to use by those disaffected by the system is not supported. That is, in a manner 
similar to members of the American Populist Party’s eschewing of direct democracy (in 
contrast to the Populist Party’s enthusiasm for the mechanism) members of the 
disaffected cohort are no more likely to turn to direct democracy, regardless of the end-
around benefits of the very system with which they are disaffected.  
                                                          
23 For example, Italy requires a 50% turnout threshold for the results to be valid.  
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The role of direct democracy in a given state cannot be properly understood 
without also considering the context of the institution relative to the participating state. 
That is, institutional design can not only foster variant outcomes, but can also affect the 
substantive aspect of the role of direct democracy itself. Institutional design refers to the 
myriad possibilities available to nation states in terms of the legal regulation of direct 
democracy: various quorum requirements, pre-regulated referendums versus ad hoc 
referendums (the former takes place according to a pre-determined constitutionally or 
otherwise legally prescribed norm, while the latter is at the discretion of a sector of 
politics), advisory referendums versus binding referendums, the ability of the nation’s 
judicial system to intervene, as well as more functional aspects, such as signature 
thresholds and gathering periods.  
For example, in terms of institutional design, Lithuanians face very stringent 
requirements (roughly 11% of the electorate’s signatures are required), compared to 
roughly two percent in Hungary and Slovenia.  Like Italy, Lithuania also requires a 
turnout quorum of 50% of the registered voters, while in Hungary that requirement is 
25%, and Slovenes simply require a majority vote. Moreover, in each of these countries, 
a period of 12-18 months is granted for proper consideration and debate of the issue. 
Fourteen European Union member states establish either participation or approval 
quorum for national referendums or initiatives (Aguiar - Conraria and Magalhaes 2008). 
Clearly, the question becomes one of how quorum rule may affect the incentive to vote. 
In developing a theory on this matter, Aguiar - Conraria and Magalhaes construct a 
“prototypal rational-choice, decision theoretic model of voting” (2008: 5) that combines 
elements of a pivotal-voter model (belief that voting will swing an election) with partial 
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equilibrium notions. The application of this theory in a large quantitative dataset finds 
several key points. First, under referendum systems that include only an approval quorum 
or no quorum at all, voting for one of the options can only increase that options chance of 
victory. However, when a participation quorum is introduced, the voter who seeks and 
votes for the status quo may actually be helping to induce change by voting (and thus by 
increasing the level of participation towards quorum requirements). Thus, the voter who 
seeks the status quo may find that abstention is the best option. The authors conclude that 
participation quorum systems display a bias towards lower voter turnout – and a count of 
roughly 11%. Their cross-sectional design also yielded other findings: compulsory voting 
and literacy both increase turnout levels; referendums are more demanding than general 
elections where voters can rely on party cues and incumbency for predictors; and that 
competitive referendum are more likely to receive higher turnout, as are ballots that are 
short and do not induce fatigue.  
The study of direct democracy in Europe depends upon the ability to classify 
these differences appropriately. That is, to analyze empirically cross-national data, a 
method of appropriate comparison must be developed. For example, an analysis of 
referendums in Italy (where the people essentially have only the ability to “veto” laws, 
and to do so, a 50% approval quorum must be reached) cannot be compared with 
referendums in Latvia (where the process is used often, but as little as 2% of the 
population may propose either a legislative or constitutional referendum). Though 
variance is a key component of analysis, excessive variance precludes (or at the very 
least, limits) meaningful research, especially in a cross-country comparison.  
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 The institutional context has proven a viable mechanism for other researchers as 
well. Hug (2000) delves deeper into the Maastricht Treaty using the lens of institutional 
construct, and finds that through an evaluation of referendum of 15 countries, the type 
(e.g., binding, non-binding) had an independent effect on the outcome. Specifically, 
because the consequences of the vote in a binding/non-binding referendum are different, 
the voting differences should also be apparent. Hug argues that when a facultative 
binding referendum has been offered, the vote-of-confidence effect is stronger, 
essentially showing support for the government’s position. However, when mandatory 
referendum votes take place, the governments cannot signal their intentions, and thus the 
confidence vote aspect is muted.  
The concept of “initiative culture” may also play a significant role in the process. 
To what degree does direct democracy play a central role in the politics of a given 
nations? That is, do the people understand the process, accept the process as a legitimate 
method of governance, and seek out the process to achieve certain ends? Such acceptance 
would likely be the result of repeated use; many countries, however, have only used the 
process in consideration of universal decisions, such as acceptance of Maastricht.  
As mentioned, however, culture includes more than turnout. Christin (2005) 
consider notions of European Union support, and find that culture does indeed play a 
significant role. In particular, levels of democratization play an important role in terms of 
EU support: citizens of less democratic nations are more likely to believe that joining the 
EU would strengthen democratic institutions, while those residing in more democratic 
nations (such as Central Europe and the Baltics) are less likely to support accession 
because of a perceived lack of need for such institutions.  
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In a separate study, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003) argue that the outcomes of 
various EU accession referendums in Eastern Europe could be considered in light of 
“elite unity” on the issue as a primary determinant and underlying public support as a 
secondary determinant.  Thus, rather than complex notions of democracy, culture for the 
present authors was determined more by “popularity” (which is indeed a problematic 
notion of culture; endogeneity is only the beginning of the problems here) but 
nonetheless find that elite support in Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Lithuania resulted 
in support, while Eurosceptic ideas were given support in the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Estonia, and Latvia where elites were unsupportive.  
Szczerbiak and Taggart also develop what they consider to be a “causal model” 
that attempt to identify both results and turnout in a given referendum vote. It is worth 
noting that the reliance upon culture is revealing. The model considers independent 
variables that predict results to be (1) direction of cues from social elites; (2) public 
support for the EU; (3) knowledge of the European issue; and (4) the credibility of elites. 
The varying levels (considered on a continuum) affect the likelihood of a yes/no vote. 
The authors also admittedly exclude the “credibility of European institutions” (Szczerbiak 
2003: 17 and 22) because, they argue, such institutions only affect referendum results “at 
the margins” but also because elites are already part of the institution, and thus, the 
effects are difficult to parse out.  
It should be noted that these findings are in opposition to those made earlier by 
Hug (2000), who had found that the institutional context did in fact mediate the impact of 
political actors (and partisanship cues). However, it should further be noted that Hug 
considered three institutional factors: whether or not the initiative was binding, whether 
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the referendum was constitutionally required, and which governmental coalition was in 
power at the time of the vote.  The importance of the finding (for my purposes) is this last 
one, which simply adds to the methodological confusion because it could be considered a 
cultural independent variable as well.  
Initiative culture may have also played a part in Lithuanian and Estonian (and 
Eastern Europe more generally) referendum voting patterns. Lust (2009) argues that the 
2003 European Union membership vote found eight Eastern European participants whose 
outcomes differed significantly from one another. The above cited states, however, 
focused on their status rather than institutional contexts insofar as their relative economic 
stations seemed to be the predictor: Lithuanians sought to overcome their economic 
hardships by a vote to join the EU; at the same time, Estonians considered accession to 
further reinforce their dependence on the West and prolong their economic hardship. 
Although the author argues that these results were based on variant strategies of 
economic reform, it seems clear that similarities in institutional constructs point to 
outcome variance as a function of culture – or at least, political elites.  
Political culture (and such influence on turnout and outcomes) can certainly play a 
role in referendum politics within nondemocratic regimes as well . In 1958, Egypt held 
two referendums, both with 98% turnout and 98% approval (the Founding of the United 
Arab Republic and Nasser for president); Egyptians in 1965 repeated the Nasser vote by 
the same margins, and the 1971 Constitution also passed with 98% of the vote, and 98% 
of the turnout (C2D). In 1974, the Egyptian regime set sights on attracting foreign 
investment with the “October Paper” – arguing to the populace that attracting foreign 
investment would make up for domestic shortfall. Like the votes before it, the regime 
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attracted nearly 100% approval, due in large part to electoral fraud orchestrated by the 
Ministry of Interior (Moustafa). Presidential confirmations by referendum in 1976, 1981, 
1987, and 1993 all had support above 95% (C2D). Interestingly, the 2011 constitutional 
referendum, held after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, found only a third of the 
electorate showing up to the polls and just 64% approved of the new Constitution – as 
Ottaway (2013) argues, this newly approved Constitution will not put an end to the 
transition period, but instead, focus the debate on the rights of the minorities, which are 
lacking in the new Constitution.  
 Other nondemocratic regimes utilize the process and find similar results. Morocco 
voters approved a 1970 constitutional referendum with a 99% approval rating (93% 
turnout), pushed by King Hassan II, and again in 1972 after a failed coup with the same 
results. Referendums in 1980 (moving the age of majority from 18 to 16 for royal 
successor, and extending the mandate of parliament from four to six years) produced 
similar results, as well as the 1992 referendum increasing parliamentary seats. As was the 
case in Egypt, the 2011 Arab Spring resulted in new constitutional referendums in 
Morocco, and although only 73% turned out, 98% voted to grant executive power to a 
prime minister (e.g., the power to dissolve parliament) but also to leave military, 
religious, and judicial power within the purview of the king24.  
 The cases above certainly raise questions on widespread policy agreement. As 
Altman (2011) notes, the 2002 Iraq referendum on the presidency of Saddam Hussein 
(100% turnout and 100% approval) does not reconcile with the notion that Shia Muslims 
                                                          
24 BBC . “Morocco approves King Mohammed's constitutional reform” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-13976480 
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or the Kurdish population were properly represented. This is not surprising, since 
dictatorships do not lose plebiscites.  Altman (2011) finds of the 254 referendums that 
occurred in nondemocratic regimes, only three resulted in losses (Uruguay in 1980, Chile 
1988, and Zimbabwe in 2000).   
Altman (2011) also considers the issue worldwide, and while his main concern is 
not the institutional structure, this is an important element. Altman considers the degree 
to which (or if) direct democracy serves to strengthen representative democracy. The 
theoretical perspective that Altman employs starts from the foundation that the institution 
of direct democracy is the mechanism that allows popular sovereignty to flourish within 
contemporary representative democracies. For Altman, the focus of this research should 
be on the degree to which the two institutions can coexist, rather than a focus on whether 
or not they are mutually exclusive.  
Altman’s research is certainly inclusive. The author builds a database of five 
thousand observations over a twenty-five year period in “each and every country” in 
which either a referenda or initiative occurred. The only limitation here is that the “event” 
must have occurred at the national level, which of course leaves out many cases 
(especially the U.S. case).  The research then focuses on the relationship between direct 
democracy and nondemocratic regimes (the findings here indicate that use is motivated 
by the “maintenance of an illusion of an existing democratic process” and to further 
legitimate the regime in both political as well as psychological elements towards the 
populace). Interestingly, Altman here argues that, in the cases in which authoritarian 
regimes accepted defeat via referendum, the cause was international leverage and 
institutional design – an important element for the purposes of this dissertation.  
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The remainder of Altman’s work (2011) focuses on the degree to which 
accountability is present within the environment of direct democracy. That is, Altman 
argues that the weak institutions are in fact assisted by countries (the focus is primarily 
Latin America) that use direct democracy, insofar as the “rules of the game” are not as 
easily (arbitrarily) altered. The single case study of Uruguay is also examined, and 
Altman concludes that when the executive opposes the objective of the promoters of the 
measure under consideration, the government in power is more likely to lose at the polls. 
This is especially the case when economic issues are at stake, when the referendum seeks 
to maintain the status quo, and when strong lobbies or unions are behind the referendum. 
Thus, institutional design is clearly a relevant factor in determining referendum 
usage. A superficial analysis suggests that easier access to the referendum device equals 
increased referendums, and that the opposite would also be true. However, this analysis 
does not fully examine the role of individuals working within the institution already 
created. In so doing, a better understanding of the degree to which referendums are used 
within systems that have easier access – and within those that have more difficult access 
points – becomes clearer.   
Campaigns, Parties, and Elite Cues 
Western Europeans have been asked to consider accession to the European Union 
more than 40 times since the 1970s (Butler and Ranney 1994). Certainly, constitutional 
referendums (either those seeking voter approval for joining a larger organization, such 
as the European Union, ratification of a treaty, or individual state level constitutional 
change) differ from policy referendums in a significant way: the former changes the basic 
institutional structure of government, while the latter focuses on the issue of 
representative versus individual level decision-making. Galligan (2001) finds that the 
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referendum is an appropriate means of decision when considering constitutional issues 
insofar as it increases the legitimacy of the process; at the same time however, the 
process itself is difficult – and properly so.  
The literature related to accession referendums is dominated by discussion of 
ruling-party support, insofar as the “required” aspects of such referendums preclude a 
study of the politics surrounding the introduction of the question. The discussion in the 
literature focuses on referendum outcomes not as reflections of the issue at hand, but 
rather of voter affection or disaffection with the ruling party (and by extension, in most 
cases, government). These take shape primarily in response to European treaties, such as 
Maastricht or EU Constitution. Franklin, et al (1995) argue that the referendum 
conducted in France and Denmark to ratify the Maastricht Treaty resulted not in true 
voter preferences for European popularity as a whole, but rather, aggregation of voter 
preferences towards the ruling party. The basis of their argument is that “partisan 
attachments in parliamentary systems are inextricably entwined with government 
popularity, so that the outcome of a referendum has to be seen in connection with the 
position taken by the government” (105).  Their findings suggest that lack of support by 
party government in France resulted in a very narrow passage of the referendum, while 
the same referendum failed in Denmark during a time of strong majority party opposition 
– only to pass a year later when the disfavored party was no longer in power. The 
consequence of this, of course, is that it questions the relevance of such referendum. 
Given the various nature of referendum possibilities (i.e., binding, non-binding, and of 
course, facultative) the very likelihood of a referendum appearing is dependent upon the 
government assuming success; however, in the case of mandatory referendum, the 
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outcomes may be more likely to reflect satisfaction with party government than with the 
issue at hand.   
More recently, Garry et al (2005) examined the issue with respect to Irish voting 
on two EU treaties. The authors argue that the result differential in the two treaties 
(actually, it was two elections on the same treaty – the Nice Treaty), is a function of 
“second-order election”25 factors, mainly because the first go-round resulted in a negative 
vote, which was determined to be the result of low campaigning on the purpose of the 
referendum by the voters; the second go-round, on the other hand, was accepted and 
determined to be the result of the party vigorously campaigning the effects of the treaty 
itself (i.e., put the focus on Europe as a whole). The Irish also initially rejected by 
referendum the Treaty of Lisbon. As Kellerman (2008) argues, the approximately 1 
million Irish voters (amounting to less than 1 percent of the bloc’s population of over 500 
million) essentially held hostage the Treaty as a whole, insofar as Ireland was the only 
member state to hold referendums on the Treaty. The stated objections ranged from 
concerns over neutrality (certainly a concern, given Ireland’s neutrality), the loss of VAT 
taxation benefits, and a fear of loss of influence in an enlarged EU; Kellerman (2006), 
however, notes that the actual concern was over political disenchantment with political 
elites who supported the Treaty. O’Brennan (2009) and later Quinlan (2009) support this 
argument, finding that the two main reasons for the “no vote” for the Treaty were “an 
enduring Irish attachment to an overwhelmingly exclusivist national identity” and also a 
“lack of knowledge” on the part of the voters, which typifies the divide in elite vs. 
                                                          
25 Second-order elections are those that are not perceived by voters or actors to be as important as national 
or general elections, and thus can be considered as mechanisms for signaling support – or a lack of support 
– for domestic political parties and government (Garry 2005: 204). Second-order effects are more likely in 
non-binding referendums.  
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popular political awareness. Yet, when asked again to approve the Treaty, Irish voters in 
2009 did so by a 67% margin, and while the distrust of elites remained in place, De 
Bruyn argues that fears of an economic recession changed the mind of many voters (one 
in ten gave a “yes” vote on economic ground in 2008; one in four gave a “yes” vote on 
economic grounds in 2009). Thus, Irish voters have had a mixed record on voting for 
treaties: “yes” votes on the 1973 EC referendum, the Single European Act, the Maastrict 
Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, but “no” on the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, 
both of which eventually became “yes” votes.  
More generally, Glencross and Trechsel (2011) consider Flash-Eurobarometer 
survey data to analyze empirically the second-order decision making by voters in Spain, 
France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on the 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe (TEC). Spain and Luxembourg both approved, while the Dutch and French 
both voted “no”. The authors find that in the case of the Dutch and the French, the 
concern was not the constitution itself, but rather, a “generally pessimistic attitude about 
the European Union” (12); similar pessimism was not found in Spain and Luxembourg. 
Thus, voters are showing concern for aspects unrelated to the immediate issue at hand, in 
both the negative and the positive sense (i.e, Spain and Luxembourg had a positive affect 
towards integration (and not the constitution itself), and thus approved.  
 This study does lead one to wonder why a state would risk ratification failure in 
the first place, if such a referendum were not mandatory. To understand this relationship, 
Finke and Konig (2009) examine the strategic interaction between government, 
opposition parties, and the electorate in 25 countries during the 2004 Constitutional 
Treaty vote. The key finding is that treaty-friendly governments may seek to circumvent 
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a “potentially treaty-sceptic parliamentary opposition by initiating a referendum” (358). 
As such, the authors argue, the referendum becomes a mechanism of policy change rather 
than yet another veto player as had been suggested by others (Hug and Tsebelis 2002). 
Moreover, the government can expect moderate to high gains in a treaty reform vote 
regardless of their desires.  
 In addition to institutional context, the role of parties is also important. A later 
study focusing on the role of parties in the 2007 EU Constitution referendum found that 
the party is indeed an intervening variable. Crum (2007) focuses on the asymmetry 
between government and opposition parties: because government parties are constrained 
to commit themselves to the “Yes” side, opposition parties can exercise a genuine choice, 
which can constitute a “competitive model” or a “collusive model” depending on their 
willingness to side with the government party. However, because the opposition party is 
likely to suffer from intra-party dissent and defection, the choice may actually become a 
liability. Crum finds that support for the EU Constitution is based on party identification 
rather than simple opposition, and that center-left parties are more likely to support the 
Constitutional Treaty. This however has implications in and of itself as center-left parties 
are more likely to follow a yes-vote but followers are more likely to oppose the yes-vote 
from the center-right groups. In either case, however, the effects of protest groups are 
ineffective. 
Hobolt (2006) evaluates the impact that parties have on voting behavior by 
examining two Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty. She finds that political 
parties have a considerable power to influence the way in which referendum choice is 
perceived by voters; however individual preferences towards the EU are a stronger 
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predictor of vote choice. Because defections are probable, Hobolt argues that parties have 
more success in framing the proposal “as close to the ideal point of the median voter” 
(641). That is, the evidence suggests that voter do in fact take cues from the parties that 
they support, but that “issue preferences condition the extent to which parties can 
persuade their own supporters to follow the party line” (642). Such framing occurs 
through the media, and thus, the effects of the framing are also important measurements 
of voting behavior.   
Support for the idea that referendum campaigns have much in common with 
regular election campaigns also comes from Jenssen and Listhaug (2001), who argue that 
party cues play a central role in the opinion formation process. Utilizing national survey 
data collected on voter attitudes to the 1994 European Union referendums, these scholars 
find that parties (especially those with a majority in parliament) can influence public 
opinion, especially through such techniques as resource control over the timing of the 
referendum, the allocation of campaign resources, the role played by other ad hoc 
organizations, and the implementation of the actual referendum results. Thus, parties are 
successfully able to mobilize their traditional followers, which make referendum events 
similar to regular election campaigns.  
 A consideration of how voters make their electoral decisions would not be 
complete without a brief discussion of the role of the media. A review of the research in 
this area finds a significant lacuna; Jenkins and Mendelsohn (2001), however, find that 
coverage of referendums mirrors closely that of standard electoral campaigns. The 
resulting (normative) implication from this is that the media does not serve to facilitate a 
deliberative environment which leads to further understanding, but given the framing 
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power of the media (and in the case of referendums, research suggests the framing was 
focused on the procedural issues of the campaign rather than substantive issues) and 
selective perception of individual voters, the result is similar to regular election 
campaigns.  
 Thus, determining how individuals vote must consider multiple variables. Christin 
et al (2002) consider the information costs that referendums have on voters, and in 
particular, examines the heuristics and shortcuts that may be employed in deciding how 
to vote. Given the unusually higher number of referendums in Switzerland, the authors 
focus their attention here. Their research results in two main findings: first, that 
systematically uninformed citizens vote more strongly against ballot measures if they 
imply a change to the status quo, which align with the risk-averse theory of voter 
behavior. The authors argue that the implication is that voters are more informed about 
the current status quo than they are about the proposed change. Secondly, they find mixed 
support for the notion that uninformed voters might mimic the behavior of well-informed 
voters if they aware of the endorsement of a political actor.  However, the authors argue 
that their data are problematic insofar as operationalizing the informed/uninformed voter 
is not all that easy; moreover, understanding the causal connection between cues 
delivered by actors and those by parties are difficult to separate.  
Hobolt (2006) considers this topic in a much more detailed manner by focusing 
on three main questions: how voters behave, what the role of the political elite is, and 
ultimately, whether or not referendums influence policy outcomes. In response to the first 
question, Hobolt finds that salience is the key: when high, the voter relies on their own 
attitudes rather than adopting the second-order approach discussed earlier. The role of the 
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political elites is considered to be primarily responsive, in that they can interpret the 
meaning of the referendum for voters, and they can also set the agenda once the decision 
is taken. Finally, she argues that the indirect effects of the referendum may be the key, as 
policy outcomes are closer to the median voter preferences in situations in which the I & 
R is used. The author extends this research (Hobolt 2009), where she finds that issue 
voting (as opposed to second-order voting) is prevalent in referendum on European 
integration especially when voters are provided with sufficient information and clear 
recommendations from political elites. This means a large prop of voters have the 
capability of voting completely and responsibly on Euro issues given that adequate info is 
available. Voter competence may be enhanced when political parties instigate serious and 
open debate on issue of Euro integration and when the campaigns offer extensive info on 
the issue. She also finds that detailed factual information is not necessary for voters to act 
in a reasonable manner since political party cues can act as substitutes. Thus, she argues 
that voters are smarter than they are often given credit for. Direct democracy may not 
produce outcomes desired by politicians but they are nonetheless decisions based on 
competent voting records.  
 If voters are indeed competent (this author does not take this notion to be proven), 
then the question becomes one of the relevance and appropriateness of direct democracy 
itself. Qvortrup (2002) examines this question in a comparative analysis, and argues that 
referendums are indeed compatible with consensus government, and that they are 
democratic institutions because they allow for equal participation of all groups and for 
protection of minorities. He further argues that turnout decreases as referendum increase 
(at least in Denmark and Sweden), and that higher socioeconomic demographics are 
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overrepresented. For the most part, voters have high knowledge of individual 
referendums, and that by extension; the referendum does not obstruct the representative 
democracy process. However, the notion that such relative appropriateness can exclude 
the notion that referendum voting on constitutional questions automatically leads to an 
increase in deliberative public. Chambers (2001) finds what many before (Gerber 1999; 
Smith, D and Tolbert 2004; Smith, Mark A 2002) have found with regard to direct 
democracy: referendums may actually undermine deliberation. Chambers argues that this 
is in large part due to the degree of majoritarianism that is inappropriate for this serious 
of a question, and that referendums present the voter with the image of “inflexibility” 
(2001: 233), which in turn lead disincentivise deliberation.  
In addition the constitutional questions, political elites often use direct democracy 
to further their own interests. Such examples draw from both democratic and 
nondemocratic regimes; it is the nondemocratic regimes considered here first. Certainly, 
the use of the referendum to legitimize or consolidate power is more common within 
nondemocratic regimes, as the legitimization in such systems must be manipulated rather 
than assumed. Early examples of nondemocratic regimes utilizing the institution of direct 
democracy include the 1802 referendum triggered by Napoleon, and a successful one at 
that: 99.7% voted for a lifetime appointment, as opposed to a 17-year term, as originally 
proposed by the French Senate. In the 1930s, Nazi Germany held several plebiscites, 
ranging from the legitimization of the withdraw from the League of Nations in October of 
1933 to reaffirming support for Adolf Hitler in 1938. Certainly, legitimizing the 
consolidation of power was Hitler’s main concern here: after an August 1934 law merged 
the offices of the President and Chancellor (granting now sole power to Hitler), the law 
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was offered to the people as a plebiscite, who overwhelmingly approved (Suksi 1993).  
As successful as these votes were (90% approval ratings), the Nazi government would 
lose some interest in the utilization of the plebiscite because the 90% approval rating left 
some room for a dissenting vote – this, Schiller (2009) argues, was seen as a “failure”.    
Thus, certain conclusions relevant to this study can be drawn from the literature 
on campaigns, parties, and elite cues in referendum politics. First, political parties and 
campaigns are relevant: the discussion in this section focused primarily on instances in 
which the referendum was mandatory, and in this sense, parties may seek to capitalize on 
the requirement for their own political ends (perhaps legitimizing or delegitimizing the 
status quo). Secondly, insofar as legitimation is a key element of political efficacy, the 
institution of direct democracy is compatible with representative democracy. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this study, are that political elites often use 
direct democracy to further their own interests, in both democratic and nondemocratic 
regimes. 
Conclusions 
The current literature on the institution of direct democracy considers several 
significant factors of the process. In large part, the significant rise in the literature related 
to direct democracy is correlated with the significant increases in the usage of the process 
itself.  Certainly, with the significant rise in the usage of the referendum, scholars sought 
almost simultaneously to explain the usage. Nonetheless, three significant problems exist 
with the current literature.  
Like those who miss the forest for the trees, scholars did not fully consider the 
wider context of direct democracy usage. Scholars have focused on the increased 
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“demand” model, from the perspective of the educated voter seeking governmental 
responsiveness (Dalton 1996); that political elites are acting as policy entrepreneurs in 
co-opting the “populist” mechanism and using it for their own ends (Craig, et al: 2001); 
that state-level usage increases later usage (Morel 2001); and that democratic revolutions 
during the 1990s produced new constitutions that were legitimized through the 
referendum (Kaufmann and Waters 2004). However, there is an underlying contextual 
cause that must be considered in each of these cases: what was the political context in 
which the introduction of direct democracy occurred in the first place? Several of the 
cases discussed here illustrate that this is a key variable: the lack of “out-groups” in the 
Soviet constitutions resulted in fewer referendums, as did the German constitutions; 
critical junctures that included “out-groups” were the key variable for referendum 
inclusion and outcomes in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, Colombia and Paraguay.  
Secondly, the literature does not fully consider the impact of the unintended 
consequences that generally occur as a function of referendum usage, especially when 
legitimizing leadership and/or policy.  While the “populist paradox” (Gerber 1999) 
records the ever-common co-opting of the initiative process by powerful elites rather than 
by the populists for whom the mechanism was designed, other significant unintended 
consequences routinely occur as well. This is a significant oversight insofar as the 
important normative concern goes: if the intended purpose of the referendum is to seek 
out and follow the “will of the people”, what are the implications that arise when such an 
outcome is rarely met (or perhaps met, but with additional consequences)? Such 
consequences certainly have implications for the efficacy of the institution. Once again, 
an examination of the context in which the institution of direct democracy was first 
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established could provide a “universal” basis for understanding the occurrences of 
unintended consequences.  
Finally, the literature considers several different avenues of institutional design 
that affect the frequency of the usage. For example, Kaufman and Waters evaluate 
multiple criteria (e.g., signature requirements, restrictions on topics that may be put on a 
referendum, quorum or turnout restrictions, and the overall “culture” of a given political 
environment. While useful individually, these studies do not provide a significant 
contribution to the study of comparative politics, insofar as increased restrictions 
obviously result in fewer initiatives or referendums (as do turnout and quorum 
restrictions). The larger (and the far more important) question is to what degree the 
context of the introduction plays a significant role in the way that the institutional 
construct is now designed – and then scholars can determine the effect that institutional 
design plays a role in direct democracy as a function of the original context and the 
resulting path dependency.  
The main focus of the remaining chapters is an examination of the context in 
which the institution of direct democracy was originally introduced, and the degree to 
which this context plays a larger role in the eventual outcomes, to wit, institutional 
design, the role of individuals, and frequency of usage. This review has, to some degree, 
“previewed” these topics by examining differences in constitutional formation and direct 
democracy, institutional design, and the role of individuals in the process. However, the 
remaining chapters apply the theoretical framework to two sets of matcher-pair studies: 
Italy and France, and Uruguay and Venezuela.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN ITALY AND FRANCE 
Introduction 
The prior chapter considered the institution of direct democracy in a variety of 
cases in an effort to focus on relevant variables: constitutional design, institutional 
design, the role of out-groups, the role of parties, and the role of political elites. The 
current chapter examines the institution of direct democracy in Italy and France with a 
particular focus on the above variables, and with the overall goal of evaluating the extent 
of  referendum usage in a given political system follows, in large part, the theoretical 
formula discussed in the first chapter: that the introduction of direct democracy in a 
political system, and cast definitively in a constitution is a function of the participation of 
out-groups (Condition 1, or C1); that the later usage of referendums is dependent upon 
(1) historical institutional design (HI1) and (2) the role of political elites in the process 
(P1), where (P1) are conditioned by (HI1) as well as by the tenets of the prospect 
theory/cybernetic theory of decision making discussed above (PC1).  The next chapter 
will follow largely the same format and examine the cases of Uruguay and Venezuela.   
The Introduction of Direct Democracy in Italy  
 The Italian Constitution of 1947 created a parliamentary regime in reaction to the 
Fascist conception of strong executive leadership. Thus, the institution of direct 
democracy largely originated in the Italian system as a function of anti-fascist fears; 
certainly, the introduction of a multi-party system in the context of pluralism (or, hyper-
pluralism?) suggests that authoritarianism on any level was a major concern to the 
originators. During the Constituent Assembly of 1947, Constantino Mortati argued for 
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the inclusion of direct democracy, noting that it “permits the resolution of conflicts, gets a 
sense of the people, and is able to live with a parliamentary regime” (Volcansek 1999). A 
relatively close vote followed considerable debate and reworking of the original proposal; 
nonetheless, the notion of pluralism was encapsulated in the offering. The effects of that 
institutional origin are clear: certainly, the process allows for the resolution of conflicts; 
the process does get a sense of the people; and in many cases, the process has either 
forced politicians in Parliament to act prior to resolution of the referendum, or in others, 
to be bound by their results. In still other cases, the referendum has proved disastrous to 
party bases, and a catalyst to legitimacy for smaller parties. In a word, pluralism; in yet 
another, anti-authoritarianism.  
The provision for the referendum did not appear to be a central feature of the 
Constitution; nor did it appear to be designed to find frequent use. Given the multiparty 
representation in Parliament and the weak executive, an appeal by the people against 
government (especially considering the abrogative nature of the referendum) did not 
appear to be something that would be often needed.  Indeed, Article 75 of the Italian 
Constitution, which provided for the referendum, did not take full effect until 1970, when 
“implementing” laws were enacted by the Christian Democrats – and then only because 
the Christian Democrats changed their stance: what had once been an instrument that 
could only weaken their power became, in 1970, the instrument through which the DC 
sought repeal of legislation passed against their wishes: the ability to seek and be granted 
a divorce. As a function of this, the DC (at the time an opposition group) sought, 
alongside other “out-groups” (e.g., the Communist Party and smaller Catholic groups) to 
use the referendums to support their policies. Nonetheless, their failure would result in a 
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sense of a power loss of the authority of the two main parties – a pattern noticeably 
repeated with later uses.  
Institutional Design in Italy 
With the exception of the Swiss, Italians utilize the institution of direct democracy 
more frequently than any other European state. Additionally, the Italian arrangement is 
the only system in Europe (again, with the exception of the Swiss) in which the people 
can trigger the use of the referendum themselves – in all other systems, the process is top-
down. The small sample size does not minimize the fact that referendums are more likely 
to be more frequent when the people retain control over its usage.  
Institutional design has an important role in the direct democracy process in Italy. 
At the top of the institution within Italy is the “abrogative referendum” which derives its 
power from the Italian Constitution. In particular, Article 7526 states that a popular 
referendum can be held to decide on the repeal (total or partial) of a law when requested 
by either (1) 500,00027 registered voters, or (2) five regional councils. This, of course, 
precludes Italians from a fully “positive” role in proposing laws, as they are 
constitutionally limited to negating either parts of laws or to the comprehensive redaction 
of law. Indeed, not all matters are at the discretion of this limited power: tax laws, budget 
laws, amnesties, pardons, and international treaty laws are “off the table”. Perhaps most 
interestingly, however, is the stringent institutional design manifested in the requirement 
of a 50% voter turnout quorum in order for the results to be legally binding. That is, a 
                                                          
26 In addition to Article 75, Article 138 allows for 500,000 voters or one-fifth of the members of either 
legislative chamber (or five regional councils) to demand a referendum on constitutional language and law, 
unless the law in question has been passed under this provision. Article 132 allows the use of the 
referendum on modifying borders of Italy. Neither has been used at the national level.  
27 The current population of Italy is roughly fifty-nine million; thus, roughly 1% of the electorate is able to 
initiate a popular vote on the complete or partial abrogation of a particular law (Kaufmann and Waters 
2004). The signatures must be collected within a 90-day period.  
76 
 
double majority is required: a majority of the valid votes cast, but also, a majority of 
those eligible to vote (Kaufman and Waters 2004). Regardless of how the referendum 
comes to the ballot (via the voters or the regional councils), the results are binding. It is 
important to note that because of the nature of abrogative referendum Italy, a “yes” vote 
actually favors repeal of a law, while a “no” vote favors retention28.  
In addition to the double majority requirement, other institutional designs 
facilitate outcomes. In particular, the Constitutional Court29 plays a significant role in the 
process in Italy. After the signatures have been collected, the Court decides on the 
admissibility of the request. Between 1970 and 1995, 75 requests were “promoted”, and 
of these, only 46 passed muster with the Constitutional Court (Uleri 1996). Additionally, 
Parliament may also intervene in the process in two ways: they may dissolve Parliament 
to postpone a popular vote (this occurred in 1972, 1976, and 1987), and they can directly 
change the laws to be in harmony with the promoters of the popular vote and thus prevent 
the vote itself; this occurred eight times between 1970 and 1995 (Uleri 1996).  
 A study of the institution of direct democracy (in any setting) would not be 
complete without a review of the role of the courts, and Italy is no exception. The 
referendum process in Italy faces two courts: the Corte di Cassazione verifies the 
signatures on petitions and forwards on the certification to the Constitutional Court, 
which has a much larger role. The essential role of the Court here is to determine the 
constitutionality of  the question at hand, and beyond looking at the constitutional 
restrictions (that the question not be an issue related to taxes, budgets, amnesties, 
indulgences, or related to ratification of an international treat) the Court has strengthened 
                                                          
28 Indeed, the ballot reads “Do you desire the repeal of the law…?”  
29 The Italian Constitutional Court is comprised of fifteen members: one-third each appointed by the 
president, elected by Parliament, and elected by the lower courts.  
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its role in the admission process. During a 1978 review of eight referendum proposals, 
the Court expanded its role in the process by arguing four separate reasons why a 
proposal would become inadmissible. First, a question may not contain multiple and 
heterogeneous questions (in other words, all questions had to be reduced to a single, 
unifying question). Secondly, the proposal could not involve or implicate any part of the 
Constitution or a constitutional law (and more to the point, such questions were governed 
by separate constitutional articles). Third, the proposal’s central intention could only be 
attained by injuring the Constitution or other laws, the proposal would be deemed 
inadmissible. Finally, the Court reaffirmed that the proposal could not consider any topics 
already delineated by Article 75 of the Constitution (Volcansek 1999).  
 The Court thus plays a central role in referendum outcomes. Of the eight proposed 
questions in 1978, the Court ruled four inadmissible; Parliament acted before the 
questions reached the voters and the lower court ruled two of the remaining four moot 
and thus inadmissible; in 1981, the Court held five of eleven questions inadmissible. In 
addition to the gatekeeping aspect, Volcansek (1999) also offers evidence that the Court 
operates with a degree of activism as well as a political slant. The author points out a 
number of examples: overturning Radical Party submissions while allowing others of a 
similar topic to proceed; allowing the “sliding scale” referendum to pass in spite of the 
budget and tax implications; and allowing controversial referendums dealing with 
electoral law (a constitutional issue) to pass.  
 Volcansek (1999) further argues that the role of the Court in the referendum 
process can be considered as a four-stage process. First, the Court practiced considerable 
self-restraint in the early stages, applying the literal words of Article 75 of the 
78 
 
constitutional text. The Court, however, soon began to expand its discretion by adding 
additional criteria, which (thirdly) allowed more elasticity in the interpretation process, 
and gave the Court considerably more influence over the process. Finally, the Court once 
again expanded its own role in the process in 1987, when the Court barred a referendum 
that would alter how  members of the Superior Council of Magistrature was chosen, 
which was later used to bar any challenge to the electoral systems. In sum, the process 
amounted to a considerable expansion of the Court’s original jurisprudence, and along 
the way, allowed the Court to “deflect issues away from a popular vote and preserve 
dominate elite values”  (Volcansek 1999: 112). After the major political upheavals of the 
early 1990s, however, the Court “recast its structural role” (113), and in so doing, 
returned to a stricter jurisprudential basis, with the net effect being “adherence to a clear, 
accurate and consistent legal policy” (113).  
In practice, direct democracy in Italy is common. Second only to Switzerland within 
European countries that have some form of direct democracy, Italy saw fifty-three 
referendums appear on ballots30 between 1970 and 2003 (C2D). Uleri (1996) finds that 
five main phases can be identified within the last half-century of Italian direct 
democracy: the first (1943-1948) coincides with the collapse of the Fascist regime 
(indeed, in 1946, a referendum was held deciding whether to institute a republic or a 
monarchy); the second (1948-1970) saw the implementation of the abrogative 
referendum as a result of conflict between the Vatican and the Christian Democrats (DC) 
on the issue of legal divorce; the third (1970-1981) saw the use of the referendums by 
opposing Catholic groups and Radical (PR) groups (both groups were successful 
                                                          
30 Of these fifty-three, 36 were affirmed, 17 denied; however 18 of the fifty-three were voided due to the 
lack of a quorum.  
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mobilizers); the fourth phase (1981-1992) resulted in use by myriad parties that had 
developed (and who focused primarily on social issues, such as wage indexation and 
cost-of-living issues); the fifth phase began in 1993 and have focused on governmental 
procedure and electoral laws.  
More recently, Uleri (2002) finds that the Italian process can also be divided into 
three further stages, and from this, implications regarding the “non-voter” can be derived. 
The first period lasts from 1970-1985, and is characterized as the “period of the NO 
vote.” The second lasts from 1986 to 1993, and is given the moniker of the “YES vote” 
period, and the third and final period, the non-vote period, lasted from 1993-2000. The 
first phase is marked by a period in which the 50% quorum was reached in all cases, and 
the electorate rejected the referendums put to it; in the second, the predictable opposite 
occurred and in the non- vote period, 15 of the 27 issues accepted by the Constitutional 
Court were void because of the lack of turnout. The reasoning, Uleri argues, is that the 
opponents to referendum found that it had “become easier to canvass for abstention rather 
than to get people to vote NO” (Uleri 2002: 867). Indeed, it appears that the institutional 
structure of the Italian system has altered the traditional mobilization methods: in this 
case, campaigns of de-mobilization took place. As a result, Uleri argues that “all voters 
are equal, but in referendums, non-voters are more equal than voters.”   
Uleri (1996) argues that the abrogative initiative has proved to be capable of 
performing as a “veto function”, but also as a method capable of interfering with the 
agenda setting process as well as a law-amendment process. Taken together, this actually 
results in a decision-promoting methodology. Given that the objects of referendums are 
the laws already in place, along with the idea that requests can be worded in such a way 
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as to focus on complete annulment or partial annulment, the outcome often depends upon 
the length of time that the law has been in effect, rather than the nature of the law itself: 
long-standing laws that are targeted often result in intervention in the agenda setting 
process, while laws recently approved that become targets tend to amount to a veto (Uleri 
1996).  
Institutional design affects outcome and usage in Italian referendum voting. To 
what degree, then, has political culture affected outcomes? The cases presented here can 
also point out the importance of “initiative culture” as a corollary to (effective) 
institutional design. That is, such culture exists if the mechanism can be used “by civil 
society groups such as unions, interest groups, social movements or alliances driven by 
political entrepreneurs” (Schiller 2005 cited from Ewert 2007). Moreover, such initiative 
culture exists if qualified actors can cooperate strategically with other political actors and 
institutions, such as parliament, government and court. Finally, an initiative culture also 
consists of a “pluralistic spectrum of parties, a liberal constitutional court, and a sense of 
democratic fairness” (Ewert 2007). 
Turnout is a prime indicator of culture, and Italian turnout is traditionally quite 
high (generally upwards of 90% of eligible voters). Referendum voting, however, has 
generally been lower than standard turnout rates (ranging from 57-87%). The difference 
is what Italian scholars refer to as “additional abstentionism” (Parisi and Rossi 1978; 
cited from Uleri 1996). Culturally, a north-south divide also exists; this has been the case 
since the above-mentioned 1946 referendum to decide on a monarchy or republic: the 
republican option dominated the north, while the monarch option dominated the south 
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(Corbetta and Parisi 1994; cited from Uleri 1996). Political parties play the usual role of 
interpretation (both politically and in terms of actual definitions).   
Given turnout levels, frequency, and the perceived legitimacy of the referendum, 
the Italian political culture can be assumed to include direct democracy. However, Uleri 
(1996) argues that while the institution implies a progressive movement towards a 
responsive democracy, the institutional design itself presents multiple problem areas. The 
primary problem, however, appears to be in the power of the above-mentioned 
Constitutional Court to “abuse” their gate-keeping power.  
The Italian Party System 
Perhaps no other country better exemplifies the concept of multipartism than Italy 
in the 20th century.  The complexities of the Italian party system are a significant variable 
in the discussion of Italian referendums, and given that complexity, a section dedicated to 
their workings seems appropriate. However, in each of the cases under examination in 
this dissertation, the role of the political elites is discussed in detail; in the Italian system, 
a discussion of political elites must first include the party system.  
The modern Italian party system is a function of both historical lineage and 
geographical realities, and scholars have contributed significantly to our understanding. 
For example, Sartori offered a theory of “polarized pluralism”, arguing that because the 
ideological center is occupied as a function of the large number of influential parties, the 
extremes would be strengthened at the expense of the moderates (Sartori 1966; 1976). 
Other scholars took a tempered view of the system. Farnetti also begins his analysis at the 
ideological center, but offers a model of centripetal pluralism that focuses on the 
continuous divisions within both the left and the right. In particular, Farnetti offered 
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evidence that on a number of occasions, the left parties moved towards the center 
throughout the 1950’s, 1960s, and 1970’s, and at the same time, documented the 
tendency of the voters on the left to reward centrist movement.  
In one sense chaotic, and in other orderly, party systems in Italy are like no other. 
After World War II, the center-right Democrazia Cristiana  (DC) dominated Italian 
politics into the early 1990s.  The nascent DC developed into a catch-all party that did not 
reflect a simple left-right alignment. Indeed, the DC purposefully opened itself as a center 
party, and in particular, a party open to “the collaboration of parties that refused to 
cooperate” with the Communists (PCI) and Monarchists (MCI), and as a result, the DC 
encapsulated both upper middle classes and lower middle classes, neither of whom would 
wholly accept capitalism nor socialism (Farnetti 1980). The DC maintained this central 
alignment primarily by representing multiple interests,  and in large part, control of civil 
society (Farnetti 1980: 8). Indeed, all prime ministers from 1945-1981 were from the DC; 
all but three presidents were as well. Gilbert (1995) argues that the DC’s centrality was 
ensured by the “absence of a credible opposition”, and as a function of this, retained 
hegemony over the leading institutions of the state.  
Nonetheless, excluded forces did exist: the PCI and the MSI. The Partito 
Comunista Italiano participated for a short time post-war; once removed, however, the 
PCI would not return but instead remain on the outside looking in. Gilbert (1995) argues 
that the party remained a “monolithic organization” run on top-down principles. The 
Movemento Sociale Italiano was also never fully accepted in the mainstream. The neo-
fascist movement was founded by supporters of former dictator Mussolini, and was based 
on anti-capitalist, anti-American  principles. These ideas notwithstanding, the MSI 
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transgressed to more conservative levels (espoused by support of Italy’s membership in 
NATO and the recognition of the legitimacy of the Italian Constitution) and in 1960 the 
MSI enjoyed a brief governing role before being relegated to the sidelines once more as a 
function of riots and bloodshed caused by their decision to hold their annual congress in 
anti-fascist Genoa (Gilbert 1995).  
In both cases, however, the DC played a role. Indeed, the 1960 MCI accession 
occurred with the backing of the DC;  in the 1970s, the PCI was considered an alternative 
to the established party system (the DC) and the radical left, and garnered 34.4 percent of 
the vote in 1976 (Gilbert 1995). In order to avoid governing with the MSI, the DC was 
forced to open to the left, and while the administration would consist of DC ministers, the 
PCI provided “external support” (Gilbert 1995).  
Clearly, times change – and the rise of Benedetto Craxi and the PSI are a 
testament to this. The Partito Socialista Italiano received just under 10 percent of the 
vote in 1979, but the strategy employed by Craxi intended to move the party away from 
its more traditional roots and towards the center – essentially moving “into” the system. 
Also, as Pasquino (2008) argues, Craxi deliberately decided to challenge the PCI in an 
effort to reduce their electoral support and to showcase their overall irrelevance in Italian 
politics.  In an effort to ensure a majority, the DC had to rely on four allies, creating a 
period of pentapartito, one of whom would be the PSI. Interestingly, Craxi would 
demand the prime minister’s job before pledging support, and would remain in this 
position between 1983 and 1987. As Gilbert (1995) argues, Craxi’s stability was the first 
sign of success; also, however were warming relations with then-President Reagan 
(though the strategic politician always knows when enough is enough, as evidenced by 
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Craxi’s independence during the Achille Lauro Signorella  affair in October 1985), an 
improving economy, and wide support for social policies.  
The notion of “bargained pluralism” (Hine 1993) certainly appear here as well: 
for all of the apparent stability, Gilbert (1995) argues that because Craxi was only able to 
govern with the tacit support of the PCI, the reality was that Craxi’s allies were trying to 
defeat him while his adversaries were trying to sustain him, and Craxi had little choice 
but to stick to uncomfortable allies within the Christian Democrats. By 1987, significant 
changes were once again underway, and the rise of the PSI here would be the start of a 
longer trend.  
 Not surprisingly, the transformation process has not slowed since the early 1990s. 
The development of Lega Nord fundamentally altered the system. The culminating 
factors of growing dissatisfaction with the existing parties (proven primarily by the 
“Clean Hands” investigation) as well as the revival of a territorial identity allowed the 
Northern League to increase its share of the political agenda. In addition, the decline of 
the Christian Democrats and the transformation of the PCI helped the fortunes of Lega 
Nord (Pasquino 2008). While electorally popular in the North, Lega has been largely 
unsuccessful elsewhere. More generally, Pasquino (2008) argues that three major 
transformations occurred within this period. First: the disappearance of the historical 
parties – especially the Liberals, Social Democrats, and Republicans. The primary 
function of their disappearance was institutional: electoral law changes increased the 
threshold for minority parties; charges of corruption, however, did not help their cause. A 
secondary cause was the transformation of historical parties, and in particular, the decline 
of the Christian Democrats, which can largely be attributed to the decline of the Italian 
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Communist Party. In large part, the PCI wore the badge of the enemy for the DC, and 
their decline took ammunition from the DC – primarily from the social sectors. The result 
was first a loss of votes, and secondly, a breakdown into several fragments, many of 
whom still claim DC heritage today. Pasquino argues that the third important 
transformation was the development and success of Forza Italia. The importance lies in 
the evolution of the party; created from scratch in short order, had become a dominant 
force in Italian politics. Due in large part to Berlusconi’s leadership (and the assets he 
brings), the author also argues that Berlusconi also appears to be the potential weakness, 
insofar as the leadership is primarily unitary.  
Pasquino’s (2008) overall argument is that Italian parties and the party system are 
not sufficiently consolidated (142). Once again returning to Sartori’s explanation of 
“polarized pluralism,” the author argues that the transformations discussed here represent 
a shift from a right-centre-left conceptualization (and the ideological difference 
separating them) to a new party competition modeled on “moderate pluralism”: one in 
which centrist parties are less influential and are unable to dictate the type of coalition to 
be constructed. The outcome, for Pasquino, is electoral competition; in the former, a 
meaningful coalition between the center and right/left was impossible; in the latter, the 
bipolar organization among two heterogeneous coalitions has made alternation a reality. 
In short, the ideological distance between the two major coalitions has been reduced.        
  The effect of earlier intraparty divisions is clear: as Hine (1993) argues, “divisions 
between different institutional arenas, and between different factional groups, ensure that 
authority to make policy is rarely delegated to a cohesive leadership group in 
government” (109). The net effect is a continuous cycle amongst parties, parliamentary 
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groups, and individual faction leaders.  More importantly however, is the basis for such 
division.  
On the formal side of the equation, Hine (1993) argues that the formal 
organizational model parallels the tiers of Italian government: municipal, provincial, 
regional, and national (111). In each instance, the composition matters – perhaps most 
notably so at the national level, where the general gathering (the congress) is held, and 
where the party leader is chosen; from this control of party organization resources are 
marshaled.  
Referendum Cases in Italy31 
 On March 18, 1946, Prince Humbert announced the House of Savoy’s agreement 
to allow a referendum to decide the fate of Italy’s monarchy. Such a case certainly 
exemplifies the tenuous relationship between direct democracy (even direct democracy, 
Italian style) and that of a representative or monarchical government. To what degree 
should established leaders deposit their fortunes with the masses? In this case, Prince 
Humbert declared that “…the free choice of the people, who we are sure will be inspired 
by that which is best for the future of our country” 32In any case, the partisan attachments 
were clear: as the New York Times reported33, the royal family attempted to stay out of 
the political debate as much as possible, while leftist parties generally opposed, while 
center and right parties generally favored – and favored especially the notions that the 
method of the referendum was the key point in settling the debate. The outcome, of 
course, favored a transition to a republic – but the outcome also resulted in considerable 
                                                          
31 See Appendix A for a complete list of direct democracy cases in Italy.  
32 “Humbert approves the referendum to decide the fate of Italy’s monarchy”. (Mar 19, 1946). New York 
Times (1923-Current File), pp. 13. 
33 “Royalist violence spreading in Italy; Naples riot rages” (1946, Jun 08). New York Times (1923-Current 
File), pp. 1. Retrieved from 
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violence, primarily between Monarchists and police forces in Pisa, Rome, and 
Naples34;certainly this vote was no exception to the regional differences that exist: 
support for the republic was found primarily in the northern regions of Liguria, Piedmont 
and Lombardy, while support for the monarchy was found primarily in the south. Reports 
of the time indicate fears that the slim margin of victory would create an unstable 
foundation for the new government, and also of an eventual split into two separate and 
independent states.35   
  In 1974, in accordance with the constitutional provision that the referendum be 
used as an abrogative device, Italians were asked by Parliament to retain or repeal a 
three-year old divorce prohibition36 statute. The law itself had been bitterly contested as it 
worked its way through Parliament, and before the law was fully approved, Christian 
Democrats, enjoying a long-standing majority in Parliament, revisited the idea of the 
referendum for the first time since the 1946 constitutional referendum. Knowing that 
provisions for specific law regarding the referendum had not been fully implemented, 
Christian Democrats sought to expedite the process to use as a counterforce once the law 
was passed (Mark 2006). In this sense, then, Christian Democrats believed that a minority 
of the population favored the divorce law, and that a majority vote through the 
referendum would right what was clearly wrong.  
 The divorce referendum process began on the day the divorce law was passed: 
Professor Gabrio Lombardi (Professor of Roman Law at the Catholic University of 
                                                          
34 “Humbert favors plebiscite in Italy”. (1946, Jan 28). New York Times (1923-Current File), pp. 7. 
35 “Italy a republic by 5-to-4 margin; Humbert to leave”. (1946, Jun 06). New York Times (1923-Current 
File), pp. 1.   
36 The divorce law was introduced by Loris Fortuna, a member of the PCI, in 1965. Scholarship suggests 
passage was a peculiar function of the times: the second Vatican Council sparked new debates over the 
merits of divorce, the media had renewed attention to the debate, and civil rights more generally became 
the focus of the public. The law itself allowed divorce in limited situations, such as abandonment, a spouse 
being sentenced to prison, mental illness, or crimes involving incest or prostitution (Mark 2006).   
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Milan) collected 1,370, 134 signatures in short order (well above the required 500,000) 
by utilizing the network associated with the Church (Mark 2006). The case brings out 
multiple elements of the importance of institutions both formal and informal. For 
example, reports suggest considerable confusion among voters over the question 
wording: in other words, Italians who wished to outlaw the statute (and thus, divorce)  
were expected to cast a “yes” vote, while those favoring divorce were expected to cast a 
“no” ballot. In addition, conservative Roman Catholics and neo-fascists transformed the 
referendum into an anti-communist crusade.  
The DC argued vehemently against divorce (and thus, a “yes” vote on the 
referendum, but once again the notion of bargained pluralism raised difficulty, as 
coalition partners (Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans) were all in favor 
alongside the PSI37.  Indeed, the very passage of the law broke a stranglehold of the 
Church on Italian society; had the social and economic transformations that marked 
postwar Italy not occurred, along with increased migration from the south to the north 
and increased women on the workforce, it is unlikely the Chamber of Deputies would 
have been successful (Mark 2006). Insofar as the 1974 referendum marked the first 
experience since the 1946 referendum on the monarch, turnout was quite high: 88% of 
the eligible voters produced a “no” vote by a 59-41%  margin, retaining the ability to 
divorce in spite of the wishes of the Catholic Church and the DC.  Once again, 
consequences for the leadership were clear: significant movement towards a leftist line 
                                                          
37 The PSI had been instrumental in securing the original passage, especially through indirect tactics, such 
as creating lobby groups (Lega Italiana per il divorzio). Public support was crucial to passage given the 
entrenchment of the DC in Parliament and the role of the Catholic Church in Italian society. The law 
eventually passed in a parliament (164-50 in the Senate, 319-286 in the Chamber of Deputies) that saw 
Christian Democrats slightly outnumbered through coalition opposition.  
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offered little consolation for Prime Minister Rumor (DC), and fights related to inflation, 
laborers, housing, education, and public transportation would follow on the agenda.38   
 Over the next few decades, Italians would return to the polls in an effort to answer 
a dizzying array of questions. In 1978, the Radical Party found the support of the PSI 
seeking repeal of police powers and engagement of the Italian police, but the issue was 
rejected by Italian voters, who instead followed the positions of the all of the parties of 
the “Constitutional Arch”; similar results occurred with the second question on the same 
ballot, this one considering public financing of parliamentary parties. In 1981, the DC 
and the Radical Party would offer two opposing abortion referendums: the DC asked 
voters to abolish abortion (voters disagreed by a large margin, retaining abortion but with 
limitations); the Radical Party asked voters to remove all limits on abortion (once again, 
the voters rejected this idea, retaining limits on – but keeping the practice of - abortion). 
These failures suggest that not only were Italians (or at least, the electorate) more secular 
than either the DC or the Church had assumed, but that clearly they were also 
considerably more liberal. Indeed, the very legislation that both referendums targeted was 
itself placed on the books under the threat of referendum in 1978. Not surprisingly, the 
hegemony of both the DC and the Church appeared fragile as a function of the outcome 
(Bodagnor 1992).  
  Three more referendums made their way to the 1981 ballot: Radical Party 
supported questions attempting to abolish life imprisonment (rejected by voters); outlaw 
private guns (also rejected) and another attempt to curb police powers (rejected yet again 
by voters). Voters again rejected a 1985 referendum that would have overturned Prime 
                                                          
38 Outcome of Italian Divorce Vote Uncertain as Campaigning Ends." New York Times (1923-Current file): 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007). May 11 1974. Web. 10 Dec. 2011 . 
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Minister Craxi’s legislation aimed at curbing inflation; the “sliding scale” referendum 
(reducing the automatic growth of salaries of Italian workers at the same rate of inflation) 
was confirmed with a 77% turnout. The main sponsor of this referendum was the 
Communist Party, and when faced with what was essentially a “censure” measure, Craxi 
offered to resign if the measure carried. With the negative outcome also comes a repeated 
pattern: in an attempt to solidify legitimacy and power, the instigator of the referendum 
ends up losing political capital rather than gaining; the failure also showed the growing 
isolation of the Communist Party in Italian politics.  
 Though Italian voters had consistently rejected referendums, this outcome does 
not suggest a general anti-government stance, especially considering the fact that most 
referendums were supported by the Radical Party. In 1987, however, voters for the first 
time approved a referendum, this time rejecting the use of nuclear power. While the 
results were not surprising (considering the 1986 Chernobyl disaster), the Radical Party 
also found success in abolishing the law that excluded civil responsibility of judges in the 
event of judicial error as well as abolishing a law that excluded ministers from ordinary 
prosecution. The referendums themselves were the subject of considerable infighting, and 
editorials questioned the efficacy of the referendums, citing the fact that “virtually all 
political parties are in agreement to change the laws, and Parliament would have to act in 
any case”.39 
 Social issues were not the only policies decided by referendum in Italy. In 1991, 
more than 95% of the voters approved a referendum aimed at simplifying the voting 
procedure in an effort to reduce corruption. By allowing voters to choose only one 
                                                          
39 “Italy voting on atom power and other issues”. (1987, Nov 09). New York Times (1923-Current File), pp. 
A9. 
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candidate per party (rather than four), and requiring voters to write the name of the 
candidate (rather than a number, which could easily be changed), the influence of the 
parties in election was reduced.40 
Spurred on by popular support, Mario Segni broke from the Christian Democrats 
and formed Poplari per la Riforma (Populars for the Reform) and sought electoral 
reform. In 1993, voters approved a referendum that would change the proportional 
representation system that was often blamed for short-lived governments. The new voting 
system incorporated first-past-the-post voting for 75% of the seats in the Senate. On the 
same day, voters approved the abolishment of state based financing for political parties, 
the redaction of the Ministry of State Industry, as well as the Ministries of Agriculture 
and of Tourism and Performing Arts, as well as reduced responsibility for environmental 
controls by the government. In addition, voters more narrowly approved restricting 
criminal penalties on the personal use of drugs. The election came in the wake of 
revelations of widespread corruption, and widespread approval seemed to indicate that 
voters were willing to take responsibility (and action) where government would not41; in 
either case, the results once again showed considerable disapproval of the Christian 
Democrats. Perhaps more importantly, was seemingly the determination (via the 
referendum) to take power from the minority (better represented through proportional 
representation systems) and give it to the majority (Amato 1996).  
 In 1995, voters were asked to decide a dozen issues by referendum – the most on 
a single ballot to date.  Center-left coalitions sought the permission of voters to dismantle 
the media empire of Silvio Berlusconi, which they argued allowed him unequal access to 
                                                          
40  “Election reform referendum in Italy” (1991) National Public Radio. Retrieved from 
]http://search.proquest.com/docview/189818537?accountid=27953 
41 “Italy - revolution by ballot”. (1993, Apr 24). The Economist, 327(7808), 52-54. 
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voters.   Voters here split their approval, and among the most controversial of them was 
the decision to require Silvio Berlusconi to reduce his media holdings. Voters rejected the 
idea that he should give up two of his three television networks and cut back the 65% 
share of the television advertising market. Voters also allowed private shareholders to 
take up a stake in the state broadcaster (RAI), and to reduce the legal powers of the 
powerful trade-union federations, and also defeated a referendum designed to extend 
shopping hours – all considered a victory for Berlusconi and his supporters42 
 The initial motivation the Italians had for the referendum seemingly vanished 
over the next 13 years. Between 1997 and 2010, 24 referendums were offered without 
meeting the turnout quorum requirements. Though 90% of the voters approved additional 
electoral law reforms related to reducing proportional representation, only 49% of the 
voters turned out to cast ballots. The turnout levels worsened in 2000, when only 32% of 
the electorate turned out to once again decide proportional representation reforms. In this 
case, care was taken to remove deceased voters and nonresidents to make it easier to 
reach the quorum, nonetheless, the voter fatigue seemed to be quite evident (Stanley 
2000). Voters again could not cumulatively meet requirements in 2005 when asked to 
decide four questions related to stem-cell research, artificial insemination procedures, and 
invitro fertilization practices; nor could electoral law reform issues be considered in 
2009.  
 Most recently, voters returned to the polls in June 2011, and in this instance 
managed to reach the turnout requirements.  Voters overwhelmingly rejected private 
water suppliers, rejected a cost-plus system for profits on water delivery, rejected nuclear 
                                                          
42 “Europe: The way things are in Italy”. (1995, Jun 17). The Economist, 335(7919), 51-51 
93 
 
power once again, and rejected impediments to the appearance in a criminal court by the 
President of the Council of Ministers (C2D).  
 Thus, where Parliament could not settle an issue, the referendum has – and the 
implication of this is the legitimacy of the referendum in Italy. Though the first 
referendum on divorce was supported by the DC and the Church, 27 of the next 33 
referendums were supported by “out” groups (primarily the Radical Party) who moved 
Italy towards secularization via the liberalization of divorce and abortion. As Bogdanor 
(1993) notes, the Constitution of Italy was designed to ensure that a one-party 
dictatorship could not be repeated. While the fear of Fascism lead to a system of 
“bargained pluralism" and diffuse power arrangements, the electorate secured an 
additional weapon in the use of the referendum. As parties utilized the referendum in 
search of policy aggregation, the context of the original inclusion of the mechanism 
repeatedly proved that unintended consequences were the norm, and perhaps more 
importantly, that within the Italian system, the referendum secured by out-groups favored 
out-groups. As the Italian political tradition continues to evolve, the referendum can be 
considered both a cause of change, but also a consequence of change.   
France 
 Constitutional framers in 1791 France had a significant dilemma (as many 
constitutional framers do): on the one hand, the abolishing the arbitrary power of the 
Bourbon monarch (while at the same time leaving the monarchy in place), but also 
avoiding excessive democracy. Significant divides originating here between the “left” 
(supporting limited powers of the monarchy) and the “right”43 (supporting absolutism of 
                                                          
43 The usage of the overly simplistic “left” and “right” is used here to recognize the French and their 
introduction of the now ubiquitous terms.  
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what would prove to be a short-lived monarchy) on major issues such as the relationship 
between church and state, government intervention into the economy and society more 
generally, and also on the power structure of the regime, would lead to continual regime 
instability. Indeed, a dozen regimes have ruled France since 1789, and many of those 
transitions were quite bloody. The drafters of the first Constitution introduced the indirect 
and restricted vote, and this pattern would follow throughout the years to come (and 
repeated within the third revolutionary Constitution as well as the Charters of 1814 and 
1830 – the Bourbon and Orleanist monarchies).  
 However, the second (albeit brief) Constitution was a notable change. The 
Jacobin Republic (1792-1794) focused on democratic outcomes, and originated the 
institution of direct democracy in France. The support for the process came largely from 
the Montagnards, who held majorities over the more moderate Girondins. As Morel 
(1996) notes, the Girondins were given the opportunity to promote a constitutional text, 
but that failure led the Montagnards to not only include direct universal suffrage, but also 
the institution of direct democracy (including the initiative process for constitutional and 
legislative matters). Indeed, the first French referendum would be held on the 
Constitution44, ironically, a referendum45 would also be used to legitimize the 
replacement Constitution, designed by more moderate Thermidoriens.  
 Napoleon’s rise to power in 1800 produced (by referendum) the Constitution of 
the Year 8 (the An VII), and in line with the consolidation of powers described the 
document, the institution of direct democracy and the referendum more particularly was 
mentioned only the context of the ratification of the document itself, and thus did not 
                                                          
44 Though supported by 99.1% of the electorate, only 25% of the electorate showed up to vote.  
45 Turnout for this referendum decreased over the 1793 version: 18% of the population approved the vote 
with a 95% majority; scholars have argued it may have been as low as 13.7% (Morel 1996).  
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appear available for future use. The 1800 referendum  in this case, along with the 
reaffirmation of Napoleon as consul for life in 1802 both received more than 99% 
approval (though low turnout numbers of 43% and 51%, the lack of information, and a 
lack of a secret ballot bring legitimacy into question here). Certainly, such referendums 
were aimed at legitimizing the power of the individual leader, rather than the earlier 
constitutions (which, it should be noted, had passed through elected representatives; 
Napoleon’s power had already been captured). These referendums, along with the 1815 
referendum restoring a modified imperial constitution and the 1852 referendum, in which 
voters were asked to approve the continuation of authority of Louis-Napoleon as 
Emperor, left later constitutional framers with the impression that the referendum in and 
of itself was anti-democratic. Indeed, populist movements at the beginnings of the Third 
Republic (1870) as well as Monarchists both agreed that devices associated with 
Bonapartism could not be associated with the new Constitution (Morel 1996), and no 
such language existed (nor was the referendum used here for its approval). In its place 
was the dependence on the sovereignty of parliament – and this historical development 
would have consequences on its future usage.  
 After the liberation of France and the replacement of the Vichy government in 
1944, the question of the referendum once again arose, and General Charles de Gaulle, 
head of the provisional government, decided to ask the nation two questions: whether to 
officially end the Third Republic (96.4% approved), and whether the provisional 
government in place should be limited to drawing up a new constitution, which would 
then be offered for a referendum vote (66% approved this question). This second 
question, garnering only two-thirds approval, was in large part a reflection of Charles de 
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Gaulle, who opposed the referendum process as a whole, and at the same time favored a 
strong presidential regime. Indeed, de Gaulle advocated a “no” vote on the subsequent 
drafts of the constitution, and the first constitutional project  was rejected by the voters 
53% to 47%; a compromise draft created between the left and Christian Democrats that 
moderated earlier positions passed later that year with 53% approving in October of 
1946. Morel (1996) argues that the small majority, coupled with a 35% turnout, did not 
fully legitimize the Fourth Republic, and that this legitimacy would never fully be 
realized. The Fourth Republic would indeed be marked by instability and ineffectiveness; 
Clarendon finds (2003) multiparty coalitions that could not remain united led to 
instability within Parliament. In addition, ministerial instability also manifested during 
this time, with 24 different governments between 1946 and 1958. Nonetheless, the 
referendum in and of itself was re-legitimized, and the 1946 Constitution included 
provisions for its use, though limited to situations in which a parliamentary majority 
could not be reached. Ultimately, these three instances (the 1945 referendum to authorize 
a new constitution, and two 1946 referendums confirming the Constitution) would be the 
only uses in the Fourth Republic.  
 The Algerian crisis provided a critical juncture with which de Gaulle found a 
number of opportunities. Though retired, de Gaulle believed that the crisis required his 
attention; that a show of force was needed:  
 “In short, the prospect was one of chaos, culminating in civil war…unless 
a national authority, outside and above both the political regime of the 
moment as well as the movement which was preparing to overthrow it, 
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could immediately rally opinion, take over power, and restore the state” (de 
Gaulle 1971: 18).  
 De Gaulle sought to replace the extant Constitution via the referendum process, 
and the people of France approved overwhelmingly in 1958, both in metropolitan France 
and in the territories46. Certainly, de Gaulle viewed the vote as a mandate – that the 
people were frustrated with the longevity of government instability, caused in large part 
by fractionalized parties.  
Certainly, de Gaulle was not a strong believer in the parliamentary process, nor of 
political parties more generally. De Gaulle’s motivation for a stronger executive can 
clearly be seen as a context of the times, rather than as a dictatorial bent; France had to 
recover from significant wartime losses, and could only do so as a united entity. As 
Morrisey argues (2002), de Gaulle sought a republican constitution that provided for the 
national interest over the factional interest47; a strong counterbalance of a dedicated 
executive would mitigate the passions of political parties and factions. Clarendon (2003) 
furthers the point, arguing that de Gaulle’s agenda during the…Fifth Republic can be 
characterized as an effort to strengthen the executive and devolve power away from the 
legislative institutions of the state” (24).  Indeed, in a radio broadcast in the 1946 
campaign, the “infernal cycle” – thirteen constitutions in 150 years – “imprints on public 
life a character of discontinuity, agitation, improvisation, which has been disastrous” (de 
                                                          
46 A “no” vote by territories would have indicated a vote for independence (though this would not apply to 
Algeria, which was considered a “department”). Only Guinea voted for secession.  
47 De Gaulle, in his memoirs, argues that “while I was convinced sovereignty belongs to the people, 
provided they express themselves directly and as a whole, I refused to accept that it could be parceled out 
among the different interests represented by the parties…I considered it necessary for government to derive 
not from parliament, in other words parties, but, over and above them, from a leader directly mandated by 
the nation as a whole…and empowered to act..” (De Gaulle 1971: 6).   
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Gaulle 1971). De Gaulle’s focus48 was twofold: to have a stronger, continuous 
constitutions built on a strong executive (it was here that the people had recourse should 
parliamentary government fail once again), but that such a constitution should be 
supported by a referendum vote.  
 The longstanding reality (and when not a reality, a likelihood) of a lack of a 
parliamentary majority gave de Gaulle in particular the opportunity to push for a more 
powerful executive. The 1958 Constitution included the power of the president to seek 
the approval of the people without going through Parliament, and moreover, Article 11 
also restricts usage to during parliamentary sessions or on the “joint proposal of the two 
assemblies,” but also to “draft laws” initiated by the government, rather than actual laws. 
This provision significantly alters the nature of the referendums submitted in two main 
ways: first, it allows significant discretion on what the president may call for in terms of 
referendums (De Gaulle, Pompideau, and Mitterrand all saw no resistance to their 
referendum proposals); but secondly, it allows the referendum to become a vehicle 
through which the president can overcome parliamentary opposition (Morel 1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 Such a focus meant sacrifice: in January 1946, De Gaulle resigned his presidency in exasperation after 
quarrels with the parties largely over national defense; the interregnum resulted in “tripartisme” wherein 
three parties ruled via coalition and ultimately could not find a majority among themselves. De Gaulle 
would return briefly to politics in 1947 to a responsive electorate dissatisfied with the gridlock between 
Socialists (SFIO), Communists, and the Christian Democrats (MRP), but would not fully control France 
until 1958.  
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Institutional Design in France 
 The referendum process in France is governed by Article 1149 (legislative 
referendums) and Article 89 (constitutional referendums). Article 89 stipulates that the 
power belongs to both the President of the Republic but also the Prime Minister and 
Parliament. A proposed amendment must pass both houses of Parliament before being 
submitted to the people via a referendum; however, the referendum process itself may be 
avoided if three-fifths of majority of Parliament votes approve, and there is agreement 
with the president.  
 Article 11 grants the power directly to the president to submit proposals to the 
people, and there have been significant debates over the constitutionality of using Article 
11 rather than Article 89. Article 11 stipulates that referendums were limited to questions 
concerning treaties and the “organization of public authorities”, but for de Gaulle the key 
was the ability of the president to bypass unrepresentative parties: as Knapp and Wright 
(2006) argue, it served several political purposes: to establish a direct line of 
communication between the president and people, to reinforce unity of the governmental 
coalition, and to divide the political opposition.  
The politics of referendum democracy in France precludes clear outcome-oriented 
conclusions. That is, the degree to which the final vote reflects the wishes of the people 
has been clouded in the context of the vote itself (especially so in the early part of French 
history), but also in the persuasive abilities of the campaign itself. Certainly, the issues 
themselves have been complex, which has led to lower turnout levels (Morel 1996) and 
                                                          
49 Article 3.1 of the current Constitution stipulates that “National sovereignty belongs to the people, who 
exercise it through their representatives and by means of referendum”. Also, Article 72-1 (revised 2003) of 
the Constitution grants power to local governments to submit all draft acts or decisions within their powers.  
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certainly making elite manipulation easier. While the French use of the referendum can 
be most notably viewed in the context of authority reinforcement (whether it be 
democratic, in the case of de Gaulle, or “less” democratic, in the case of Napoleon), later 
French leaders avoided the same path: Pompidou certainly was a first-hand witness to the 
political “suicide” committed by de Gaulle in 1969 via the referendum device; d’ Estaing, 
Mitterand and Chirac would also not make use of the same process (though each served 
for a considerable period of time) to the same extent, and when doing so, they were not 
entirely enthusiastic about the process. Certainly, direct election by the people mitigates 
the need for a legitimizing referendum, but at the same time, the revival of parties in the 
1980s and 1990s (Morel 1996) also caused the decline in the use of the referendums in 
France.  
A discussion of the “culture” of referendum politics in a system in which the 
referendum is rare is difficult, to say the least. It is not axiomatic that simply because the 
referendum does not exist, a culture associated with it does not either; perhaps to 
overcome this problem; the politics of decentralization may serve as a proxy to the 
participatory nature of French citizens. Though often viewed as a model of a unitary 
state, especially after the French Revolution, two phases of French politics focused on 
decentralization efforts: the Decentralization Act of 1982-83, which granted further 
responsibilities to local and territorial governments, and the Decentralization Act II 
(2003-2004). Each act sought to transfer functions such as waterway management, 
education, labor issues, and finance to lower levels of government (Cole 2008), and 
perhaps for the purposes of this study, also allowed for subnational referendums to take 
place in each of the twenty-seven regions in France (Kaufmann and Waters 2004).   
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Referendum Cases in France50 
 Three early referendums would not only set the “tone” for later referendum usage, 
but would also reinforce the idea that the referendum was a weapon best utilized by the 
president and not Parliament. The Constitution itself was ratified by referendum in 1958 
by an 85% margin with a 79% turnout, and all subsequent referendums have been held 
under Article 11. The first two, dealing with the Algerian self-determination crisis, were a 
first “test” of the new powers granted to the president under Article 11. As Kaufmann and 
Waters (2003) argue, French presidents “use the referendum in a very controlled way and 
only if they feel safe about the outcome”; certainly, such a lesson was learned from 
Charles de Gaulle in the 1961 and 1962 referendums.  
 The 1961 referendum asked voters if they would accept the right of Algerian self-
determination and the organization of public powers in Algeria until self-determination 
(passed with  75% approving). In this vote, the weakness of the French Parliament was 
evident; though some opposition was evident, no effective coalition could be formed and 
de Gaulle was successful at marshaling public opinion away from parties through his 
charismatic appeals (Clarendon 2003). De Gaulle made a personal appeal to the French 
two days before the referendum, asking the voters to ignore the intermediaries and inform 
instead de Gaulle directly what was in their “hearts and minds” (De Gaulle 1971). 
Through preparation (using the 1958 Constitution to weaken the power of parliament) but 
also skill (personal appeals to his pet policy), de Gaulle was able to shape public opinion 
and also to transform that shift into a political victory.   
The 1962 referendum not only asked voters to approve Algerian independence, 
but also whether de Gaulle should be granted full power to implement these agreements – 
                                                          
50 See Appendix B for a complete list of direct democracy cases in France. 
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certainly, the president sought a mandate that could not be undermined by parliament – 
but, de Gaulle was also concerned about reelection, insofar as the Algerian crisis (now 
essentially solved) was the motivator of his initial election (Morel 1996). Once again, de 
Gaulle turned his attention directly to the public, and in so doing, garnered 90% approval. 
However, there is some question on whether the referendum was legally needed in the 
first place – public opinion as well as parliament was now on the side of de Gaulle. 
Clarendon (2003) argues that it “seems as if this referendum vote was necessary from de 
Gaulle’s perspective in order to satisfy his personal need to be regularly legitimized by 
the public’s vote (31). Such an action suggests that referendum politics clearly extends 
beyond the particular policy at hand.  
 The 1962 reforms of the 1958 Constitution were centered on the direct election of 
the president, but the new process was in large part following the trend toward 
diminishing the role of parliament as a whole. In response to the concern over his 
reelection chances, as well as the possibility that there would be an attempt to reestablish 
a parliamentary regime (Morel 1996), de Gaulle and the UNR party put forth the 
referendum to the people, who supported the idea with a 62% approval rating. This 
process was the subject of considerable debate – all other parties opposed the idea, and 
questions of constitutionality were raised: should de Gaulle utilize Article 89, which 
required the approval of parliament?  
 A common trait among successful presidents is the power to persuade, and de 
Gaulle utilized his persuasive power effectively. In a speech to the people regarding his 
intention for the direct election referendum, de Gaulle argued that:  
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“the institutions in force for nearly four years have replaced the chronic 
confusion and perpetual crisis which bedeviled the action of the State by 
continuity, stability, efficacy, and balance in the powers of 
government…no one doubts that our country would soon be plunged into 
the depths of disaster if, unhappily, we were to abandon it once more to 
the sterile and contemptible games of yesterday” (De Gaulle 1971).  
For de Gaulle, the use of Article 11 to circumvent parliament via a direct vote of 
the people was in and of itself a show of no confidence of party politics. For his part, de 
Gaulle saw not only his presidency as crucial to the stability of France, but future 
presidencies: “For me there was no doubt that once I was gone, unless my successors 
enjoyed a unique mandate…the parties intended to find ways and means of reverting to 
the previous system (De Gaulle 1971: 313). Indeed, de Gaulle’s insistence that Article 11 
was the clear avenue, rather than the parliament-based Article 89 led to a debate between 
the power of the parties and parliament more generally, and the powers of the French 
President. De Gaulle forcefully argued that the language of Article 11 allowed him to 
submit such a referendum directly to the people insofar as dealt it “organizing the public 
authorities”; that Article 89 was useful when public authorities deemed it “useful” to use 
parliamentary channels (De Gaulle 1971: 314). Importantly, De Gaulle further argues that 
“if there was an Article 11, it was because…I had wanted it [the Constitution]  to include 
just such an article, in that place, with that meaning and scope (De Gaulle 1971: 315). De 
Gaulle had met with party leaders, the Minister of Justice (who was in charge of drawing 
up the Constitution), as well as Ministers of State, and they had all agreed on this point; 
de Gaulle thus found their “shameless ignorance of the principles” as evidence that 
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parties were unable to effectively govern. The French President would ultimately cast the 
referendum as a vote of confidence for his own tenure: “It is your answer…which will 
tell me if I can and if I must pursue my task in the service of France” (De Gaulle 1971: 
320). The voters heard the message, and in spite of considerable media attention 
advocating a “no” vote, 77% of French voters turned out on October 28, 1962 with 62% 
of them approving the referendum. Parliamentary elections held just two weeks later 
would also show public support for de Gaulle and his party.  
General de Gaulle utilized the referendum to serve his own ends, and did so by 
arguing that such a mechanism was fundamentally democratic – it invoked the civic 
participation lacking in the Fourth Republic – but (and along similar lines) it would also 
help to reveal the true wishes of the populace, rather than factional parties. As Butler and 
Ranney (1978) argue, de Gaulle also intended to bring about a “catharsis” – in other 
words, to help move the public mindset from the “chaos and confusion” of the Fourth 
Republic to the modernized Fifth Republic. In addition, basing the power of the regime 
on that of the people rather than parliament, and at the same time increasing the power 
and legitimacy of the presidency (as well as de Gaulle’s own power) were clear 
objectives (Butler and Ranney 1978:145). Scholar Francois Goguel has argued that the 
political climate associated with the Algerian self-determination crisis was overall quite 
negative; there was fear of a civil war, with centrists, left-wing and extreme right-wing all 
opposing de Gaulle’s policies. Thus, the 1961 referendum can be especially seen as a 
calculated attempt to re-center political power; the dual 1962 referendums reaffirmed this 
motion and further undermined his opposition.  
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Clarendon (2003) argues that the calculated move by de Gaulle in 1962 sought 
three main goals: first, the power of Parliament would be significantly reduced, while at 
the same time, the power of the presidency would be significantly increased; secondly, 
that de Gaulle could meet his goal of seeking public approval for both his policies as well 
as his personal leadership; and finally, that the public would support the process insofar 
as they were being asked to decide. Certainly, these goals were met, and de Gaulle’s 
desires for a strong executive alongside a weaker Parliament were realized.  
De Gaulle would not turn to the referendum again until April 1969. The proposal 
aimed to devolve the power of the Senate into a simple consultative body with a 
significantly limited role in actual governance (and to also remove them from direct 
election). At the same time, the proposal focused on regional reforms, and in particular, 
would change the electoral process of regional councils to one of appointment. Indeed, 
the referendum sought to weaken the power of both of de Gaulle’s contemporary political 
enemies, as these had both served as the center of Gaullist opposition (Clarendon 2003). 
After being elected in a 1965 election that proved de Gaulle was politically weakened (a 
second-round vote was required), 1967 parliamentary elections nearly cost Gaullists the 
majority they had retained. At the same time, student and labor protests in 1968 quickly 
gained ground, and de Gaulle and his ministers seemed out of touch and unwilling to 
address the growing discontent. Nonetheless, the Gaullist block, with the help of Georges 
Pompidou, fared well in June 1968 parliamentary elections, winning 354 of the 487 seats 
in Parliament (Knapp and Wright 2006).  
Even with the success of his party, de Gaulle pressed on with what were seen as 
unpopular referendum proposals. Indeed, the proposal that would eventually reach voters 
106 
 
in 1969 had been borne out of earlier proposals that had died before garnering a vote due 
to unpopularity: in May 1968, de Gaulle proposed that the head of state should be given 
authority to change “outdated and rigid structures” (Berstein 1993). De Gaulle’s need to 
reaffirm his mandate, even with significant parliamentary victories, was further based on 
his desire to further weaken the Senate, and while de Gaulle had earlier enjoyed 
tremendous public support, the French were suspicious of these proposals insofar as they 
were viewed as a tactic to weaken or eliminate his own political enemies51 (Clarendon 
2003).  
De Gaulle once again appealed to the public for referendum support – going so 
far, in fact, to hinge his presidency upon the outcome of the referendum vote. 
Resignation, he told the people, was the cost of a “no” vote. Such a policy had worked in 
the past, however, referendum politics are not predicated on the past, but on the context 
of the times; executives, in other words, can certainly underestimate the chance of losing 
a vote. Significant economic challenges alongside social unrest in the late 1960s gave 
Pompidou (removed by de Gaulle in 1968) the opportunity to bolster his own support 
among the public. More importantly, perhaps, his indication that he would be willing to 
serve as president allowed Gaullists in Parliament as well as the electorate more generally 
to support Pompidou while at the same time voting no on the proposed referendum. 
Though close, de Gaulle lost the referendum vote with only a 48% approval rating, and 
de Gaulle kept his promised threat to the people: on April 28, 1969, Charles de Gaulle 
resigned the presidency.  
                                                          
51 The reforms sought by de Gaulle also included provisions reordering the line of succession: removing the 
president of the Senate from next-in-line and placing the prime minister in this position. At De Gaulle’s age 
(79), succession would certainly have been a concern.  
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The post-hoc view of the 1969 referendum characterized de Gaulle as committing 
political suicide, insofar as de Gaulle tied his fortunes to a sinking ship. Later presidents 
would not be so quick to push for a referendum vote; however, occasional referendums 
were put to voters. In 1972, voters were asked to consider a largely non-French related 
issue: the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK to the European Economic 
Community. Held under Article 11, President Pompidou did find an issue that was sure to 
find a significant victory (Morel 1996), and French voters approved with a 67% majority 
on 60% turnout.  
The French also considered a 1988 referendum on retaining New Caledonia as 
part of the French Republic (80% approved, with a low turnout out 36%), and once again, 
scholars find that the lack of controversy led to relative certainty about the outcome. The 
New Caledonia referendum, carried out by Francois Mitterand, did help to legitimize the 
policy itself, but the vote was not wrapped in the personal assurances by the president as 
de Gaulle had done.  
The 1992 vote on the Maastricht Treaty was – like many constitutional 
referendums – as much a vote on the Mitterand government as it was on the Treaty itself. 
While the question of using Article 11 or Article 89 was revisited, Mitterand ultimately 
decided that Article 11 was the most appropriate venue, insofar as the Maastricht Treaty 
impacted French institution. Mitterand was not originally concerned about the vote 
(public opinion suggested two-thirds of the electorate approved), but significant 
campaigning on the part of the National Front, the Communists, and part of the RPR 
(center-right) brought the certainty into question. Indeed, Mitterand explicitly announced 
in 1992 that he would not resign if a “no” vote was recorded (Knapp and Wright 2006) – 
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and such a move would certainly disassociate the referendum from the Napoleonic nature 
of the French referendums – but does not suggest that constitutional referendum votes 
can be disassociated with second-order voting: ultimately, voters approved the Treaty – 
but with a bare 50.8%.   
In 2000, President Chirac submitted a referendum via Article 89 (rather than 
Article 11) asking voters to approve to approve five-year presidential term. The vote on 
le quinquennat  was pushed by Parliament in an effort to reduce the likelihood of 
cohabitation52 by reducing presidential terms and to make the elections of the legislature 
immediately succeed the presidential election. Chirac (not surprisingly) remained 
lukewarm about the prospect of a referendum cutting his term, but ultimately showed 
some support53. Ultimately, a record low turnout of just 30% voted by a 73% margin to 
approve the plan.    
The last referendum to occur in the French political system occurred in 2005, 
when voters were asked to decide whether France should ratify the proposed Constitution 
of the European Union. At the time, the European Constitution required ratification by 25 
EU members, and Spain had (two months prior) become the first country to approve the 
treaty; others had had approved it with a parliamentary votes. Analysis of the process 
suggest that Chirac sought the momentum of the Spanish “yes” vote, and sought to hold a 
quick vote, but that he was also aware of the ability of the French electorate to deliver a 
                                                          
52 Cohabitation occurs when a president of one party must select a prime minister of another party due to a 
lack of majority-party control by the president. The outcome from this is a dual-executive, with a president 
of one party and a prime minister controlling parliament as leader of another party.  
53 “France names Referendum Date”. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4317819.stm 
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protest (second-order) vote against unpopular economic reforms.54 Turnout increased 
from the 30% in 2000 to 70% in 2005, and 55% of those voted “no.” Interestingly, Chirac 
viewed the vote as an easy victory (BBC), but Brouard and Tiberj (2005) report that 
Chirac may have underestimated popular opinion towards the EU. Quantitative analysis 
suggests that a second-order vote related to political distrust was an irrelevant variable in 
the voter decision, but that the left and right wings of the electorate split their reasoning: 
on the left, dissatisfaction with social issues, but on the right, the nationalist threat was 
the main determinant (Brouard and Tiberj 2005).  
Conclusions 
 This dissertation is an examination of institutions and individuals working in 
concert with the overarching goal of showing that the introduction of direct democracy 
into a given political system is a function of the participation of out-groups in the original 
process, and that later usage of referendums is dependent upon (1) historical institutional 
design (HI1) and (2) the role of political elites in the process (P1), where (P1) are 
conditioned by (HI1) as well as by the tenets of prospect theory/cybernetic theory of 
decision making discussed in the first chapter (PC1).  
The theoretical perspective discussed earlier in this work focused on two main 
hypotheses: first, the historical context in which direct democracy was introduced is 
crucial to its later usage; that institutionalism holds explanatory power in terms of how it 
constrains the choices of individuals and actors who must work within them at some 
point in the future (generally as a function of the critical juncture in which it was 
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created). Secondly, and in consideration of those individuals, the choices they make are 
guided not by ranked preferences, but rather by the loss/gain analysis offered by prospect 
theory, but within the bounds of institutional arrangements.  
In the Italian case, the introduction of direct democracy was clearly a function of 
former out-groups: the focus on anti-fascism resulted in a multi-party system, and the 
context in which the institution of direct democracy was created within the Italian system 
suggests that fears of fascism were evident. The success of the Christian Democratic 
Party that emerged after the fall of fascism, and who would find victory in the first 
elections held under the new Constitution in 1948, was based on inclusivity rather than 
exclusivity. The concept of pluralism that informed the creation of the Constitution rested 
on this inclusivity in the institution of direct democracy.  The Christian Democrats, 
Socialist, Liberals and Communist Parties constituted the Constituent Assembly charged 
with crafting the Constitution, and not surprisingly, the document contained a mixture of 
Catholic, Marxist, and Liberal doctrines (Kogan 1983). In so crafting, both the Christian 
Democrats and Communist Parties succeeded in some areas and gave in on others. Over 
the course of the drafting period, the executive emerged with more power, primarily 
through executive decree law but also through the ability of the president of the Republic 
to return any bill of which he disapproves. Such power is still quite limited, however; if 
the bill is again approved by the chambers, promulgation must follow, in addition, while 
the president carries the ability to dissolve parliament, such power is restricted in the last 
six months of office. In this area, the Christian Democrats (certainly thinking about their 
probable future majority) were successful, while the Communist Party registered defeat. 
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The inclusion of direct democracy in the 1947 Italian Constitution thus satisfies the first 
condition of the theoretical approach utilized here (C1) insofar as the out-groups involved 
did not eschew the institution of direct democracy. Table 3.1 summarizes these findings.  
 
Table 3.1: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes in Italy 
Key Variable Outcome 
Out-group presence at 
constitutional formation 
Strong parliamentary system created in reaction to fascist 
regime 
Institutional Design 
 
Top-down referendums 
Citizen-led initiatives with low signature requirements 
Low signature requirements 
50% quorum requirement 
Role of Political Elites Often seeking larger gains while working in a domain of loss 
 
 
 The route to direct democracy in the case of the French was certainly much 
different. Though the referendum had been used sparingly throughout France’s history, 
de Gaulle introduced the referendum not as a function of out-group participation, nor as a 
function of anti-fascist fears, or even authoritarian fears. As has been shown earlier in this 
chapter, de Gaulle utilized the referendum to legitimize his original power by asking the 
people to dissolve the Third Republic and create the Fourth Republic and a new 
constitution. De Gaulle began consolidating power early in his tenure via the referendum; 
his starting point was that multiparty systems impeded a strong and unified France. For 
de Gaulle, the referendum in large part was a method by which legitimation of what was 
considered the “best policy” (regardless of parliamentary concerns) occurred; de Gaulle 
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was quite adept at forcing the hand of Parliament here in relation to referendum usage – 
and the primary motivator was the threat of his resignation (Walker 2003).  This, of 
course, conflates personal legitimacy with that of the state and as such the function is a 
redistribution of power using the instrumental variable of direct democracy. In the end, 
however, this process would end up resulting in that which he threatened so many times – 
resignation.  
Importantly, however, the introduction makes the difference: for the Italians, the fear 
of the governmental overreach centered on singularity was problematic; for the French, 
the multiparty system created squabbling, indecisiveness, and eventually the adaption of 
problematic policies. Thus, in the case of the former, the plebiscite is welcomed; in the 
latter, the use is restricted. For the Italians, the multiparty system has proved at once 
chaotic and oddly stable; direct democracy has helped foster both of these mentalities via 
the usage by Parliament, voters, and parties both in and out of power. Thus, the systems 
matter; individuals may start the institutions on their path but the institutions themselves 
conduct the outcome. In this sense, path dependency – considered an inherent problem 
with historical institutionalism – is thus not an instrumental variable, but rather, a simple 
indicator of the institution itself, as discussed earlier in this work. 
Thus, on (C1), Italy meets the condition, as does France.  As has been shown, 
however, direct democracy has been much more common in Italy than in France, and 
further study will determine if the intervening variable here is simply the context of the 
introduction, or if other variables play a role.   
Differences in institutional design may also affect usage. In Italy, direct 
democracy is quite common, and qualification requirements are relatively easy: a popular 
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referendum can be held to repeal a law when requested by 500,000 voters or five regional 
councils. Though some topics are not debatable via the referendum, access to the ballot is 
relatively easy. The difficulty in Italian referendum politics lies in achieving the outcome: 
the double-majority (50% approval along with 50% voter turnout) often affects outcomes. 
Further, the Constitutional Court does play a “gate-keeper” role in the admittance of 
referendum questions to the people, but the requirements outlined by the Court are not 
overly burdensome. Thus, access to the referendum ballot is relatively straightforward in 
the Italian system.  
 Institutional design in France, however, is much more stringent. First, no 
mechanism exists for the populace to trigger a referendum. Secondly, Article 89 requires 
amendments to be passed by both houses of parliament before being submitted to the 
people and the referendum itself can be bypassed if three-fifths of Parliament and the 
President agree. Though Article 11 also allows the President to submit a referendum 
directly to the people, assuming such a question deals with “the general organization of 
the state”, the reality that it is “the President, not the people or their representatives  who 
has the right to initiate referendums” (Kaufmann and Waters 2004:62)  in France.   
Clearly, institutional design shapes future usage. As discussed earlier, however, such 
a variable should not be easily dismissed because of its simplicity: insofar as 
institutionalism holds explanatory power in terms of how it constrains the choices of 
individuals and actors who must work within them at some point in the future, the role of 
institutions cannot be underestimated vis-a-vis the role of individuals. Thus, in the cases 
of Italy and France, HI1 is shown to be a relevant variable in determining later usage.  
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The role of individuals, does, however, play a central feature in referendum politics. 
As discussed earlier, the theoretical foundation of this dissertation expects to find that the 
choices that individuals make are an explanatory factor in usage, but such choices are 
constrained by the historical institutional design (HI1), as well as by the prospect 
theory/cybernetic theory discussed earlier (PC1).  
Throughout the early years of the Italian Constitution, the Christian Democrats 
viewed the device as an instrument that could only weaken their power. Nonetheless, the 
Christian Democrats were unable to garner their every wish. For example, Christian 
Democrats, seeking greater regional autonomy, found their position marginalized by a 
Liberal-Communist alliance55 that reduced the powers of the regions listed in the original 
draft of the Constitution (exclusive, concurrent, and complementary) in several areas of 
public service. In addition to a reduction in the number of regions from twenty-two to 
nineteen, the central government was granted increased dissolution powers – national 
security was added as a basis for dissolution.  
In this sense, the role of political elites (P1) were conditioned by the historical 
institutional design (HI1) but were certainly working within the confines of the prospect 
theory/cybernetic theory earlier discussed (PC1): as the dominant party facing positive 
prospects, Christian Democrats became risk-averse, seeking the smaller, “sure” gains 
over actions which may have brought them larger gains (certainly, utilizing the 
referendum to legitimate their own policies was an option, and an option not taken). By 
the same logic, the conceptual framework posited by cybernetic theory suggests that 
                                                          
55 Nor were alliances stable. A Liberal-Christian Democrat alliance sought and succeeded in guaranteeing 
absolute equality of powers of a bicameral legislature – an uncommon system in post-war constitutions.  
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within the confines of cognitive theory, value separation exists in a systematic manner: 
the focus is on logical operation. The cybernetic theory of decision making also suggests 
(in a manner similar to “bounded rationality”) that the “decision-maker is like a 
servomechanism and has the ability to determine their systems-level output in accordance 
with set standards and input variation among those standards: “the cybernetic thesis then 
is that the decision mechanisms screen out information which the established set of 
responses are not programmed to accept” (Steinbruner 57). Such a device explains the 
lack of referendum usage in this sense much more efficiently than the rational choice 
paradigm, which suggests that individual acts autonomously and exogenously to the 
political process, most likely through following utility maximizing tenets. Certainly, such 
an approach does not focus enough attention to the institutions that constrain individuals.  
 Further, the increased usage of the referendum in Italy began with an unlikely 
“veto player” – the Christian Democrats became the minority party. Once again focusing 
now on (HI1) as well as (PC1), successful mobilization occurs by out-groups: Christian 
Democrats, the Radical Party, and opposition Catholic groups. Once Christian Democrats 
(now facing a loss scenario as a minority party interested in retaining the status-quo on 
divorce policy in Italy) utilized the referendum device in 1974, other elites focused on the 
device as hyper-pluralism became the norm in the late 1970s through the present day, 
reducing the power of the political elites (as a function of new institutionalism, and 
associated veto players). Institutional design also plays a significant role in increased 
usage in Italy: while a double-majority requirement is in place, only 500,000 voters (out 
of a voting-age population of 47 million in 2012) are needed to request a referendum.  
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Since the referendum device is a top-down approach in France (Kaufmann and 
Waters 2004), the focus of political elites here is the president. Further, since the majority 
of referendums occurred during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, particular attention 
will be focused here. The historical institutional design (HI1) seems to play a lesser role 
here: for de Gaulle, the referendum was always (technically) available; in a prima facie 
analysis, this suggests that usage would be increased, rather than decreased. Moreover, 
insofar as this dissertation suggests that institutions are more of an explanatory factor 
than individuals (political elites included), the case of de Gaulle seems to be an outlier. 
However, the theoretical foundations discussed earlier suggest that individuals working 
within the confines of institutions best explains usage. Though de Gaulle had the 
referendum device available to him,  the prospect theory/cybernetic theory of decision 
making discussed earlier (PC1) best explains usage in the French case. That is, de Gaulle 
clearly saw the role of parties as secondary to that of the presidency, and further, that 
parties would impede governance of the state, as described earlier. Moreover, de Gaulle – 
at least until his last referendum offering in 1969 – was viewed as a popular leader. In 
that sense, de Gaulle was not facing a loss scenario, and as prospect theory dictates, had 
no reason to “gamble” unnecessarily. The outcome of the referendum vote was, by all 
accounts, a foregone conclusion. In addition, as the cybernetic theory outlines, the 
decision-maker has set standards (rather than preference-based rankings of utilitarian 
values), and for de Gaulle in 1958, 1961, and 1962, the standards included (as described 
above) legitimizing the power of the presidency over the factionalism of parties, insofar 
as de Gaulle intended to bring a paradigm-shifting belief to the people that the “chaos and 
confusion of the Fourth Republic” (Butler and Ranney 1978)  was inferior to the 
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modernity of the Fifth Republic. As de Gaulle’s popularity waned in the late 1960s, and 
at the same time, Gaullists lost seats in Parliament, de Gaulle sought another referendum 
relegitimizing his power, and in this sense, both prospect theory serves well as an 
explanatory mechanism: though unpopular, the gamble that had worked in the past 
(though under different circumstances; certainly the 1969 referendum was much more of 
a gamble than the earlier events) and facing the loss scenario, the standards of the “servo-
mechanism” (i.e., what had worked in the past) seemed an appropriate path. In each case, 
however, de Gaulle was forced to operate within the institution created, and that 
institution was created largely as a function of the critical juncture described earlier. 
These findings are presented in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes in France 
Key Variable Outcome 
Out-group presence at 
constitutional formation Semi-presidential system created in reaction to weak parties 
Institutional Design 
Top-down approach (president can submit directly to the 
people, or submit to Parliament) 
No quorum requirements 
Role of Political Elites Often seeking smaller gains while operating in a domain of gain 
 
 
 The 1988 referendum on New Caledonia can be once again viewed within the 
context of (PC1), insofar as Mitterand was quite sure of its passage and achieved the 
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legitimization without a gamble, but the 1992 Maastricht Treaty referendum must be 
more closely considered. In this case, Mitterand foresaw (belatedly) some difficulty with 
getting the referendum that he supported passed (as a function of significant minor party 
campaigning), and explicitly protected his own political position by disassociating 
himself from the outcome: should a “no” vote be recorded, he would not resign, and 
instead stay in power. The 2000 referendum had such a low turnout (30%) that any 
analysis would be suspect (there was no campaign to keep voters away from the polls); 
and the 2005 referendum certainly had unintended consequences for Chirac. However, in 
both the 1992 case and the 2005 case, the same elements exist: political elites operating 
within the domain of protecting the slight gains they have, rather than seeking a larger 
return when facing a loss scenario, and in the more general sense, operating within the 
elements of the cybernetic theory of decision-making (PC1) as described above.   
This chapter has examined Italy and France with the assumption that out-group 
participation in the constitutional formation was more likely to produce referendum 
institutions within a political system. This hypothesis is confirmed in Italy, as well as in 
France.  Secondly, the chapter examines  the overall usage of direct democracy, in terms 
of frequency – and finds that in both the cases of Italy and France, usage is a function not 
of individuals (even political elites) seeking utilitarian gains through rational choice, but 
rather of  institutional design (the initiating process is easily attainable and often used in 
Italy; difficult and rarely used in France), and a positive initiative culture (as defined 
above as a system in which qualified actors can cooperate strategically with other actions 
and institutions; more present in Italy than France, as discussed above).  To the degree to 
which individuals have a role in the process, that role is severely limited by the 
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institutional design, and of course, by the relative loss/gain scenario faced by those 
seeking to utilize the referendum. Indeed, as is shown above, the majority party (in both 
the parliamentarian-based Italy and the semi-presidential-based France) rarely uses the 
device (and working within the confines of institutional design but also a non-loss 
scenario), while the minority parties and coalitions strongly favor the device (also 
working within the confines of institutional design, but facing a loss scenario, and thus 
seeking a bigger “gamble”). These findings are presented in table 3.3 below.  
 
Table 3.3: Impact of Key Variables on Outcomes in Italy and France 
Key Variable Italy France 
Out-group presence at 
constitutional formation 
Direct: Strong parliamentary 
system created in reaction to 
fascist regime 
Direct: Semi-presidential 
system created in reaction to 
weak parties 
Institutional Design 
Top-down referendums 
Citizen-led initiatives with low 
signature requirements 
Low signature requirements 
50% quorum requirement 
Top-down approach (president 
can submit directly to the 
people, or submit to Parliament) 
No quorum requirements 
Role of Political Elites 
Often seeking smaller gains 
while operating in a domain of 
gain 
Often seeking smaller gains 
while operating in a domain of 
gain 
Frequency High Low 
 
 
As suggested by the theoretical foundations discussed earlier in this work, historical 
institutionalism holds explanatory power in explaining why institutions are “sticky”; that 
is, why they often constrain the choices of individuals and actors who must work within 
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them at some point in the future. Institutions are designed by individuals, but once 
designed, institutions facilitate particular outcomes based on the original design; 
institutions constrain and refract politicians (though they are never the sole basis for the 
outcome); moreover, the outcomes can be examined primarily as a function of the origins 
of the institutions. Taken together, the cases of Italy and France show that historical 
institutionalism is relevant as an explanatory mechanism insofar as both cases show the 
dominance of institutions over individuals.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN URUGUAY AND VENEZUELA 
Introduction     
 The preceding chapter considered direct democracy in the context of two 
European states; the current chapter follows the same format with an examination of 
Uruguay and Venezuela in the Latin American context. Clearly, the two systems 
discussed here are in many ways unrelated to the European cases; however, the purpose 
here is to discover the importance of relevant variables on referendum outcomes: the role 
of “out-groups”, the role of parties, and the role of political elites. I begin with an 
examination of the context in which direct democracy was first introduced into both 
systems, and proceed with an analysis of institutional design, and the more general 
examination of the role of parties and political elites. I conclude by examining these two 
cases within the context of the theoretical formulae discussed in the opening chapter: to 
what degree does C1 (the participation of “out-groups”, or minority influences) have 
upon the introduction of direct democracy into a system; also, to what degree later usage 
is dependent upon HI1 (historical institutional design) and P1 (political elites in the 
process), where P1 are condition by (HI1) as well as by the tenets of the prospect 
theory/cybernetic theory of decision making (PC1).  
The Introduction of Direct Democracy in Uruguay 
As the preceding chapters have shown, referendum politics generally begin in an 
era of independence-seeking on behalf of an individual, a group, or even the ruling elite. 
The case of Uruguay is no different. Though most Latin American countries achieved 
their independence by the 1820s, the legacy of authoritarianism as a function of Spanish 
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and Portuguese colonialism still remained well into the twenty-first century. The decline 
of the Spanish Empire in the 1800s as well as the rise of European industrialization in the 
1880s resulted in many Latin American countries producing primary goods for 
exportation; at the same time, however, political participation was limited – indeed, 
questions of “who” should participate – and to what degree they should participate – were 
common (Smith, P 2005). Though the consolidation of the modern nation-state began to 
occur in the 1900s, the focus on economic development led to commercial elites centered 
on foreign investment and economic integration (Vanden and Prevost 2006).  
Uruguayan politics in the early twentieth century inherited a legacy of 
compromise and inclusivity that began in the late 1800s with what was described by early 
practitioners as coparticipation: two traditional parties sharing the responsibility of 
governance. The more conservative Blanco and liberal leaning Colorado began as 
opposing warring factions - identified through colored hatbands - in the 1830s, but would 
eventually find an uneasy peace  into the Pacto de la Cruz (1897) that would attempt to 
guarantee political stability through a guarantee of Blanco control of six departments in 
northern Uruguay (Weinstein 1988). The uneasiness of the peace would be tested by José 
Batlle y Ordóñez, who would lead Uruguay from 1903-1907 and again from 1911-1915. 
Indeed, eight months of civil war would follow Batlle’s initial presidency, and with the 
Colorado victory, Batlle sought to deprive the Blancos of the territorial control while at 
the same time promising to respect Blanco’s position as a minority party in the legislature 
(Ameringer 2009).  
Batlle’s legacy on Uruguayan politics should not be underestimated. Scholars 
(Ameringer 2009; Weinstein 1988) note the radical change envisioned by Batlle not as 
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Marxist in orientation, though the change could be considered socialist in nature. While 
Batlle recognized inequality across classes, he disagreed that state destruction was a 
foregone conclusion, and instead argued that the state intervention was needed in an 
effort to equitably distribute the resources and public goods within society. Thus, Batlle’s 
focus became that of increased regulatory legislation as well as providing services 
directly from the executive branch, such as state monopolies on insurance, public works 
programs, secondary schools, and indeed, an initial reduction in the income tax on public 
officials, followed by an end to the income tax on the entire population (Alisky 
1969).  The focus on the people was not limited to collective goods: Batlle argued that 
the referendum was “an essential tool for insuring citizen participation, given the limits to 
direct participation imposed by the size and complexity of modern society” (Weinstein 
1988). Batlle worked intensely on drafting the new Constitution, and his draft included an 
article that allowed one-fifth of the registered voters to require a plebiscite, which would 
revoke approved laws within 60 days of passage (Vanger 2010).  
     Among the many reforms Batlle introduced was the Colegiado, or nine-member 
council of ministers to replace the singular presidency in Uruguay.  Each member would 
be separately elected, and would be responsible for a specific executive function in an 
effort to combine democracy with a strong interventionist state. The idea for the 
collegiate executive was largely the result of an extended vacation that José Batlle y 
Ordóñez took to Europe during the interregnum of his Uruguayan administrations (1903-
1907; 1911-1915). Influenced by the workings of the French and particularly the Swiss, 
Batlle called for the induction of a collegiate executive upon his return. As Fitzgibbons 
(1966:144) argues, Batlle would have discarded the presidency entirely.  The idea, 
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however, met with fierce resistance both from outside the Colorado Party (the Blancos 
began arming themselves, perceiving the plan to be a power-grab) and from within the 
Party (fears of division and indecision and a possible dictatorship). Altman (2008) argues 
that “the collegiate executive was a political mechanism through which Batlle sought to 
maintain dominance of the Colorado Party (489), insofar as gaining a majority would 
require winning five of the nine seats.    
Altman (2008) examines the systems of Uruguay and Switzerland, noting that 
both were oddly similar in terms of institutional arrangements, yet the institution of direct 
democracy did not take hold in Uruguay in the same fashion that it did in 
Switzerland.  Along with direct democracy, the author also considers the collegiate 
executive, noting that with the case of the Swiss, the population was quite heterogeneous 
and the collegiate executive and the institution of direct democracy were designed to 
create a sort of political safety net for political minorities. However, the institutions 
developed in the Uruguayan case with a different context: “in Uruguay the multi-person 
executive was implemented within one of the most homogenous contemporary western 
societies as…a way to block the opposition from increasing its political power” (484). 
Mechanisms of direct democracy were, Altman argues “bargaining chips among political 
elites” (484) such that their “broadening” was only the result of an executive who sought 
to quell dissatisfaction while ultimately increasing their unitary power. 
The historical context of the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy into 
Uruguay is instructive. Altman (2008) argues that the “European influence” on Batlle is 
not sufficient in this case, mainly because the influence itself is not all that influential 
(many European countries did not adopt the Swiss model, etc). Rather, Altman argues 
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that the introduction, while championed by Batlle as “a measure in defense of freedom 
and against caprices of the state and public officials”, there were also “significant short-
term partisan and political interests towards advancing with direct democracy” (499). In 
particular, Batlle found that such mechanisms were ingenious towards his overall goal of 
the collegiate executive, such that it could work as an end-around a possibly adversarial 
legislature. 
        The case presented by Altman (2008) also fleshes out how unintended 
consequences are an integral part of the institutionalist perspective. Altman argues that 
while a collegiate executive ostensibly “disperses authority, diminishes capacity for 
decisive action, and profound change in a timely fashion”, the problem is that 
mechanisms of direct democracy do essentially the same thing: immobilize through 
additional veto points. While the Swiss could afford (literally) such stagnation, the 
Uruguayan population simply could not. Certainly, Altman utilizes the benefits of eight-
plus years of hindsight, but ultimately, the assertion proves correct.  
For the purposes of this study, the compromise that allowed the Constitution to go 
forward is the key focus. Included in the Constitution, at Batlle’s request, was the request 
for a plebiscite and a referendum on legislation, though no such mechanism would 
actually be introduced. Months of debate culminated in the “Committee of Eight” who 
were primarily concerned about the responsibilities of the president and of the National 
Council, and in particular, which of these entities would control the ministry of finance; 
in any case, the inclusion of the popular referendum would not make it through the 
multiple changes made by the Committee (Vanger 2010). The compromise itself was 
based on the political realities: because a Constituent Assembly, with a anti-collegial 
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majority, was the only method to reform the Constitution, Batlle and the pro-collegial 
General Assembly were forced to negotiate in an effort to avoid paralysis (Altman 2008).   
Scholarship on the 1934 Constitution is lacking, and scholarship related to the 
reasoning of the introduction of direct democracy is seemingly non-existent. Thus, a brief 
discussion of the overall sense of the context in which the Constitution was created will 
serve as a proxy for the overall discussion of the introduction of direct democracy into 
the 1934 Uruguayan Constitution.  
In 1933, Colorado president Gabriel Terra dissolved parliament with the support 
of the Blancos, and was in large part seen as a reaction of the upper classes whose 
economic fortunes were dwindling in the post-World War I era (Weinstein 1991). Such 
fortunes had depended largely on livestock production and exportation, which had been 
the focus of the Uruguayan economy since the late 1800s. The Uruguayan economy 
centered on the meeting world demands for beef, leather, and wool as technological 
advances made such exports feasible. Dependence on foreign markets hit Uruguay 
especially hard during the Great Depression, as Uruguay’s export earnings fell by 40% 
between 1930 and 1932, and in response Uruguay sought diversification towards 
industrial production (import-substitution industrialization) which in turn led to questions 
about  the  degree to which such industries would be state-led, and, for the Colorados and 
Blancos, the degree to which they could dispense public-sector jobs (Mcfeeters 1990). 
  A strong supporter of a new Constitution, Terra sought widespread support by 
arguing that the old constitution was serving the wrong interests, and the institutions 
supported in the new constitution included a singular head of government and head of 
state in the presidency and at the same time strengthening the two-party system in an 
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effort to reduce fractionalization issues. More generally, Weinstein (1975) argues that the 
intellectual ideas for the new constitution were the foundation for corporatist56 ideas, 
though none of these would actually make it into the new document in full (though hints 
of the ideas flow through; for example, the provision of Article 52 which cast work for 
the community as a “duty” and offered preference to its citizens in this regard). The new 
constitution included provisions that allowed the state direct control over imports and 
exports, laws amending the penal code to include crimes against the state, and reduced 
the freedoms of the press. For the purposes of this study, the importance lies in the fact 
that the 1967 Constitution, from which several referendums were produced, retained 
much of the language regarding the process of direct democracy.  
Institutional Design  
 Article 284 of the 1934 Constitution introduced the institution of direct 
democracy by allowing the people to call for reformation of the Constitution in whole or 
in part with the signatures of 20% of the electorate, which would require the presence of 
the reform alternatives in the next regular election. In such a case, the General Assembly 
can formulate alternative measures to be submitted to a popular vote alongside the 
original initiative. In addition, two-fifths of the General Assembly may propose revisions 
to the president, which must then appear on the next ballot. Passage of the measure 
requires a simple majority vote; no threshold restrictions exist. However, if two-thirds of 
                                                          
56 Weinstein argues that the intellectual model (for Terra) was based on prolific leaders of the time: Getúlio 
Dornelles Vargas in Brazil; Mussolini in Italy, and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera in Spain. Such ideas refer 
generally to “state corporatism” as defined by Schmitter (1974:105) as “…associated with political systems 
in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent 
or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities 
are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on 
class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed.”  Ultimately, the constitutional convention did not 
accept “corporative projects” because “democratic ideals are profoundly rooted in the mass of 
citizens….perhaps someday a happy formula will emerge which permits the conciliation of democracy with 
the indubitable advantages of a firm organization of labor by the state” (Weinstein 1974:71).     
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the General Assembly accepts either of the submitted referendum proposals, the vote of 
the people is no longer needed.  
Uruguay has undergone several constitutional transformations, but the institution 
of direct democracy has remained. The 1942 Constitution addressed the issue of direct 
democracy as well, and introduced two major changes from the 1934 Constitution. First, 
the required percentage of signatories to the initiated petition was lowered to 10%, and at 
the same time, a minimum threshold came into effect: 35% of the electorate must cast a 
vote for the results to be valid. The 1951 Constitution affirmed both of these 
requirements without change. The 1967 constitution made further instruments of direct 
democracy available: 25% of the electorate may initiate referendums on new proposals, 
or may seek the revocation of an existing law, so long as the referendum is called within 
one year of the act’s promulgation57.   
Thus, Uruguayans have access to direct democracy, and they have used the 
process extensively, compared to other parts of Latin America. Between 1900 and 1967, 
voters decided 13 referendums (seven by initiative, with voters approving three of these); 
one counter-proposal by the General Assembly (accepted by voters) and five mandatory 
referendums (voters approved all five). Since 1967, an additional five referendums have 
come to the ballot: one mandatory referendum, and four optional referendums. 
Comparatively, only Ecuador eclipses Uruguay in terms of referendum usage, which has 
taken 53 referendums to voters since 1900 (though, all but two of those have been 
conducted since the late 1990s) making Uruguay a much more “experienced” user of 
                                                          
57 This mechanism does not apply to laws dealing with taxes or legislation that falls within the “exclusive 
initiative” of the executive power.  
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direct democracy. Venezuela is next on the list with nine, four fewer than Uruguay, and 
the remaining Latin American countries have only a handful of referendums among them.  
 Turnout58 for referendums in Uruguay is consistently quite high; though threshold 
requirements are in place for parts of the referendum mechanisms, voters clearly have no 
trouble believing that their vote makes a difference. Consistently above 80% and 
sometimes reaching 90%, the importance of participatory democracy is not lost on 
Uruguayans. Considering the culture of direct democracy includes not only examination 
of turnout levels, but also the method by which support is found among the electorate. 
While no data exist on citizen attitudes towards the initiative59, a discussion of how 
voters decide may cast light on the culture of direct democracy in Uruguay.  
As Altman (2012) argues, Uruguayans rely primarily on party loyalties when 
voting on popular initiatives. Through extensive quantitative analysis, Altman finds that 
other variables, such as inflation, unemployment rates, and per-capita income rates 
(together, economic indicators) are not statistically significant indicators of vote 
preference. Measures related to individual salaries and salary changes over time also have 
no impact (using OLS regression). However, a measure developed to rate loyalties to 
political parties has an almost one-to-one relationship between voting for an initiative and 
voting for the party that supports the initiative. Altman further evaluates the indirect 
influence of economic conditions on outcomes through path analysis and finds that of 
unemployment levels, changes in unemployment levels, salaries, and levels of salary 
                                                          
58 Turnout levels will be discussed in more details in later sections.  
 
59 This claim is supported by my own research (conducted for this dissertation) as well as Altman (2012: 
187).  
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change, only levels of salary change had a direct influence on outcomes, suggesting that 
better economic conditions favor support for the party loyalty measure.  
 In a separate study, Altman (2008) finds that legislator perceptions of direct 
democracy are quite positive, even in an environment where the power of mobilized 
citizens can undermine the power of elected officials (that is, legislate from the bottom-
up). His quantitative analysis find that more than half of the representatives interviewed 
believed that the institution of direct democracy strengthens representative democracy as 
a whole, and at the same time, 70% of the representatives consider the presence of the 
referendum device a suitable reason to attempt broad consensus within parties. However, 
such findings are not universal: 70% oppose the idea that all issues can be considered by 
initiative or referendum, and at the same time, a majority question the ability of the 
electorate to properly consider the importance of such questions. Finally, Altman argues 
that the institution of direct democracy – the availability of mechanisms of citizen-
initiated referendums, along with the threat of referendums fosters consensus, which in 
turn fosters a sense of legitimacy.  
Referendum Cases in Uruguay60 
Uruguayan voters would not see a referendum in place until 1934, when they 
were once again asked to approve a new Constitution. Economic problems plagued 
Uruguay in the early 1930s, and Colorado President Gabriel Terra sought to consolidate 
power in 1933 by preventing both the legislature and the National Council from meeting. 
The relatively peaceful coup found support when Terra promoted cooperation among 
conservative Colorados as well as Blancos, and quickly cut nonessential spending 
programs, reduced the salaries of government employees, and focused on improving 
                                                          
60 See Appendix C for a complete list of direct democracy cases in Uruguay. 
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trade relations (Alisky 1969). A second Constitutional Assembly would restore the 
traditional singular executive (and thus, abolishing the National Council) while at the 
same time creating a Senate that would equally allocate seats among Colorados and 
Blancos. Containing elements of political consolidation as well as compromise, the 
Constitution also allowed for the people to call for a constitutional initiative with a 20% 
vote (Parliament would be able to submit a counter-proposal). The Constitution was 
supported with 95% of the vote, and went into effect in 1934.  
In 1938, voters were asked to approve changes to the Constitution, and the 
practices involved would be the subject of several future referendums: the recognition of 
the “lema” system of factions within political parties. The amendment passed with 93% 
approval. Overall, however, the 1934 Constitution would last only until 1942, when the 
Colorado Party won significant majorities in both houses of Parliament. The perceived 
mandate brought political cover for President Alfredo Baldomir, who, with support of the 
two traditional parties, staged a 1941 coup. The redrafting of the Constitution reinstituted 
coparticipation and the integration of political parties, and included provisions for direct 
democracy: constitutional initiative requirements were reduced from twenty percent to 
ten percent of the population, and the General Assembly was still allowed to submit 
counter proposals. Constitutional amendments would also require ratification by the 
people via the referendum, as well as approval by a Constitutional Council.   The new 
Constitution would also limit presidential terms to a single term, as well as a Senate 
elected by proportional representation, and finally, would abolish the lema system 
(Pendle 1963).  
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     By 1946, descendants of Battle had won the presidency, and would attempt to 
revisit the idea of Colegiado by offering the voters a chance to decide via referendum. In 
November of 1946, voters were asked to bring back Colegiado as well as separate 
municipal and national election dates, and to allow government initiatives to be approved 
by two-fifths of the members of the Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, the left-
leaning Civic Union offered voters the chance to hold referendums on constitutional 
changes assuming ten percent of the population signed a petition, and to allow for the 
separate election of the President and Vice-President. Neither of the proposals was 
successful, though the Blanco leader once again sought to retain a share of governance 
and supported the younger Batlle’s call for a 1951 constitutional convention that would 
successfully create a nine-member executive. In this instance, six of the seats would go 
the majority while the remaining would go the second largest party (thus ensuring 
representation by either Colorados or Blancos). The new Constitution would revisit and 
accept the lema system, and at the same time provide a bicameral General Assembly 
elected by proportional representation. Finally, the ability of the people to utilize the 
initiative was retained: petitions for amendments could be submitted with 10% of 
registered voters, and the General Assembly could still submit counter-petitions (C2D).  
The effect of the Colegiado has received considerable debate in the literature; 
Pendle (1963: 39) argues that “one result of the constitutional reform has been a slowing 
down in governmental processes.” Altman (2008) largely agrees, finding that the 
unusually slow economy that plagued the normally profitable Uruguay was in part due to 
“efficiency yielding to banal political bickering” (497). Altman also interviewed Jorge 
Batlle about the mechanism, who argued that “the Colegiado works fine when economic 
133 
 
affairs run by themselves without problems. But in cases facing gross economic 
problems, the Colegiado stops working because it has within its framework political 
adversaries who, naturally, want to predominate” (497).   
     The economic boom years of the 1950s would not last the decade, and as 
Weinstein (1988) argues, the Colegiado was largely responsible for the economic 
decline. Voters responded in 1958 by putting Blancos in power for the first time in 
ninety-three years, and at the same time, voters rejected a Colorado-supported 
referendum that would reinstate the presidential system, abolish the lema system, and 
separate presidential and parliamentary elections. Voters also rejected a similar initiative 
supported by Civic Union that would also have introduced a presidential system (C2D).  
     The 1960s saw continued economic decline for Uruguay, with annual inflation 
reaching well into the ninety percent range and GDP growing at less than 1% (Alisky 
1969), and constitutional reform was once again on the minds of voters generally, and in 
particular, the Colegiado, as politicians focused on the gridlock caused by the system and 
its inability to respond adequately to growing economic problems (Alisky 1969). The 
Colorados returned to power after discontent with two Blanco governments under the 
Colegiado, and with the support of the General Assembly, a bipartisan project for 
constitutional reform convened (Altman 2008).   Nonetheless, when voters were once 
again asked to remove the Colegiado in favor of the presidential system in 1962, voters 
defeated the measure, 83-17%, largely on the basis of populist Colorado Luis Batlle 
Berres. Weinstein (1988) finds that support for a return to a presidential system was less 
likely among lower classes.  
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     With the status-quo in place and economic fortunes still in decline, voters were 
once again asked to consider multiple constitutional reforms in 1966. A series of four 
“colorful” referendums were placed before voters: the “orange” referendum was put 
forward by the General Assembly as a counter-proposal to three popular initiatives, and 
would re-introduce the presidential system, ban the President and Vice-President from 
seeking immediate reelection, allow the President to dissolve the General Assembly, and 
extend parliamentary terms from four to five years. The “grey” initiative, supported by a 
faction of the Blancos, planned for a president who could be reelected, could dissolve the 
General Assembly and “restrict personal freedoms”.  The Colorado Party supported the 
“pink” initiative that reintroduced a presidential system, but limited presidents to a single 
term, and allow the President to dissolve the General Assembly. Finally, the “yellow” 
initiative reintroduced the presidential system, banned the President from seeking 
immediate reelection, dissolved the lema system, and set  pensions to 85% of employees’ 
final salary. The Colorado Party ultimately abandoned the pink initiative and supported 
the yellow, but the General Assembly-supported orange garnered 65% of the vote, with 
the grey winning only 15% and the yellow 7%. The period described here suggests that 
referendum politics in Uruguay were not focused on substantive issues61. For the better 
part of thirty-five years, the main issues finding attention in direct democracy dealt with 
the creation of - and abolishment of - the Colegiado system, as well as the lema system.  
However, the rise of the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) in the late 
1960s resulted in the rise of violence between Uruguayan leadership and Tupamaros, 
with the end result being a significant decline of civil liberties in the early 1970s, and, in 
                                                          
61 This is not to suggest that direct democracy should only be used for substantive measures. In a 
comparative context, as I describe in future sections, Venezuelans focused on considerably more 
substantive issues via the referendum. 
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June of 1973, President Bordaberry, with military backing, launched a dictatorship by 
closing Parliament and empowering police and military to take “whatever measures 
necessary” to ensure normal public service (Weinstein 1988). Certainly, the effect of the 
often violent dictatorship on Uruguay and its politics should not be ignored here, but the 
1980 referendum on the Constitution drafted by the military seems the more appropriate 
focus for the purposes of this work.  
The roots of the 1980 referendum stretched back to the 1973 military coup in 
more ways than one. First, the military government amended the Constitution in 1976 to 
include the National Security Council (COSENA) that was granted both legislative and 
executive powers enabling it to declare different kinds of national emergencies, one of 
which would permit the restrictions of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties 
(Weinstein 1988). Secondly, the military government announced (in August of 1977) that 
a referendum on a new constitution would take place in 1980. The draft constitution 
suggested a transition to a limited democracy: the COSENA would be supreme to 
Parliament, individual rights could be restricted in times of conflict, and, beginning in 
1986, parties would be allowed one candidate each. Third, (though not directly related to 
the 1973 Uruguayan coup) was the larger context: Chile, in 1978, approved a military 
rule by a large margin in a referendum, suggesting such a move was likely to succeed. 
The basis for support from party leaders was primarily in the end-game rather than in the 
status-quo: it was a step towards constitutional democracy (Ameringer 2009). 
Nonetheless, Uruguayan voters defeated the proposal by a 57-43 percent margin (with 
87% turnout levels), and while the outcome produced a period of uncertainty, Uruguay 
slowly returned to democracy, installing a civilian government in March of 1985.  
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     Referendum politics were not completely excluded from the dictatorship of 1973-
1985. In 1989, opponents of President Sanguinetti’s plan to ensure amnesty for military 
offenses during the dictatorship collected enough signatures to force a referendum. 
Support for the amnesty law both in the interior and in Montevideo, however, held up, 
and the referendum to repeal the legislation failed.  Sanguinetti argued that upholding the 
amnesty law would help ease the transition to civilian rule (Bennett 1989), though 
scholars agree that had the referendum succeeded, it is far from definite that prosecutions 
would have actually taken place (Weinstein 1988, Oxford 1989). Interestingly, this issue 
was revisited in 2009, when a popular initiative was mounted to abolish the law on the 
waiver of criminal prosecution. The push for the initiative was led primarily by the 
governing Frente Amplio, and while the initiative failed (though, just barely, with 48% 
voting to repeal the law), the Uruguayan Supreme Court found (in a limited fashion) that 
the law was unconstitutional.  
 Also in 1989, supporters of pension reform sought to amend the Constitution to 
include a specific measure that stated that the pensions have to follow the national salary 
index (C2D). It should be noted that the attempt to amend the Constitution, like many of 
the referendums discussed here, is primarily a function of the inability of Uruguayans to 
utilize the referendum to affect budget and taxation issues. In this case, the National 
Organization of Pensioners (ONAJPU), with the support of Frente Amplio as well as the 
labor organizations (PIT-CNT) enjoyed wide support of the electorate insofar as the topic 
of the referendum affected many citizens. The Partido Colorado did not support the 
initiative, and President Sanguinetti himself was the target of strong campaigning, as 
supporters argued that he had failed to adequately adjust pensions in an effort to reduce 
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fiscal deficit (Altman 2008: 7).  Given the high levels of support from the electorate, the 
measure passed easily (85%).  
     In 1992, voters had the opportunity to decide whether recent legislatively-
approved privatization of state enterprise would remain in place. When Luis Alberto 
Lacalle of the Blanco Party ascended to the presidency in 1989, he sought economic 
reforms primarily in the area of deregulation; the legislature passed law n. 16.211 (Ley de 
Empreasas Publicas) which allowed for the privatization of state-led enterprises with his 
support. The 1992 referendum, thus, was the first instance in which opposition leaders 
(initially supported by ANTEL, the National Telecommunication Company) managed to 
accumulate 25% of the electorate to force an abrogative referendum. Altman (2008: 6) 
argues that this referendum was “well-noticed in Latin America because it was one of the 
very first democratic responses that sought to halt the (then) fashionable Washington 
Consensus” and the high turnout (83%) and subsequent  approval (thus, repealing the 
law) was supported by 67% of the voters. The referendum enjoyed considerable support 
from both Frente Amplio and two groups of the traditional parties (Altman 2008:8).  
     In 1994, the pension issue was revisited by popular initiative, and voters once 
again responded by preventing pension cuts that the legislature had earlier passed.  At the 
same time, the question of reserving 27% of the state budget for education (an initiative 
supported by the Teachers Union) failed. Also in 1994, the General Assembly put a 
referendum in front of voters that would have split the vote for president, parliament, and 
governors. Although opinion polls showed support for the referendum in the area of 80%, 
the referendum was ultimately defeated by 68% of voters (C2D). However, general 
election results in 1994 may have spurred electoral reform: the three main parties split the 
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vote (32,31,30), and two of the parties (Frente Amplio and Blancos) argued that the 
electoral system was to blame, while Colorados argued that ticket-splitting caused the 
split (Qvotrup 1996). Thus, all three parties mounted support for another referendum to 
be held in 1996. The amendment would alter the electoral system in Uruguay, which 
utilized a “double simultaneous vote”, which called for a primary and a general election 
to be held at the same time, and parties could field several candidates for each office. At 
the same time, voters could not split their tickets, and voters were required to choose 
candidates for president, the legislature, and local offices from the same party. The 1996 
amendment would have allowed ticket-splitting, and at the same time, separated national 
and municipal elections.  At the same time, changes to the presidential election format 
were proposed: each party would select one candidate through internal elections, and in 
the general election, the winning candidate would need to receive 40% of the vote, or 
face a run-off election. For the two main parties, the idea was to block the minor party 
(Frente Amplio) from winning the presidency. However, as Qvotrup (1996) finds, each of 
the parties feared the plebiscite, insofar as the people had - in prior elections - opted for 
policies that parliamentarians did not support, and the resulting loss in legitimacy that 
accompanied the defeat was not enticing. Thus, the parties sought compromise in an 
effort to achieve broader appeal: parties would select a single candidate through internal 
elections; in the general election both a 40% vote share and a 10-point lead over the 
closest opponent were required; municipals would enjoy greater autonomy; and 
presidential and local elections would be held at different times, thereby allowing people 
to “split the ticket” (Qvotrup 1996).      
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     The compromise would not last through the campaign, however. A split within 
the Frente Amplio Party resulted in initial broad support for reform, but initial supporter 
and former presidential candidate Tabare Vazquez (of Frente Amplio) would eventually 
shift his position and become an opponent of reform. The switch was largely pragmatic - 
reform, he believed, would hurt his own election chances. By attracting support from 
radical factions of the Frente Amplio as well as moderate left through opposition to 
reform he believed his future electoral chances improved (Qvotrup 1996). Such a 
calculation certainly did not hurt his successful presidential election in 2005.  In the end, 
voters opted for reform, but by the slimmest of all Uruguayan referendums: 50.4%. 
Studies find that voting patterns in this election mirrored the 1989 election, where there 
was 90% correlation between a “yes” vote and support for Blancos or Colorados; 
moreover, the “yes” vote was more common in areas where the lowest unemployment 
rates occurred (Qvotrup 1996). 
 Just as important as the referendums that do occur may also be the referendums 
that do not occur. In 2002, Uruguayan legislators approved law 17.296 which would have 
allowed the cellular telephone company ANTEL S.A. to be held in partially private hands 
– 40%. As with the 1992 referendum, unions pushed for abrogative referendum, and were 
able to gather the required 25% of the electorate’s signatures which were presented to the 
electoral commission. At the same time, public opinion polls showed considerable 
support for revocation, and the government sent a bill to Congress withdrawing the 
articles supporting privatization. The referendum was never held, and ANTEL remains 
100% publicly-owned (Altman 2008).  
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 In March of 2003, the Uruguayan legislature passed a law that would privatize the 
water supply. Clearly not learning from the 1992 issue of privatization, in which the 
government was handed a defeat by voters, the legislature faced a similar result: as 
Altman (2008) finds, the causal configuration was identical: state-owned water company 
workers, along with – once again – PIT-CNT collected the requisite signatures, and with 
the support of the Broad Front coalition and half of the Blanco factions, voters rescinded 
the law with 65% approving.  
 Finally, in 2009, the Uruguayan legislature launched an initiative with 2/5 of the 
Congress supporting the idea that citizens living abroad should have the right to vote by 
mail. Supported by the governing Frente Amplio party, the measure failed, with only 
37% approving (C2D). Widespread support for this measure was limited, as the measure 
was indirectly related to the other referendum held at the same time (discussed earlier in 
this chapter) that revisited the law on abolishing the waiver on amnesty – anywhere from 
ten to twelve percent of the Uruguayan population migrated for either economic or 
political reasons.62 
Venezuela 
The institutional design of direct democracy discussed here will be limited to the 
1999 Constitution and beyond. Obviously, Venezuela has a long political history, and 
that history is important to understanding the current context of direct democracy in 
Venezuela. However, with the exception of a single referendum vote in 1957 (the 
legitimacy of which is discussed below), all cases of direct democracy have occurred 
after the introduction of the 1999 Constitution. Thus, this section discusses the 
introduction of the mechanism of direct democracy as a function of the 1999 
                                                          
62 http://en.mercopress.com/2009/10/24/uruguay-votes-for-president-and-a-new-parliament-on-sunday 
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Constitution. Nonetheless, the creation of the constitution must be considered as a 
function of the context in the time in which it was created (rather than post-hoc 
justifications), and thus, a look back at Venezuelan political history is necessary.  
 Certainly, the Venezuelan political arena can be described as evolving in cycles: 
as Lombardi (2003) has noted, the “cyclical nature of this process reflects a set of 
limitations on the range of alternatives available to the country and its leaders” (1). A 
constant, however, through the years has been the focus on economic viability as a 
function of exports - the production of cacao and coffee in the nineteenth century, and 
later petroleum. As Lombardi (2003), the fluctuation in world prices of such commodities 
leads to a cyclical nature, where Venezuelan politicians prioritize revenue with an eye 
towards state stability first and improving society second, though such exogenous forces 
may not always lead to optimum choices. Ellner (2003) argues that the period of 195863-
1998 can be characterized as a “near-perfect” democracy, for several reasons: first, a two-
party system64 with minimal ideological differentiation existed and alternated in power65 
; secondly, that political leaders were committed to democracy and avoid 
ultranationalistic rhetoric; third, that political leadership was mature enough to form 
interparty agreements; fourth, that the parties held a predominantly middle-class 
leadership (rather than oligarchic leadership); fifth, that an emphasis on party discipline 
                                                          
63 In 1958, The Pact of Punto Fijo recognized the acceptance of the three main parties, and committed the 
parties to ensuring the “stability of the nascent regime” and respecting election results (Lissidini 2006).  
64 The two major parties are the social democratic Accion Democratica (AD) and the Christian Comte de 
Organización Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI). Hellinger (2003:29) notes that the pact was not 
entirely exclusionary: the Communist Party was a considerable force in party politics at the time, but was 
not included in the pact.  
65 Sartori (1976) argues that political stability is greater when two major parties lacking in ideological 
differences effectively operate. 
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within AD and COPEI existed66 ; sixth, that the political system was open enough to 
provide attractive opportunities for smaller parties; and finally, that parties were highly 
institutionalized (rather than simply a vehicle for ambitious politicians). Hellinger (2003: 
27) argues that such stability rested upon a “material basis” - a distribution of 
international oil rents through a system of clientelism; and Lissidini (2008) agrees, 
arguing that conflicts were resolved by consensus with actors who benefitted from oil 
reserves to maintain and nurture the system, but at the same time, the presidential regime 
played a key role in the establishment of a stable democracy.  
The stability that characterized the Venezuelan political system, however, was 
based on a clientelism that was inherently flawed; oil prices (and, rents) dropped in the 
late 1980s, and significant economic troubles followed. The election of Carlos Andres 
Perez in February 1989 brought the paquete - a negotiated structural-adjustment 
agreement with the IMF; soon after, the Caracazo uprising reflected anger among 
citizens over increased transport fares (the increased fares themselves a result of 
increased fuel hikes) and resulted in an official death toll of 287, though reports suggests 
the number to actually be between 1,000 and 1,500 (Hellinger 2003). Protests continued 
as Perez deregulated the banking industry, privatized the national telephone company, 
and opened the oil industry to private capital (Lissindi 2006). The uprising continued 
with the attempted coup led by Hugo Chávez, and while the coup itself failed, Maya 
(2003) argues that the process itself was a political victory for Chávez when his television 
appearance accepting responsibility for the defeat stirred hope among supporters who 
rallied behind his “por ora” phrasing: for now.   
                                                          
66 The author notes that this is in large part of a function of Romulo Betancourt’s desire for avoiding 
internal conflict (Ellner 2003:9) 
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Maya (2003) argues that the period from the attempted coup to the successful 
presidential election of Hugo Chávez in 1998 was marked by political actors attempting 
in vain to find stability. The stability that was COPEI and AD67 faltered; the Causa R 
(Radical Cause) rose in the early 1990s only to falter in the late 1990s (Hellinger 2003). 
Along the way, the movement founded by Chávez, the Movimiento Bolivariano 
Revolucionario 200 (MBR), based on traditional values of populist caudillism, began to 
move towards finding electoral victories, rather than purposefully avoiding the process68 
(Hellinger 2003). Chávez’s eventual party, the Movimiento Quinta República was 
converted from the MBR, and Chávez would win the presidency in 1998, defeating AD 
candidate Salas Romer, in large part due to Chávez’ support during his campaign for a 
new constitution. 
 The 1999 Constitution produced a number of significant changes. As Alvarez 
(2003) argues, the process of decentralization was the focus in the early 1990s and this 
process allowed the political elite to formulate its own agenda (147); and under the 
Chávez presidency, the party-based representative democracy was transformed. The 
transformations were focused on the sources of decision-making power, and while 
Chávez established parliamentary pacts with minority parties in the style of the Punto 
Fijo69 period, the new Constitution did not put as much emphasis on party-based 
functions, but rather, the emphasis was on allowing civil society the ability to directly 
                                                          
67 Between 1974 and 1993, AD and COPEI together controlled no less than 80 percent of the seats in the 
National Assembly (Hellinger 2003:33)/ 
68 Chavez admits this tactic in interviews with scholar Marta Harnecker: “Until 1996 we had chosen not to 
participate in the elections. Really, we were calling for abstention as the tactical element in a strategy to 
force a constitutional assembly, which was always our plan” (2005: 45).  
69 This should not be viewed as a measure of Chávez’s support for the pact: as Hellinger (2011:28) argues, 
President Chávez “often dismisses the Punto Fijo era entirely as just another episode in a pageant of 
oligarchic regimes that made up the “Fourth Republic” over nearly the entire history of Venezuela since 
independence”  
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participate. While the 1961 Constitution encouraged the formation of political parties 
(Hellinger 2003), the 1998 Constitution reduced party influence in the naming of top 
public officials to the judicial branch and instead replaced this process with the 
participation of civil society (Alvarez 2003). As discussed below, Venezuela also 
introduced multiple avenues for direct democracy, including the citizen initiated 
referendum devices as well as the ability to recall all popularly elected officials and 
judgeships. Alvarez (2003) argues that the system of referendums enacted in this 
Constitution serves a dual purpose: first, to force those who govern to respect the popular 
will, and at the same time to provide a possible “escape” from situations of extreme 
crisis. Second, the objective was to allow for the possibility for recall, but to not make 
easy enough that political retaliation would be the ultimate use of the mechanism. More 
generally, the very idea that citizens held supremacy over the branches, insofar as they 
theoretically could  call for a new constituent assembly at any time represented a new era 
of, at the minimum, the possibility of direct participation. At the same time, however, the 
new Constitution significantly increased the powers of the president, both through direct 
powers granted, as well as through the provisional powers he could request from the 
National Assembly to allow him to legislate by decree on all matters for up to a year 
(Alvarez 2003).  
 A significant focus of this study is the degree to which “out-groups” are included 
in the constitutional drafting process. Though scholarship on this instance is limited, 
Lissidini (2008) notes that the Polo Patriotico  (an alliance of parties supporting the 
president) utilized successful strategies and were able to secure a majority of the 24 seats 
that made up the constituent assembly, and thus, they played a significant role in the 
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drafting process. The process was not closed to outsiders; as Lissidini notes, the ANC 
invited “citizens and organized groups to present proposal, opened a popular service 
office, and set up a website to receive numerous public inputs” (Lissidini 2008: 16) and 
thus, discussions about the process were quite numerous. Canon (2009) also finds that 
while the 1999 Constitution was drafted by a group dominated by members of Chávez’s 
party, many would ultimately move to the opposition in later years. Garcia-Guadilla 
(2003) argues that “social organizations” succeeded in persuading the ANC to include a 
high percentage of their proposals in the constitutional text, though the author notes that 
the basis for the success was in large part due to the fact that the demands formed part of 
the “Bolivarian Project” of Chávez (186).  
 Canache (2012) argues that the 1999 Constitution was intended to increase 
participatory70 democracy at the expense of liberal71 democracy, insofar as Chávez 
viewed participatory democracy as an alternative model to the liberal idea. In particular, 
the members of the Constituent Assembly sought to avoid existing problems with 
traditional check-and-balance formulae with the institutionalization of the people’s 
participation at the grassroots level. In addition to the institution of direct democracy, 
Chávez would promote models of participatory elements in the form of cooperatives, 
socialist enterprises, and communal councils (Canache 2012) over the next several years.  
 In an interview with scholar Marta Harnecker, Chávez himself argued that the 
constitutional assembly created telephone lines for citizen input, and that “his” majority 
                                                          
70 Article 62 of the constitution protects the right of all citizens to “freely participate in political affairs, 
directly or through elected representatives.” 
71 In this sense, the term “liberal democracy” refers to the idea of a “representative government in which 
rule by the people is understood as the rule of the majority, as expressed through free and fair elections”, 
along with constitutional limitations on power, and protections for both freedoms and rights. Participatory 
democracy involves increased participation on the part of the citizen through increased elections, increased 
range of political offices, and methods of direct democracy - all of which coexist with a representative 
democracy (Canache 2012).  
146 
 
did listen to constituent opinions. Moreover, Chávez concedes the fact that the process 
was completed hastily, but argues, “sometimes it is necessary to sacrifice some important 
things for the sake of expediency, and at the time it was urgently necessary to transform 
the political map, to be able to continue moving the revolutionary project forward” 
(Harnecker 2005:50).  
 Brewer-Carías’s (2010) examination finds that the process through which 
members were elected to the Constituent Assembly ultimately affected the group 
dynamics. The referendum approving the constituent assembly allowed for a 131-
member assembly, with 104 members to be elected in 24 regional constituencies that 
corresponded to political subdivisions; 24 members to be elected by national vote, and 
three members representing indigenous peoples. Members were elected individually but 
appeared on a list which Chávez supported in personal visits to each voting district. As a 
direct result, all of the president’s supported candidates were elected except one (for a 
total of 123); thus, the author concludes that the Constituent Assembly was “totally 
controlled by the newly established government party and the president’s followers, to 
the exclusion of all traditional political parties” (56).  
  Ultimately, the text “finally approved by the constituents included virtually all 
elements of the draft that Chávez had given at the original meeting” (Lissidini 2008: 22). 
Chávez, Lissidini argues, insisted that the “reform of the constitution was the only way 
out of the chaos” (Lissidini 2008:23). The Chávez-led majority was pushed into drafting 
the new constitution quickly, and did so by appointing twenty commissions to deal with 
the essential subject matters, which they did in just a few short weeks, and importantly 
for the purposes of this study, “each commission acted alone and in isolation, consulting 
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only briefly with groups the commission considered appropriate” (Brewer-Carías 2010: 
61).  
The top-down approach included significant allowances for citizen-initiated direct 
democracy, but such top-down inclusion in the case of Venezuela does not necessarily 
suggest that out-groups were not present at the formation of the 1999 Constitution. The 
Assembly was itself a function of the campaign promises of Chávez, who, along with his 
key constituencies of the rural and urban poor, had long been excluded from participation 
and benefits from the Punto Fijo system. The Punto Fijo system was based on 
agreements between Acción Democrática and COPEI, which would ultimately fail as a 
function of a loss of legitimacy. This loss was based, as Canon (2009) argues, on the 
failure to consolidate gains on the economic level (and especially an economy able to 
withstand the oil shocks of the 1980s); the political level (which would ultimately prove 
too rigid to respond to economic and social emergencies of the 1980s); and on the 
sociocultural level (in that material rewards and motivations could not be afforded 
because of a lack of material resources, but also because of communicational difficulties 
among different cultures. The loss would eventually allow the populist Chávez to base his 
support among the “popular sectors, and parts of the middle sectors, which had felt 
themselves excluded from the economic, social, political and cultural life of the country” 
(Canon 2009:48). As the Assembly formed primarily with Chávez supporters, the 
inclusion of previously excluded “out-groups” is identified in the Venezuelan case. 
Institutional Design 
Among Latin American countries, Venezuela is one of the few that allow citizen-
initiated referendums (along with Uruguay and Colombia), and is the only Latin 
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American system to provide for the possible revocation of presidential power as well as 
the only system to allow the president promote a referendum to repeal laws (Lissidini 
2008).  
Article 70 of the Venezuelan Constitution protects the “participation and 
involvement of people in the exercise of their sovereignty”, and Article 71 allows for 
consultative referendums at both the national and subnational levels, and is reserved for 
issues of “national transcendence”. Such a referendum can be triggered at the national 
level by the president, by a resolution of the National Assembly with a majority vote, or 
by the people with a petition signed by 10% of all registered voters. At the subnational 
level, such consultative referendums can be convened by municipal councils, legislative 
councils, or state legislative councils with a two-thirds vote, or by petition of 10% of the 
voters registered in the specific jurisdiction.  
Article 72 of the new Constitution affords citizens the opportunity to recall all 
popularly elected offices and judgeships that are in the second half of their electoral 
periods. Such an action requires 20% of the voters to petition, and requires turnout of 
25% or more, as well as the requirement that the vote share for removal is equal to or 
greater than the vote share that initially elected the official72. The Constitution stipulates 
that if the revocation occurs during the first four years (in the case of the president) 
elections must be called to complete the term; if in the last two years, the executive vice 
president assumes the position of the term (Article 233). In the case of officials in the 
National Assembly, representatives cannot seek reelection in the subsequent term (Article 
198) but is silent on this matter related to other public officials.  
                                                          
72 This makes officials who were elected with high degrees of abstention more likely targets, of course.  
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Article 73 provides for the referendum process to be used in approving draft 
statutes of the National Assembly, provided two-thirds agree to refer the statute. The 
Constitution establishes a 25% turnout threshold but a simple majority to approve the 
statute. The president also has the ability to call a binding referendum when treaties or 
agreements that “compromise national sovereignty or transfer powers to bodies 
supranational organs”73; if two-thirds of the Assembly agrees or 15% of the people 
petition, such a referendum vote may also be forced. 
 Article 74 allows for the abrogation of existing statutes with the exception of 
those dealing with budgetary, tax, public debt, amnesty, and human rights laws, and can 
be initiated with by petition of ten percent of the voters or by the president. This 
provision also allows for decrees issued by the president to be subjected to a abrogative 
referendum (though, in this case, it can only be achieved by popular initiative, and 
requires only five percent of registered voters). Article 74 requires that abrogative 
referendums require a turnout level of not less than 40%.  
 In addition, the Constitution provides other allowances for direct participation. In 
particular, Article 204.7 allows for the introduction of draft legislation (related especially 
to “organic”74 )law with just 0.1% of the voters. Article 211 of the Constitution informs 
the National Assembly to submit draft legislation to public consultation and to also ask 
the opinion of citizens and organized society. Article 347 allows for the populace to 
convene a new constituent assembly for the purposes of “transforming the state”, in 
effect, to draft a new Constitution.  
                                                          
73 In this instance, 25% of the electorate must also cast a vote.  
74 As defined in the Venezuelan Constitution, “organic laws are those designed as such by this Constitution, 
those enacted to organize public powers or developing constitutional rights, and those which serve as a 
normative framework for other laws” (Article 203).  
150 
 
 Certainly, the institution of direct democracy is given significant attention in the 
Venezuelan Constitution, especially insofar as it contains provisions for both a top-down 
and bottom-up approach. Nonetheless, the extensive availability of the mechanism has 
not translated to excessive use: Venezuelans have, since 1999, voted on nine referendums 
(C2D).  
Direct Democracy Cases in Venezuela75 
Venezuela’s first experience with direct democracy came in 1957, when 87% of 
voters76 approved General Marcos Perez Jimenez governance77 as President without 
being directly elected as well as his ability to appoint all national and local 
representatives. Venezuelans would not be given another opportunity to take matters into 
their own hands until 1999, when they were asked two questions in April and another in 
December. The April questions were presidential plebiscites asking the people if they 
wished to see a Constituent Assembly formed, and of  the voters who did cast a ballot 
(only 37% of the electorate), 92.3% of them agreed. The plebiscite itself was a function 
of promises made by Chávez when elected in December of the prior year, and carried out 
on the day of his inauguration. Turnout increased on the day voters were to approve the 
new Constitution, though heavy storms may have impacted the overall numbers: only 
44% of the electorate showed up, and the new constitution was approved with 72% of the 
voters in agreement.  
                                                          
75 See Appendix D for a complete list of direct democracy cases in Venezuela. 
76 The total turnout percentage is unknown.  
77 Though impartial observers were not in place for this election, the vote was hardly democratic; indeed, 
the legitimacy of the vote could be questioned by (1) the fact that his initial rule was instigated via military 
junta; secondly, that within a month of the election, a popular uprising drove him from power (O’Grady 
2007).  
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 The low turnout cannot be completely explained by storms, however. The new 
constitution was a drastic change from the earlier versions. Though popularly elected, the 
new provisions were far from democratic78: in addition to changing the name of the 
country, the new constitution prohibited public financing of political parties, eliminated 
the bicameral congress in favor of a unicameral National Assembly79 (which could 
dissolved at Chávez’s discretion), military promotions became the direct responsibility of 
Chávez, rather than that of the National Assembly, and removed the power of the 
Supreme Court to suspend or impeach the president. In addition, presidential terms 
increased to six years, and allows for immediate reelection. Economically, the new 
constitution further downsized the role of the private sector, increased state guarantees, 
and increased housing, healthcare and retirement pensions to all80. Significant changes 
may certainly have affected the average voter’s ability to fully understand the new 
document (and as discussed earlier in this work, the rapid development of the document 
may have led to lower levels of comprehension); Tierney (2003) argues that polling data 
showed less than two percent of the population had read the document they would vote 
on, and in large part, the new constitution was a change from the “old ways”, as voters 
seemed to put the general feeling.  
In 2000, the Venezuelan National Assembly conducted a consultative referendum 
in an effort to gauge public approval of a plan to suspend trade union leadership for six 
                                                          
78 The degree to which the document was intended to be democratic - from Chávez’s perspective - is 
debatable. Nonetheless, the preamble to the new constitution states that the Bolivarian Republic will be 
“democratic, participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible and pluralist, with revocable 
mandates.” 
79 The ANC argued that a bicameral legislature is inherently bureaucratic, costly, and inefficient (Oxford 
1999) 
80 Venezuela: Constitutional questions. 1999.  Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/192434571?accountid=3611 
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months. Once again, voter turnout was quite low (just 23.5% - though the referendum 
was held at the same time as local elections), and voters approved the measure with 70% 
margin. Viewed largely as a measure to continue his power consolidation, Chávez asked 
voters to agree with his proposal that would transform union leadership accountability 
from parties, as it had been for decades, and towards the union personnel, who would 
elect their own leaders. Chávez argued that the prior system was largely undemocratic, 
and corrupt, insofar as their leadership remained entrenched for decades at a time, and 
that financial resources were being used for personal gain. Organized labor, on the other 
hand, called for an abstention, arguing that Chávez was simply attempting to gain control 
of the unions and align them with the MVR.81 The relationship between the main trade 
union confederation (CTV) was quite tense: they - along with the main business 
association82 had led campaigns to remove Chávez from office, and would continue to 
lead a series of work stoppages - including the “indefinite” strike in April 2002, which 
resulted in a brief coup d’etat (Canon 2009).  Results suggest that both entities may have 
had some success: though the measure passed, rewarding Chávez, the abstention rate 
suggests that organized labor was able to get the message out as well.  
In 2004, voters increased their turnout numbers and voted “no” for the first time 
when a recall vote on President Chávez was held.  Article 72 of the 1999 Constitution 
provides for the possibility of the people to dismiss all elected officials once half of their 
                                                          
81 VENEZUELA: Reform approved amid abstention (2000). \Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd. Retrieved 
from://search.proquest.com/docview/192434571?accountid=3611 
 
 
82 The tension was underscored by the fact that the unions associated with CTV had been allied with AD 
(or, as Canon (133) argues, “dominated by AD”) , and Chávez’s  movement had displaced AD (as well as 
COPEI) which in turn undermined the traditional benefits union leaders received.  
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term has passed (and assuming 20% of the voters sign a petition to begin the 
proceedings), but requires a 25% turnout of the qualified electorate. In this case, 70% of 
the people turned out to vote, and 60% of them voted “no”, keeping Chávez in office. 
The recall vote was preceded by a brief coup led by Pedro Carmona in 2002, during 
which Carmona abolished the 1999 Constitution and all public powers, only to face 
spontaneous demonstrations insisting on Chávez’s return; as well as sixty-three day strike 
in the oil sector which lead to significant economic  problems in 200383 (Canon 2009).  
Thus, the recall vote can be considered in the context of extreme political 
polarization, and such polarization is often difficult to mitigate. McCoy (2006) argues 
that several reasons why the institutional context in which the vote took place was unable 
to mediate the levels of distrust within the highly polarized society. First, the 
politicization of the CNE84 - and as a consequence, the lack of transparency -  resulted in 
a lack of confidence in electoral outcomes85. Secondly, political divisions within the 
Supreme Court also prevented the institution from becoming an independent arbiter 
(though, in other systems, close elections requiring the intervention of the Courts were 
widely accepted). Third, public and private media fueled suspicions and “painted their 
own realities and thus the moderating influence of the media was ineffective. Finally, 
there were limited possibilities in terms of third-party mediators and arbiters who may 
have helped provide additional checks on the process in an effort to legitimize the 
                                                          
83 The recall election was also supported by the US, with support from the National Endowment for 
Democracy (Harnecker 2005:191).  
84 Prior to the election, the CNE threatened to limit the number of observers as well as access to voting sites 
and the technical aspects of the vote (The Economist [London]. 2 September 2004. Jennifer McCoy. "What 
Really Happened in Venezuela?") 
85 International monitors, including the Carter Center and the Organization of American States (OAS) 
declared the voting process in the recall election as “fair and accurate” and “legitimate” (Carter Center, 
2004).Felten, Ruben and Stubblefield  support the conclusions after statistical analysis of voting data.   
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outcome86. Thus, McCoy argues (2006:78) that ultimate outcome from the recall vote 
was continued polarization, and at the same time, demoralized opposition leaders who 
questioned the outcome of the 2004 recall election would not mobilize as well and as a 
result, opposition leaders would lose elections for governors and mayors in 2004, 
municipal councils in 2005, and the national legislature in 2005. Certainly, Chávez 
claimed significant support for his policies as a function of the vote share87. Shortly after 
the vote, the government focused on consolidating power within the Supreme Court and 
also was able to pass legislation strengthening their ability to penalize political dissent 
and sanction private media outlets (McCoy 2006).  
In 2007, Chávez sought to amend the 1999 Constitution in an effort to “complete 
a transition to a socialist republic and implement his socialist agenda” (C2D). In total, 69 
proposals were grouped in two blocks, with Block A consisting of 46 items proposed by 
Chávez and the National Assembly; and Block B consisting of 23 items proposed by the 
National Assembly.  Among the proposals in Block A were a socialist economic system, 
moving the Central Bank to government control, reducing the voting age from 18 to 16, 
reducing the maximum workday to six hours (and provisions for better working 
conditions), as well as a right to education. In addition, the referendum called for 
increasing the petition rates for recall election from 20% to 30% and increase turnout 
requirements from 25% to 40%, while at the same time requiring that the final vote in 
favor of a recall be greater than the number of votes that elected the official in the first 
                                                          
86 For example, the Catholic Church is often called upon to mediate disputes. In this case, the author notes 
that such a possibility did not exist because the conflict involved many societal sectors (70). 
87 Sheridan, Mary Beth. 2004 "Chavez Defeats Recall Attempt" http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A4208-2004Aug16.html. See also Forero, Juan. 2004. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/17/international/americas/17venezuela.html 
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place88 (Brewer-Carías 2010: 287). Turnout for this referendum was once again low 
(56%), and a very close vote ensued: 50.6% of the electorate voted no on Block A, while 
51% voted no on Block B,  and Chávez was handed his first defeat.  
 The 2007 referendum vote can be explained in a variety of ways. Certainly, the 
44% abstention rate suggests that many voters simply stayed home – perhaps because 
they did not understand the multitude of questions, the ideas associated with “twenty-first 
century socialism”, or perhaps they did not accept the referendum as wholly necessary 
because many provisions could have been handled legislatively (Ali 2007; Lander 2007).  
Each of these reasons suggest that the ideals of participatory democracy that such 
referendums were designed to produce were in fact not met; and more to the point, the 
spirit of populism was not perceived by voters. Canon (2009) argues that while Chávez 
accepted the defeat, he continued to blame the media as well as a US conspiracy against 
the Venezuelan government. Additionally, Chávez blamed the people themselves; 
arguing that they were “insufficiently revolutionary” (65).  
However, voters may have been “lashing out” to some degree against Chávez. 
Buckman (2012) argues that three main factors contributed to the defeat: first, many 
Venezuelans held resentment towards the suspension of privately-owned RCTV, which 
had been shuttered in May of 2007 when Chávez announced that its license would not be 
renewed89. Secondly, crime rates in Venezuela were at all-time highs; Venezuela had the 
second-highest murder rates in the world in 2006. Finally, public perception regarding the 
                                                          
88 Indeed, all referendum devices included new proposed provisions increasing turnout thresholds or 
approval thresholds, including the provision allowing citizens to convene a new constituent assembly for 
the purposes of drafting a new constitution, which would increase from 15 to 30%.  
89 Chávez was not a fan of RCTV, who he blamed for helping to orchestrate the 2002 coup and more 
generally for the station’s opposition against him (Buckman 2012: 375).  
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distribution of oil profits was negative; excessive poverty still existed despite new social 
programs.  
 More generally, Brewer-Carías (2010) argues that the 2007 referendum was a 
failed attempt to consolidate a centralized state through constitutional approval. The 
author argues that the referendum ultimately failed insofar as the design was to eliminate 
the vertical distribution of powers system, eliminate representative democracy, local 
political autonomy, change the way that Venezuela interacted on the international level 
(with particular attention to economic integration across Latin America), reinforce and 
increase executive powers90, as well as reducing the separation of powers between the 
legislative and executive branches91.  
Venezuelans last voted in a referendum in 2009, in which they approved the 
request by Chávez to remove any term limits on all departmental offices: governors, 
representatives of the single states, local governors, deputies of the national assembly, 
and the president. Certainly, the simplicity of the question involved seemed to reflect a 
willingness on the part of Chávez to learn from his mistakes, and to some degree, Chávez 
was reacting to representative elections held in November of 2008, where chavistas were 
successful but not in a dominating fashion: the 53% of the 10.2 million votes cast 
represented a decline from the 63% approval Chávez recorded in the recall election. The 
push for the referendum came just days after the electoral victory, and Chávez sought to 
rectify his earlier referendum campaign mistakes - this time by mobilizing PDVSA92 and 
                                                          
90 This was especially apparent in the clauses dealing with the extension of the president’s term and 
unlimited reelection capabilities, the appointment of a vice-president by the president, and the power of the 
president to lead the military.  
91 For example, legislators could accept executive branch positions without losing legislative tenure, and 
could return to the legislature once the appointment ended.  
92 PDVSA is the state-owned oil and natural gas company. Buckman (2012) argues that Chávez made it 
clear that their jobs depended on a favorable outcome.  
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the state-owned telephone company in what Buckman (2012: 380) calls a campaign of 
“Orwellian proportions.” Canon (2009) also finds that the government ran a smooth 
campaign, and the overall result showed the difference.  Interestingly, the original 
proposal only included the president; however, protests by the national assembly resulted 
in amendments for the other offices (C2D). Voters approved the plan, 55-44%, and 
turnout rose to 70%.  
 Significant debates occur regarding the motivation for Chávez’s referendums. 
Maxwell Cameron argues that Chávez’s government instituted a “slow motion 
constitutional coup” by terminating Venezuela’s Congress through a referendum of 
“dubious legality” and through ensuring elections in which his party would dominate, 
which would thus ensure the writing of a constitution befitting his ideals. However, as 
Canon (2009) argues, the referendum was permitted by a pre-Chávez Supreme Court, and 
at the same time, Chávez had an electoral mandate, and was pursuing avenues suggested 
during his campaign. Along these lines, Canon argues that while the Constituent 
Assembly (ANC) was indeed dominated by the Chávez-led Patriotic Pole (PP), the group 
was actually quite broad; indeed, the 2007 failure could, as Canon argues, be seen as 
simply voter attachment to the 1999 Constitution, which was viewed as a “fair and 
balanced document” (164).  
 However, the above debate does not fully capture the nuances of the institution of 
direct democracy. In a study directed towards determining how Venezuelans 
conceptualize democracy, Canache (2012) finds that few Venezuelans have embraced the 
notion of participatory democracy, and instead rely on traditional notions of liberal 
democracy (as discussed earlier). Indeed, a substantial majority of Venezuelans surveyed 
158 
 
point out that democracy - to them - depends on civil liberties as well as economic 
freedom. Few Venezuelans, the author found, define democracy in participatory terms, 
even after Hugo Chávez had been in office for ten years. When compared to 13 other 
Latin American nations as part of the AmericasBarometer survey, Venezuelans espoused 
the definition of democracy along liberal lines more commonly than any other nation 
surveyed (108). Thus, for Venezuelans, the idea of increased participation, especially via 
the institution of direct democracy, was not fully embraced. The author concluded that 
“little evidence has emerged in this study to suggest that Hugo Chávez’s actions have 
caused Venezuelans to rethink the meaning of democracy and to embrace participatory 
conceptualizations...if anything, Chávez’s supporters tend to slightly less favorable 
toward democratic governance than are his opponents” (114).  
 That is not to say that Venezuelans do not fully appreciate the role of voting. 
Latinobarometro data suggest that 74% of Venezuelans agree that “the way you vote can 
change the way things will be in the future”, the highest of all Latin American countries 
surveyed with the exception of Uruguay (84%)93. In addition, Venezuelans recognize that 
“open and fair elections” are among the most important characteristics of a democracy 
(35.7%); this response overshadows the importance of competitive parties (8%)94, 
freedom of speech (14%), and equal treatment for all by the courts (11%). Venezuelans, 
however, are not uniformly convinced that the elections are fair: when asked in 2007, 
only 58% agreed that elections are “clean”.95 
 The definition of participatory democracy as labeled here suggests that direct 
democracy is a defining feature: without participation in direct democracy, Canache 
                                                          
93 http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalizeQuestion.jsp (A504402) 
94 http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalizeQuestion.jsp (A104) 
95 http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalizeQuestion.jsp (A504501) 
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suggests, then the focus must be on liberal democratic values. This is not axiomatic. 
Indeed, participatory democracy can also succeed when governments are established at 
local or municipal levels through political decentralization.  Indeed, “participatory 
democracy cannot be mistaken for direct democracy” (Brewer-Carías 2010: 188). Thus, 
the elusive participatory democracy in Venezuela in the 2000s may be a function of 
Canache’s (2012) argument, but also of the centralization process that Chávez pursued 
after taking office in 1999. Though the new constitution calls for decentralization, and 
thus, the importance of such a concept is recognized, Brewer-Carías argues the 
“decentralized federation mentioned in Article 4 of the Constitution is no more than void 
words, with the power of the state organized in an even more centralized way”96 (2012: 
190). Such an arrangement resonated with the people as well: 15% report having “a lot” 
of confidence in local governments (and 26% report having “none”), while 36% have “a 
lot” of confidence in the government as a whole, and only 16% report having “no 
confidence”.97 
Conclusions 
 Direct democracy across Latin America is a rare event. Certainly, in many 
systems, simply maintaining democracy at all is a challenge. Nonetheless, the two 
examples of systems that utilize direct democracy discussed here present a number of 
possible conclusions.  
 First, the requirement that out-groups be a part of the drafting of the constitutions 
finds limited support. In the Uruguayan sense, the support came primarily from Batlle, 
                                                          
96 For example, while the Constitution calls for - and organizes - communal councils, they function without 
elected representatives; these, along with the citizen referendum process found in Article 70 have the 
purpose of replacing “local governments in their constitutional task of being the basic instance for political 
participation” (Brewer-Carías 2010: 191).  
97 http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalizeQuestion.jsp (A60201H and A60201G) 
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though the mechanism was not fully introduced in his lifetime, and would not fully be 
introduced until the 1934 Constitution. Thus, the introduction of the mechanism of direct 
democracy in Uruguay is largely the function of majority-led inclusion, rather than out-
group participation. Further complicating the analysis is the degree to which the legacy of 
Batlle may have influenced the introduction of the mechanism. Indeed, further 
complicating the analysis is the multiple constitutions in which direct democracy is 
included. The most recent Constitution – from 1967 and amended in 1997 – included 
provisions, but those provisions were also included in prior versions. As Barczak (2001) 
notes, Uruguay thus becomes a “special case” when considering the introduction of the 
institution of direct democracy as a function of out-group participation insofar as the 
prior extant constitution accounted for the inclusion, making it neither in-group nor out-
group, per se.  
 Venezuela, on the other hand, presents a much clearer distinction. The 1999 
Constitution clearly introduced mechanisms of direct democracy, and to find support for 
out-group participation, one must only look as far as Chávez, who was on the “outside 
looking in” for quite some time, as evidenced by his thoughts (and actions) on taking 
over the presidency of Venezuela. The previously excluded out-group in the Venezuelan 
case was responsible for the introduction of direct democracy into the 1999 Constitution.  
Thus, support is found in the Venezuelan case for C1, but not for the Uruguayan case, 
where the results do not disprove the hypothesis, but do not prove it, either.  
 The theoretical approach discussed in the first chapter also put considerable 
emphasis on the role of institutional design and the effect of the design on outcomes. 
Interestingly, the model suggested in this dissertation would support the notion that 
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Venezuela, given the relative ease of access to the referendum device, would see more 
instances than Uruguay, which has fewer alternatives and more restrictions. Further 
complicating the analysis is the differences in available time: Uruguay has had the 
referendum option since 1934; Venezuela since 1999.  Within those timeframes, nine 
referendums have taken place in Venezuela, and eighteen in Uruguay, suggesting that 
Venezuela has had more referendum votes when adjusted for the time variances98. Thus, 
institutional design does seem to play a role here; however, it should be noted that while 
the citizen-initiated referendum is available to both systems, Uruguay is the clear leader 
here, with 13 of the 18 referendums being initiated from below, while in Venezuela, only 
the referendum concerning the recall of Chávez was initiated from below.  
 The role of political elites in the process is certainly more complicated. The 
influence of Batlle can be felt throughout Uruguayan institutions, but the lack of the 
individual in referendum politics complicates the analysis. Nonetheless, the general sense 
of referendum politics in the Uruguayan sense can best be captured by the discussion of 
“veto points” as discussed earlier. In most cases  (13 of 18), the citizen-initiated 
referendum acted as a check on the power of the majority; the majority of cases here 
describe contexts in which the minority out-groups were able to successfully utilize the 
instrument of direct democracy to counter the wishes of political elites. Voters responded 
to political concerns via the referendum, with decisions on the lema system as well as the 
Colegiado; they also responded to economic concerns via the referendum as well – most 
notably when the concern was privatization of state-run industries or decreases in state-
mandated economic benefits. The institution of direct democracy was also frequently 
                                                          
98 Though such math is admittedly problematic, Venezuelans face .62 referendums per year on average; 
Uruguayans face .22 referendums per year, on average.  
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used to either block or abrogate neoliberal economic reform measures, such as 
privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, and reductions in government spending.   
Indeed, they have also responded to social issues via the referendum, most notably with 
decisions related to amnesty laws.  The ability of unions to mobilize support in the face 
of losses suggest the possible victories they found in the referendum was worth the risk; 
at the same time, the choices they (repeatedly) made suggest the structure of the 
institution in which they operate were key factors in the decision to utilize the referendum 
process. This in turn suggests that the cybernetic theory of decision-making, along with 
prospect theory, better explains the process than does that of rational choice, which 
would suggest simply that individuals were able to make choices without formal 
constraints placed on them from above, and that utility-maximizing processes explain 
preferences. Clearly, supporters of the Uruguayan referendum system, as viewed from the 
bottom-up approach as most commonly used, were constrained by the historical 
institutional design, and motivated by the prospect of significant loss. As such, they were 
not interested in smaller gains; they were instead interested in altering the status quo by 
reversing the legislatively-approved policy. 
 In each of the multiple cases discussed in this chapter, the political elites seeking 
refuge through the referendum device did so to seek larger gains when faced with the 
prospect of loss, and to protect smaller gains when not facing the same prospect; more 
importantly, however, the structure of the institution dictated the values through which 
they viewed the range of possibilities – such ranges were not simply those which seemed 
most suitable to the individual actor. As a function of this, historical institutionalism is 
useful in explaining why institutions are created in the first place, and the historical 
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context is crucial to understanding the outcome. The “critical junctures” that resulted in 
the various constitutions are (as discussed in the first chapter) descriptive and not causal; 
the institutions themselves predict the outcomes. The range of actors described here are 
all constrained by the institution created before them, and they changes they make are a 
function not of the rational choices they make, but rather of the context in which the 
institution itself was created (and indeed, in the Uruguayan case, compromise came to be 
not always as a function of actual referendum usage, but because of the possibility of the 
referendum). Thus, in the complicated cases that are Uruguayan referendums, I argue that 
the role of political elites (P1) in the process is crucial to understanding later usage, and 
that  (P1) in this case are condition by historical institutional design (HI1) as well as 
tenets of prospect theory/cybernetic theory of decision-making (PC1). These findings are 
summarized in Table 4.1 
 
Table 4.1: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes in Uruguay 
Key Variable Outcome 
Out-group presence at 
constitutional formation 
Indirect: Recent constitutions included mechanisms of 
direct democracy carried over from earlier constitutions 
Institutional Design 
Citizen-based initiative and referendums 
Moderate signature requirements (25%) 
Parliament-based referendums 
 
Role of Political Elites Often seeking larger gains while working in a domain of loss 
 
 The Venezuelan case is less complicated by the very fact that there are fewer 
referendum examples. Nonetheless, the simplicity does not equal simple conclusions. 
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Indeed, the Venezuelan case is a fascinating case in which the ideas of direct democracy 
are clearly supported constitutionally – the letter of the law – but the spirit of the 
constitution (and later changes to it) suggest that direct democracy is not as supported as 
it first appears. In the 2000 consultative referendum, Chávez picked a small fight with 
organized labor over their leadership practices, and having the majority on his side, 
sought small gains (as prospect theory suggests) and was working within the confines of 
the institution created. Certainly, the ideas laid out in prospect theory/cybernetic theory 
also help to explain the rationale behind the decision to seek the 2004 recall vote against 
Chávez (facing a prospect of loss, groups sought large gains. A summary of findings 
from the Venezuelan case is presented in Table 4.2 below.  
 
Table 4.2: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes in Venezuela 
Key Variable Outcome 
Out-group presence at 
constitutional formation 
Indirect: Recent constitutions included mechanisms of 
direct democracy carried over from earlier constitutions 
Institutional Design 
Citizen-based initiative and referendums 
Moderate signature requirements (25%) 
Parliament-based referendums 
 
Role of Political Elites Often seeking larger gains while working in a domain of loss 
 
 The 2007 unsuccessful referendum vote, however, is the outlier. The theoretical 
approach outlined here does support the notion that Chávez would be working within the 
confines of the historical institutional design in seeking changes to the status quo. The 
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approach does not, however, explain why Chávez, not facing a domain of loss99, would 
seek to enact massive changes to the status-quo. Though Venezuela was suffering from 
crime issues as well as economic concerns (as discussed), neither suggest that Chávez 
was operating within the domain of possible loss. The remaining element to consider here 
is the cybernetic theory of decision-making, which suggests that the inputs the decision-
maker receives may change, but the reaction is based on the standards of the individual as 
well as the structure of the institution in which the decision-maker operates. To broadly 
consider the context, the standards of the individual idea reflects Chávez’s notion of 
“twenty-first century socialism”, and the structure of the institution allowed him the 
opportunity to proceed via the referendum.  
 However, if this fully explained the process, from start to finish, it would not 
similarly explain the 2000 referendum nor the 2009 referendum. In the latter case, 
Chávez was once again not facing a loss scenario, having won a majority in the recent 
elections, and chose to pare down the referendums and focus on the campaign as a whole 
-- and did so successfully. Thus, I argue here that the theoretical application applies with 
the exception of the 2007 referendum held by Chávez, insofar as the historical 
institutional design (HI1) and the tenets of prospect theory/cybernetic theory (PC1) 
condition the political elites (P1). However, the importance of the theoretical approach 
may also be better appreciated when one remembers that Chávez, in this outlier case of 
the 2007 referendums, was unsuccessful. Clearly, the purpose of this theoretical approach 
is not to gauge the degree of (or likelihood of success) but, the cases discussed thus far 
suggest that the prospect theory/cybernetic theory – when followed – is more likely to 
                                                          
99 To the degree that economics plays a role; oil prices (the main source of governmental revenue in 
Venezuela) were at record highs ($88.28 a barrel on Election Day, and would eventually climb to 
$140/barrel in 2008).  
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lead to success. Table 4.3 summarizes key findings related to both Uruguay and 
Venezuela.  
 
Table 4.3: Impact of Key Variables on Outcomes in Uruguay and Venezuela 
Key Variable Uruguay Venezuela 
Out-group presence at 
constitutional formation 
Indirect: Recent constitutions 
included mechanisms of direct 
democracy carried over from 
earlier constitutions 
Direct: Chavez-led reforms 
Institutional Design 
Citizen-based initiative and 
referendums 
 
Moderate signature 
requirements (25%) 
 
Moderate quorum 
requirements (35%) 
 
Parliament-based referendums 
Citizen-based initiative and 
referendum 
 
Low signature requirements 
(10-20%) 
 
Parliament-based referendums 
with majority vote 
 
President-initiated 
referendums 
 
Municipal-level referendums 
 
Recall referendum 
 
Moderate quorum 
requirements (20%) 
Role of Political Elites 
Often seeking larger gains 
while working in a domain of 
loss 
Often seeking smaller gains 
while operating in a domain of 
gain 
Frequency High Low 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
As discussed in the opening chapter of this dissertation, the overall purpose of this 
study is to examine broadly the role of individuals working within institutions, and more 
particularly, the influence of institutions on individuals. In so doing, the opening chapter 
discussed the prominent role that general scholarship has placed on individuals in the 
political arena, and that this role is at the general expense of the influence of institutions. 
That is, rational choice theory focuses on the choices individuals make to maximize 
utility under institutional constraints. Nonetheless, the independent role of institutions in 
shaping political outcomes cannot be overlooked, and this dissertation seeks to focus 
scholarship on where it is best suited: institutions. This concluding chapter identifies the 
importance of institutions by examining referendum politics across the four case studies 
examined in this dissertation, and at the same time, applies broadly the theoretical 
foundations discussed in the opening chapter.  
Discussion 
The main propositions in this study are that political outcomes are a function of 
institutional design, and further, that while political elites play a role in the eventual 
outcomes, that role is limited by institutional design on the one hand, and a combination 
of the factors associated with cybernetic theory/prospect theory on the other. The 
application of these presumptions to the case studies presented in this dissertation seems 
an odd set at first glance: politically, the four cases are quite different. Italy is centered on 
party-based governance with a relatively weak executive (insofar as the legitimacy of the 
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executive branch is based on the confidence of parliament), while France is a semi-
presidential system with relatively weak (though certainly not inchoate) party system. 
Uruguay can be described as a presidential system with two dominant parties operating 
throughout recent history (though this has evolved over the past decade), and Venezuela 
also exists as a presidential system, but with (in relation to the power of the presidency) 
weaker party system. However, the significant variation among these cases facilitates a 
better examination of the causal variables discussed in the opening chapter, and in 
particular, their influence on referendum outcomes.  
 To what degree do “out-groups” influence the introduction of direct democracy 
mechanisms into a given system? In the Italian case, a complete re-working of the 1948 
Constitution suggests that groups who were previously excluded from the political 
process were included. Provisions for the mechanisms were included, though clearly the 
focus was on a multiparty system in response to predominant anti-fascist fears. Indeed, 
the institution of direct democracy lay dormant until the majority party (in this case, 
Christian Democrats) believed it may become necessary to legitimize their desired 
policies through the device - twenty-two years later. In so doing, the Christian Democrats 
were ultimately unsuccessful, finding the unintended consequences of their actions to be 
less than favorable, and at the same time, offering the “gun behind the door” to other 
groups, who for the next several years (as the minority party) would also continue to fail 
via the referendum device. Ultimately, however, the late start that the Italians had with 
direct democracy did not preclude later usage, as the Italians utilize the referendum more 
than any other European country except for the Swiss (who, it seems, are in a league all 
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of their own100). Certainly, the context of the introduction helps to (though does not fully) 
explain the later usage: consistent with the anti-fascist fears, participatory democracy was 
the preferred route (though initially, the party-based system was the favored method). 
The lack of a strong executive that has greater control over referendum usage precludes 
limited use.  
In France, a long history of “top-down referendums” referendum availability led 
to the removal of the device in the 1870s, only to be reintroduced with the Fourth 
Republic in 1946 after compromises between de Gaulle and Christian Democrats. Insofar 
as de Gaulle (and future presidents) had considerably more control over when (and in 
what subject area) a referendum could be called, frequency as a function of the context in 
which the mechanism was first introduced can also be considered a causal variable. 
Indeed, de Gaulle’s stated purpose for the device (as discussed earlier) was to keep a line 
of communication open between the president and the people; this line, however, is 
unidirectional. De Gaulle, like other leaders, sought the referendum to legitimize his 
initial power, his policies, and, trusting the device perhaps a bit too far, ended his own 
political career as a function of the referendum.  
Interestingly, the Uruguayan case presents two interesting anomalies: first, that 
the referendum device was sought by the dominant force in politics at the time but was 
not introduced as a function of compromise; secondly, that Constitution of 1967 in large 
part retained the language regarding direct democracy from the earlier 1934 Constitution, 
which itself was derived as a function of general revolt: while President Terra dissolved 
                                                          
100 From 1848-2013, the Swiss have utilized the referendum device 589 times (C2D) at the federal level, 
with “thousands more occurring at the cantonal level, hundreds of thousands at the municipal level” 
(Kaufman and Waters 2004:118). By comparison, the closest user of direct democracy in Europe is Italy, 
conducting 72 votes on referendums in the same period.  
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Parliament with the support of the Blancos, the new Constitution was generally 
considered to be a function of majority interests. Thus, retaining the language (regardless 
of the position of out-groups related to the 1967 Constitution) suggests that Uruguayan 
“out-groups” were not the primary basis for the inclusion of direct democracy. 
Nonetheless, Uruguayans utilize direct democracy more commonly than other Latin 
American systems. Importantly for the purposes of this study, then, is the discovery made 
by this examination: out-group participation is more likely to result in the introduction of 
direct democracy into a given state, but it is not absolutely necessary.  
 Finally, in the Venezuelan case, Chávez could certainly be considered 
“previously excluded interests” – or, “out-groups” – and as the constitutional design 
admits, the institution of direct democracy exists.  The core constituency supporting 
Chávez was a previously excluded out-group, and was represented quite heavily in the 
Assembly that drafted the Constitution, which ultimately included expansive options for 
direct democracy.  Thus, the case of Venezuela fits the expectation of the theoretical 
approach outlined here regarding C1. Like de Gaulle, Chávez did not view multiple 
political parties as a path to political efficiency, though ultimately for different 
ideological reasons. Chávez also viewed the institution of direct democracy as a line of 
communication to the people, and while Chávez argued for the lines of communication to 
be bidirectional, the reality has been (to this point) that the line of communication has 
remained unidirectional (with the exception of the 2004 recall vote). Scholars may get a 
better frame of reference as we look to Venezuela in the post- Chávez era (though, 
Chávez’s Vice-President, Nicolas Maduro has taken the reins, which suggests minor 
changes to the status-quo). The cases presented here are too few to suggest that a lack of 
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multiple parties is a causal variable affecting referendum outcomes; however, insofar as 
the both of the actors here actively focused on reducing the role of parties in the system, 
and both cases show fewer referendums, a possible connection can certainly be 
considered.  
Thus, support for the notion that institutions of direct democracy require “out-
group” inclusion for the introduction into a particular constitution is supported but not 
evident in each case. More generally, the idea that the power of the people to choose – 
and the institution of direct democracy itself – was clearly a concern for all cases: for the 
Italians, a method to collectively resolve differences; for the French, this was viewed as a 
concern¸ rather than a problem to solve.  De Gaulle, arguing from the position that parties 
were more destructive than constructive, sought to limit the institution of direct 
democracy as much as possible. Again, concern on the part of Gabriel Terra (also about 
the role of parties) led to the introduction of direct democracy in Uruguay, and in 
Venezuela, Chávez sought to weaken the power of minority parties at the expense of 
executive power, and at the same time, introduced the institution of direct democracy, 
ostensibly to give the “veto” to the power of the people. Thus, the Italians - seeking 
greater party inclusion - are the eventual outlier, and it should be noted, also utilize the 
referendum process considerably more frequently than any of the other cases discussed 
here. In all cases, however, the importance of historical institutionalism is evident: 
“policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is being 
initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into 
the future” (Peters 1999).  
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As discussed in the opening chapter, accounting for change within historical 
institutionalism is generally thought of in terms of punctuated equilibria (Krasner 1984); 
this study, however, argues that new institutionalism is compatible with historical 
institutionalism. In this sense, then, this study seeks to avoid the independent/dependent 
variable confusion often associated with institutionalism and that same time explain 
change: as Thelen and Steinmo (1992), argue, institutional dynamism can appropriately 
explain change, of which there are four sources: first, broad changes in the 
socioeconomic  or political context can produce a situation in which previously latent 
institutions suddenly become salient, with implications for political outcomes; secondly, 
changes in socioeconomic or political balance of power can produce a situation in which 
old institutions are put in service of different ends, as new actors come into play who 
pursue their new goals through existing institutions; third, exogenous changes can 
produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions: 
changes in outcomes as old actors adopt new goals within the old institutions; and finally, 
political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in the institutions 
themselves. 
Thus, the institutions discussed (the institution of direct democracy) are thus 
mediated by the broader political context (in line with the theoretical approaches of 
Thelen and Steinmo). Christian Democrats in Italy sought to utilize the referendum after 
keeping it dormant for decades is in line with the idea that broad changes in the political 
context produces a situation where previously latent institutions became salient (in this 
case, the broader change could be conceived of as the threat to long-standing societal 
values). Later usage by minority parties (as discussed here) could certainly be 
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characterized as a function of exogenous changes that produce a shift in goals or 
strategies being pursued within existing institutions.  De Gaulle’s acceptance of the 
institution (and later reluctance to use) could be characterized in much the same way (and 
of course, could also be explained by exogenous changes that produce a shift in the goals 
or strategies). The Venezuelan case also fits within the broader theoretical outlines 
presented here, insofar as the changes in the socioeconomic or political balance of 
power101  produces a situation in which old institutions are put is service of different ends 
– clearly, Chavez understood the institution of direct democracy, and its effect on the 
participatory aspect of his version of democracy.  
Institutional Design 
Taken on its own, institutional design is a significant explanatory factor in the 
overall usage of direct democracy. Italy has the most expansive opportunities for direct 
democracy (both from the bottom-up and top-down), as well as relatively low petition 
requirements (500,000 registered voters). The only significant roadblock in the Italian 
system of direct democracy is the quorum requirement102 (the 50% requirement exceeds 
all other countries) but this affects outcomes, not usage. It is not surprising then, that 
Italians utilize direct democracy more so than the other three cases considered here. At 
the same time, Uruguayan voters also have the ability to petition for referendums, though 
                                                          
101 Though the “political balance of power” referenced here is apparent, the socioeconomic conditions play 
a significant role here as well: between 1990 and 1997, Venezuelans saw dramatic decreases in per capita 
income as well as increases in income inequalities, unemployment, and poverty rates; certainly, falling oil 
prices (especially in 1986 and 1988) left Venezuela vulnerable to internal strife and open to later neoliberal 
restructuring programs. Such policies “sparked off the greatest public disorders seen in modern Venezuelan 
history”, known as the caracazo  - the first of many disturbances, and the basis of the coup attempt by 
Chávez. As Canon (2009:37) argues, these events “cleared the way for the emergence of Chavez as a 
political force in the country”.  
102 Italians may only repeal existing laws – they may not propose new laws. Certainly, this could be viewed 
as a “roadblock” as well, however, the absence of citizen-initiated proposals precludes speculation and 
calculation.  
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twenty-five percent of the electorate must agree103. Uruguayans utilize this opportunity 
extensively, though not as commonly as Italians. Though Venezuelans also have the 
ability to initiate referendums, with signature requirements ranging from ten to twenty-
five percent, they have utilized this opportunity only once since 1999. Of the four cases 
presented here, only France does not allow citizen-initiated referendums, and it comes as 
little surprise that usage in France lags104 behind the other three cases in terms of 
frequency. However, institutional design is not in and of itself a singular predictor of 
outcomes: if it were, the expectation is that Venezuelans would utilize citizen-initiatives 
more frequently than they have (even considering the shorter time frame) in comparison 
to both Uruguayans and Italians. Thus, institutional design cannot be isolated as the 
single causal variable accounting for usage or non-usage in systems that allow citizen-
initiatives.  
The Role of Political Elites 
Though this is a study of the importance of institutions, the role and influence of 
individuals must be fully considered. This dissertation argues that referendum usage is 
influenced by individuals (political elites) but such individuals are constrained by 
historical institutional design as well as the tenets of prospect theory/cybernetic theory of 
decision-making. The Italian divorce referendum in 1974 finds each of these concepts at 
work: when the ruling Christian Democrats were unable to stop the passage of the 
divorce law through Parliament, they turned to the last remaining institution: the 
referendum. Lying dormant since the inception of the Constitution in 1946, the DC were 
                                                          
103 Uruguayans may propose new laws or seek the repeal of existing laws; in the latter case, the referendum 
seeking repeal must occur within one year of passage of the original legislation.  
104 Usage in this sense is limited to the referendums utilized under the most recent Constitution (in each 
case).  
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able to bring about its usage in what they saw as an effort to unite the wishes of the 
majority of Italian voters,  under the standards set by the Church. Certainly operating 
within the domain of loss, the referendum choice sought greater rewards105.  
 The majority of referendum usage in Italy after the divorce referendum saw the 
Radical Party at work (and occasionally the Communist Party) throughout the 1970s and 
the early 1980s. Though the minor parties here succeeded in weakening the political 
hegemony that was the DC, they were ultimately unsuccessful at attempting to abolish 
life imprisonment, outlawing private guns, curbing police powers, and reducing salaries 
in an effort to combat inflation. Viewed from the prospective of the initiator, such 
instances suggest the historical institutional design is a major factor. But perhaps more 
importantly, concern brought up in the first chapter is exemplified here: what happens 
when neither “loss” nor “gain” properly frames the scenario? In such case, the theoretical 
approach argued that the cybernetic theory may best explain the decision-making 
process: certainly, the systems-level output could be argued to be in accordance with the 
set standards of the referendum initiators; they were seeking no other gains than those 
sought (such instances were not designed to test the strength of the ruling party).  
 The major reforms sought by the 1993 referendums in Italy suggest that 
unintended consequences are a threat: seeking to expand on recent gains (the 1991 
referendum efforts to reduce corruption via voting methods), Mario Segni formed the 
Populars for the Reform movement, and sought additional gains via electoral reform. 
Interestingly, though, the reforms resulted in the reduction of the minority influence in 
Parliament, which would later cost Segni the very power he sought. Nonetheless, the role 
                                                          
105 It should be noted that Weyland argues that elites in a dire situation will be more likely to risk a 
proposition that has a “lower expected value”; the degree to which the DC perceived this option as having a 
“lower expected value” is unclear.  
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of historical institutional design as well as that of political elites working within the 
constraints imposed upon them is once again reflected here. As discussed in chapter 
three, the role of political elites is important, and as suggested by the theoretical 
foundations outlined in this dissertation, individuals are in large part constrained by the 
institutions in which they operate, but also by the tenets of the decision-making tenets of 
prospect theory/cybernetic theory.  
 The Uruguayan case is in many ways similar to the Italian case. Though the 
context in which the mechanism of direct democracy was first introduced does not fully 
fit with the expectations discussed in this dissertation, its usage by out-groups fits the 
general pattern. Many of the referendum cases in Uruguay were a function of out-groups 
seeking fundamental change through established institutions. Like the Italians, 
Uruguayans groups that utilized the referendums were working within a sort of “bounded 
rationality”, and primarily interested in altering the status-quo by seeking significant 
gains via the referendum device.   
 Though referendum cases in France are far fewer, the theoretical approach 
discussed here explains the process in an informative manner. De Gaulle viewed the 
referendum device as a method through which he could seek the approval of the populace 
directly; this, essentially, was a method to silence parties rather than seek their collective 
approval. The use of the referendum by de Gaulle in each of the cases presented in 
chapter three also suggest that the historical context creates a limitation on usage, but that 
individual usage is dependent upon the individual: in de Gaulle’s case, the choice was 
based in large part on his desire to legitimate the power of the presidency (and the 
executive institution more generally – and more longitudinally) over the factionalism of 
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parties. As was shown in chapter three, prospect theory is highly instructive towards 
understanding de Gaulle’s motivations.  
 As suggested earlier in this chapter, the Venezuelan case is in many ways similar 
to the French case, insofar as historical institutional design played a significant role in 
future outcomes. In both cases, outcomes were fewer; though interestingly, a remaining 
question must still be addressed: if Venezuelans had the opportunity for citizen-initiated 
referendums (where France did not) what accounts for the lack of use (from the “bottom-
up”) in Venezuela? Citizen-initiated referendum usage is high in Italy and Uruguay, but 
low in Venezuela, yet all three systems have the device available to them. Though the 
data presented in this dissertation are not designed to answer this question (and thus, this 
question should be addressed by future studies), some speculation is possible: first, 
Venezuelans have only had the option of referendum available to them for thirteen years, 
while Uruguayans have had the option available since the 1930s. Perhaps it is simply a 
matter of time: the Italians did not use the device available to them for decades after its 
introduction. Secondly, differences in party systems exist between three systems: a much 
stronger party system, to be exact. Many of the referendum cases discussed here are 
instances in which parties are seeking to legitimate preferences through voter approval; 
fewer (and weaker) parties suggest the outcome as a function of party cleavages would 
also reduce. Finally, (and certainly an object for future study) is the role of Chávez as a 
unitary leader. In other words, to what degree did Chávez “co-opt” the ideas of the 
populace and instead turn the ideas from “bottom-up” to “top-down”? While scholarly 
research does suggest that “Chávezismo” is centered on apparent rather than actual 
democratic procedures, research does not suggest that Chávez in some fashion worked to 
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avoid a “bottom-up” approach from developing. Thus, a question remains for future 
study. These conclusions are summarized in Table 5 below.  
Limitations of Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
 Though the theoretical framework developed here has considerable explanatory 
power (likely a function of its breadth), significant limitations exist both within this work 
and within the literature more generally, and such limitation could be addressed in future 
work. I begin with an overview of the lacunae present in the literature, and then address 
the shortcomings within this study, and offer some possible avenues for future research.  
The depth of (or more specifically, the lack thereof) research in this area is on one 
level disconcerting, but on another level inviting, insofar as this subfield deserves and 
(unlike many other subfields) can handle additional research into the causes and 
outcomes of measures of direct democracy. The most glaring problem with the literature 
is the quality of research. First and foremost, few studies properly define the range of 
measures of direct democracy available. With Latin America, as within Europe, 
significant differences exist within referendum politics: they may be initiated by the 
executive, by the legislature, or by the people; they may be facultative, obligatory, or 
consultative; they may focus on general social policy or on governmental policy; 
differences in turnout requirements for different countries exist before the measure can be 
considered binding; and in still other countries, the likelihood that the measure will 
actually be carried out is in question. Each of these factors makes a difference in 
research; as such, a definitive index should be designed such that these factors are 
considered. A ranking could be based on the availability, type, usage, frequency, and 
compliance with outcomes.  
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Table 5: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes across Cases 
Key Variable Italy France Uruguay Venezuela 
Out-group 
presence at 
constitutional 
formation 
Direct: Strong 
parliamentary 
system created in 
reaction to fascist 
regime 
Direct: Semi-
presidential system 
created in reaction 
to weak parties 
Indirect: Recent 
constitutions 
included 
mechanisms of 
direct democracy 
carried over from 
earlier constitutions 
Direct: Chavez-
led reforms 
Governance 
Parliamentary 
(strong multi-
party) 
Semi-presidential 
system (weak 
multi-party) 
Presidential system 
(strong multi-party, 
though long 
dominated by two 
parties) 
Presidential 
system (weak 
multi-party) 
Institutional 
Design 
Top-down 
referendums 
Citizen-led 
initiatives with low 
signature 
requirements 
Low signature 
requirements 
50% quorum 
requirement 
Top-down 
approach 
(president can 
submit directly to 
the people, or 
submit to 
Parliament) 
No quorum 
requirements 
Citizen-based 
initiative and 
referendums 
 
Moderate signature 
requirements (25%) 
 
Moderate quorum 
requirements (35%) 
 
Parliament-based 
referendums 
President, 
Parliament, and 
Citizen-based 
initiative and 
referendum 
 
Low signature 
requirements (10-
20%) 
 
Recall 
referendum 
 
Moderate 
quorum 
requirements 
(20%) 
Role of Political 
Elites 
Often seeking 
smaller gains while 
operating in a 
domain of gain 
Often seeking 
smaller gains 
while operating in 
a domain of gain 
Often seeking larger 
gains while working 
in a domain of loss 
Often seeking 
smaller gains 
while operating 
in a domain of 
gain 
Frequency High Low High Low 
Support for 
Hypotheses Yes Yes Inconclusive Yes 
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The depth of (or more specifically, the lack thereof) research in this area is on one 
level disconcerting, but on another level inviting, insofar as this subfield deserves and 
(unlike many other subfields) can handle additional research into the causes and 
outcomes of measures of direct democracy. The most glaring problem with the literature 
is the quality of research. First and foremost, few studies properly define the range of 
measures of direct democracy available. With Latin America, as within Europe, 
significant differences exist within referendum politics: they may be initiated by the 
executive, by the legislature, or by the people; they may be facultative, obligatory, or 
consultative; they may focus on general social policy or on governmental policy; 
differences in turnout requirements for different countries exist before the measure can be 
considered binding; and in still other countries, the likelihood that the measure will 
actually be carried out is in question. Each of these factors makes a difference in 
research; as such, a definitive index should be designed such that these factors are 
considered. A ranking could be based on the availability, type, usage, frequency, and 
compliance with outcomes.  
Moreover, the research designs themselves are often problematic. As discussed 
throughout the literature review in this dissertation, very few works related to direct 
democracy consider the context in which the institution was first introduced. Such an 
examination is critical. Within the context of direct democracy, research is primarily 
focused on the theoretical side (the degree to which direct democracy is compatible or 
incompatible with representative democracy) or the outcomes side (the effects of actors, 
campaigns, or actions of voters). Both of these are important questions, but without the 
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larger theoretical approach that considers the limitations of those actors as a function of 
historical design, each of these questions lacks structural support.    
This particular work focused largely on theory-building and its application to the 
cases. Such an effort in theory building naturally raises questions. First, the theoretical 
approach designed here applies quite well to the cases discussed. Such an approach, 
however, to have elements of validity and reliability, should be expanded to other cases. 
Secondly, the theoretical approach described here is quite broad, leading to concerns over 
falsifiability. While it can be argued that falsifiability is present (insofar as the context of 
the times in which the institution is designed “suggests” its future usage, and the opposite 
is not the case), significantly more cases should be examined as well.  
 Though the cases presented did support the explanatory power of the model, a 
much more detailed case study is in order in an effort to determine the extent of the 
explanatory power. Such a study could also focus on the seemingly inherent tension 
between the level of democracy and the institution of direct democracy. That is, the 
uniqueness of Latin America, when compared to other regions of the world where 
democracy is widely used (e.g., the United States and Europe) is that there are, still today, 
varying levels of consolidated democracy, both in terms of substance but also in terms of 
longevity. The rub here, of course, is the populism (or, neopopulism) aspect of the 
equation: to what degree do populist revolts that result in leadership further result in the 
use of direct democracy? Insofar as direct democracy itself has long been considered a 
tool of populist movements and ideology, one would expect such a measure to be used. 
However, the role of populism must be further explored; the left-right continuum does 
not exclude populism. On the other side of this equation, are measures of direct 
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democracy more likely to be used in consolidated democracies, and if so, for what 
purpose, and on what basis? Such a study would require an in-depth case study of various 
regimes within Latin America, but would be fruitful insofar as the framework applied 
here discredits the notion that individuals (in a rational choice/microfoundational 
perspective) are largely responsible for political outcomes, instead favoring institutions 
and the constraints they present to actors.  
The present theoretical application could be expanded in an effort to evaluate 
questions more commonly associated with referendum politics. Though certainly not 
inclusive, the cases discussed in the literature review of this dissertation help to support 
the argument. In cases across Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America, the 
recurring feature was that the context in which the constitution was created has 
implications for later usage; just as importantly was the finding political elites were 
constrained those institutions and were limited in the options they could pursue.   
Nonetheless, further questions remain. For example, to what degree are referendums, 
especially complicated referendums in areas of low-educated voters, simply a vote of 
confidence of the party in power? Moreover, to what degree do the party systems control 
the use of direct democracy measures and influence outcomes? Are they more or less 
likely to occur in presidential systems? Are they more likely to occur in areas where 
“democracy” is considered to be more consolidated? What about the relationship between 
perceived party efficacy and direct democracy? If the legislature is unable to facilitate the 
decisions before them, does that make direct democracy more attractive? In other words, 
what is the relationship between the deliverance of collective goods via the traditional 
institutions versus the referendum? The other institution that receives limited attention in 
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the literature are the courts: do executives in either presidential or parliamentary systems 
seek different outcomes via the referendum if the power of the Courts are considered to 
be stronger? What about when they are weaker? Politics is politics: there’s always a “gun 
behind a door” with another door and another gun somewhere nearby. Insofar as the 
theoretical foundations developed here are applicable to any political system (assuming a 
constitution was drafted at some point, that direct democracy exists in some form, and 
that political elites are capable of manipulating direct democracy procedures), the 
inclusion of other cases would help to further our understanding of the relationship 
between institutions and individuals.  
Conclusion 
 This dissertation is now complete. The study presented here represents small steps 
in terms of developing an applicable theoretical framework to the complex and 
unorganized study of direct democracy. The subfield has implications for the discipline, 
as measures of direct democracy, their usage, frequency, and the role of elites in the 
process answers questions related to the bigger question of how far a particular state has 
come in terms of democratic consolidation (a seemingly ubiquitous question in the 
literature).  As was stated in the opening chapter, the benefits of this study included 
understanding the importance of historical institutionalism (and the degree to which it is 
compatible with new institutionalism), which has been shown across the cases. In 
addition, a general purpose of this study was to show the importance of institutions, and 
how they constrain the role of political elites. Though I have argued here that the role of 
individuals has been given considerable attention throughout the literature, that is not to 
say that other scholars have neglected the role of institutions (clearly, this would be 
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difficult to do!). However, it is to say that, in my opinion, every study must consider the 
role of institutions, and in particular, the context of the time in which it was created. Such 
an examination (as shown here) may have tremendous power in explaining later 
outcomes. Certainly, such an approach may defy the parsimony and elegance sought by 
researchers, but with a clear theoretical approach, such elegance may simply be 
redefined, rather than replaced.  
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APPENDIX A: DIRECT DEMOCRACY CASES IN ITALY   
 
Date Title Result (%) 
Turnout 
(%) 
6/2/1946 Form of Government 54.27 89.1 
5/13/1974 Abrogation of divorce law 40.74 87.72 
6/12/1978 Abrogation of financial support of the parties by government 43.6 81.2 
6/12/1978 Abrogation of legislation on law and public order 23.54 81.2 
5/18/1981 Abrogation of life imprisonment 22.6 79.43  
5/18/1981 Suspension of the Police Chiefs and Prefects competence to grant firearm licenses 
14.1 
 
79.42 
 
5/18/1981 
Abrogation of the Law on urgent provisions for 
the protection of democratic order and public 
security 
 
14.88 79.38 
5/18/1981 Legalizing abortion  11.58 79.41 
5/18/1981 Amending the law on abortion  32.00 79.41 
6/10/1985 
 
 
Abrogation of urgent measures for fees fixed 
prices and living costs 
 
 
79.71 65.12 
11/9/1987 
 
Abrogation of the parliamentary commission for 
investigations against government members 
 
45.68 77.85 
 
11/9/1987 
 
 
Abrogation of ENEL contributions to nuclear 
reactors 
 
 
32.00 
 
79.43 
11/9/1987 
Abrogation of civil responsibility of courts for 
intentional misjudgments 
 
11.58 79.41 
11/9/1987 
Abrogation of the choice of locations for nuclear 
reactors by the CIPE government panel 
 
14.88 79.38 
11/9/1987 Abrogation of State subsidies for municipalities with coal or nuclear power plants 14.08 79.42 
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11/9/1987 
Assignment of the European Parliament to 
elaborate a European Constitution 
 
22.63 79.43 
6/4/1990 Abrogation of the permission to trespass private property while hunting 49.58 91.52 
6/4/1990 Prohibition of the use of pesticides in agriculture 30.2 85.58 
6/4/1990 Abrogation of the hunting laws 30.15 74.06 
6/4/1990 Abrogation of the four preference votes in parliamentary elections 30.29 71.69 
6/10/1991 Abolition of the Treasury's right to appoint the board of directors of public banks 30.15 83.55 
4/19/1993 Abrogation of the Ministry for State Investments 30.05 66.85 
4/19/1993 Abrogation of proportional representation in the Senate 30.21 80.9 
4/19/1993 Abrogation of the Ministry for Tourism and Entertainment 30.04 65.52 
4/19/1993 Abrogation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 57.36 64.68 
4/19/1993 Abrogation of communal responsibility for environmental protection 57.22 49.97 
4/19/1993 Legalizing the consumption of drugs 57.25 63.68 
4/19/1993 Suspension of financial support from the government for political parties 58.07 43.59 
4/19/1993 
Abrogation of the Prime Minister's powers in 
matters pertaining to the representation of labor 
unions 
57.24 35.63 
6/11/1995 Complete reorganization of the administrative councils 57.27 56.24 
6/11/1995 Restricting house arrest for Mafiosi to their proper residence 57.4 49.4 
6/11/1995 Abrogation of the right to advertise on more than three channels 57.34 37.4 
6/11/1995 Abrogation of municipal powers regarding trade licenses 58.06 43.07 
6/11/1995 Abrogation of direct deduction of contributions to labor unions from salaries and pensions 58.12 44.34 
6/11/1995 Abrogation of elections in two rounds for municipalities of over 15 000 inhabitants 57.17 62.14 
6/11/1995 Abrogation of regional competences regarding shop opening hours 57.38 54.9 
6/11/1995 Abrogation of the law limiting the possession of 76.87 89.8 
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television channels by private individuals to 3 
6/11/1995 Abrogation of advertising interrupting television programs 76.86 90.11 
6/11/1995 Partial reorganization of the administrative councils 77.01 82.74 
 
6/11/1995 
 
Abrogation of the restriction of state concessions 
to public television stations 
 
76.88 
 
82.28 
6/11/1995 Abrogation of the right to additional  extra-judicial professions for members of the Judiciary 76.88 70.23 
6/15/1997 Ending the Treasury's majority of shares (Golden Share) in privatized businesses 76.85 82.57 
6/15/1997 Abrogation of admission restrictions to civilian service 76.98 55.36 
6/15/1997 Abrogation of the automatic promotion of civil servants 76.95 90.25 
6/15/1997 Abrogation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery 62.5 95.57 
6/15/1997 Abrogation of the right to trespass private property when hunting 42.92 92.28 
6/15/1997 Abrogation of the Association of Journalists 43.12 93.51 
6/15/1997 
Abrogation of the election of 25% of the 
parliament in relation to proportional 
representation 
43.36 92.2 
4/18/1999 Abrogation of the permission to trespass private property while hunting 49.58 91.52 
5/21/2000 Abrogation of civil servants right to have a second gainful employment 23.49 77.63 
5/21/2000 Abrogation of the proportional method of 25% in the attribution of the seats of Parliament 23.52 77.68 
5/21/2000 Abrogation of the reimbursement of costs for referendum and electoral campaigns 24.02 87 
 
5/21/2000 
 
Abrogation of automatic salary deduction for 
trade unions and worker associations 
 
34.1 
 
81.62 
5/21/2000 
Abrogation of the electoral system concerning 
the composition of the Consiglio Superiore Della 
Magistratura 
52.46 38.71 
5/21/2000 Abrogation of career link possibility between Prosecutor and Judge 25.66 88.03 
5/21/2000 
Abrogation of the norms restricting protection 
against unjustified dismissals in enterprises with 
more than 15 employees 
25.66 88.78 
10/7/2001 Amendment of Title V  second Part of the 25.65 87.73 
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Constitution concerning Regionalization 
6/15/2003 Abrogation of the obligation for estate owners to tolerate road rights for circuit lines 25.63 77.38 
6/15/2003 
Abrogation of the restriction on protection 
against unjustified dismissals to enterprises with 
more than 15 employees 
25.56 85.55 
6/13/2005 Abolition of the restrictions on embryonic research 25.52 86.74 
6/13/2005 Abolition of restrictions on embryonic implantation 34.05 64.21 
6/13/2005 
Abolition of the restrictions on embryonic 
implantation and of the recognition of the 
embryo as participant 
31.99 75.22 
6/13/2005 Abolition of the prohibition of heterologous fertilization 32.44 82.02 
6/26/2006 Constitutional reform 32.19 71.06 
10/10/2007 Social security reform 32.2 61.82 
6/22/2009 Abolition of combined lists for the elections of the House of Representatives 31.86 70.57 
6/22/2009 Abolition of combined lists for the elections of the Senate 31.96 69 
6/22/2009 Abolition of multiple candidacy for the elections of the House of Representatives 32.51 33.36 
6/13/2011 Abolition of the partial privatization of the water supply 95.3 54.82 
6/13/2011 Abolition of privatized profits from the water supply 95.8 54.83 
6/13/2011 Abolition of the planning and the construction of new nuclear power plants 93.82 54.59 
6/13/2011 Abolition of the duty of the holders of top state offices to appear before court 94.62 54.78 
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APPENDIX B: DIRECT DEMOCRACY CASES IN FRANCE 
 
Date Title Result (%) 
Turnout 
(%) 
9/28/1958 Adopt New Constitution 85.15 80.48 
1/8/1961 Algerian Self-Government 74.99 73.76 
4/8/1962 The Evian Treaties 90.81 75.34 
10/28/1962 Direct election of the president 62.25 76.97 
4/27/1969 Regional Reforms and Reforms of the Senate 47.6 80.13 
4/23/1972 Enlargement of the European Community 68.32 60.24 
11/6/1988 Self-determination for New Caledonia 80.00 36.89 
9/24/2000 Reduction in presidential term of office 73.21 30.19 
5/29/2005 Adoption of the European Constitution 45.33 69.37 
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APPENDIX C: DIRECT DEMOCRACY CASES IN URUGUAY 
 
Date Title Result (%) Turnout (%) 
4/19/1934 New Constitution 96% NA 
3/27/1938 Constitutional Reform 52.47 NA 
3/27/1938 Constitutional Reform 93.45 NA 
11/29/1942 New Constitution 77.17 NA 
11/24/1946 Constitutional Reform 43.15 67.43 
12/16/1951 Constitution 54.00 NA 
11/30/1958 Constitutional Reform 76.00  72.38 
11/30/1980 New Constitution 41.8 86.87 
12/13/1992 Abolition of Law on Public Enterprises 66.6 82.80 
8/28/1998 Electoral Reform 28.41 86.24 
12/8/1996 Electoral Reform 50.45 85.90 
10/31/1999 Financial Autonomy to Judiciary 43.09 91.78 
10/31/2004 No privatization of water supply 64.61 89.62 
10/25/2009 Voting Rights for Citizens Abroad 37.42 89.91 
10/25/2009 Amnesty Provisions 47.98 89.91 
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APPENDIX D: DIRECT DEMOCRACY CASES IN VENEZUELA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Title Result (%) 
Turnout 
(%) 
12/15/1999 Mandatory Constitutional Referendum 71.78 44.05 
04/25/1999 
Approval of the presidential decree 
concerning the convening of the 
constitutional convention 
86.5 37.37 
04/25/1999 Convening a Constitutional Convention 92.36 37.47 
12/03/2000 Suspension of Trade Union Leadership for 180 Days (consultative) 69.4 23.5 
08/15/2004 Recall by the people 40.75 69.97 
12/02/2007 Constitutional Reform (Block A) 48.99 56.16  
12/02/2007 Constitutional Reform (Block B) 49.35 56.16  
02/15/2009 Unlimited reelection of the president 54.87 NA 
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